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Abstract 
The goals of this dissertation are two-fold. First is to investigate and explain the key 
variables responsible for the process whereby political parties form alliances with or create 
terrorist organizations. Second is to fill an important gap in the literature by offering a more 
precise conceptualization of the issues and a different theoretical view. Extant literature argues 
that institutional structural constraints, such as electoral systems, are more likely to lead political 
parties to create terrorist organizations. However, this dissertation hypothesizes that regime 
ideology is also an important factor explaining the creation of terrorist organizations by political 
parties regardless of structural institutional constraints. This dissertation seeks to illuminate 
existing fears and concerns about alliances between terrorist groups and political parties in states 
whose ruling party platform is based on leftist, rightist, centrist, or religious ideology.  Using 
empirical methods, which includes both quantitative and case study approaches, this dissertation 
intends to show that particular kinds of party ideology is positively correlated with the formation 
of terrorist organizations even after controlling for institutional structural constraints. The 
implication of these findings is important for policymakers eager to create stable polities.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
 
“The terrorist seems to have a rather intimate understanding of our system” 
Inspector Dominic, V for Vendetta 
1.1 The Question 
Studies of terrorism have evolved since the 1960s when the form of violence emerged as 
a significant feature of domestic and international political life (Chalk 1998; Crenshaw 2000).  
Terrorism has recently been thrust once more into the consciousness of citizens across the globe. 
A large number of books and articles have been published in the last decade that attempt to 
explain the causes of terrorism.  As a result of sensational terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the 
Madrid train bombings, and the London attacks, most scholars have focused on a few well-
known international terror networks such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA), and Hamas or on other issues such as bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings.  While the 
aforementioned themes are cogent to the overall discussion of terrorism, what is missing in the 
extant literature on terrorism is why several well-known terror groups, such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas, originated from political parties.  
Within the past forty years, various scholars and policymakers have noted an increase in 
the use of violence by quasi-political organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Pape 2003; 
O’Brien 1996; Cronin 2002). The literature illustrates that there has been a concerted effort by 
scholars and policymakers to understand the nexus between political parties and their use of 
terror (Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).  
The guiding principle behind this emerging research program is the belief that terrorism 
remains a useful tool for some political parties. Terrorism is seen as a relatively inexpensive way 
 2 
of making a statement before a broad audience (Vittori 2009, 445). Extant literature thus 
suggests that political parties and terrorist organizations sometimes form alliances to achieve 
organizational objectives (Crenshaw 1981; Hamilton 1978; Ranstorp 1996; Ross 1993; Vittori 
2009; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). While conceptually terrorist groups and 
political parties may appear to contrast, they often share many of the same goals, which make 
cooperation between the two possible (Weinberg 1991).  
Weinberg (1991), and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) found that, in many cases, political 
parties create terrorist wings or organization to advance their causes. Conversely, in a few cases, 
terrorist organizations have moved in the opposite direction and created bona fide political 
parties1, such occurrences are minimal and even disputed by a number of observers (Weinberg 
and Pedahzur 2003, 57). Despite numerous documented cases where terrorist groups and 
political parties have coalesced, scholarly research on the issue remains surprisingly minimal.2
 
 In 
general, what scholars have failed to explain is why a political party would resort to terror even 
within democracies where there is an institutionally peaceful outlet to express grievances. 
Furthermore, extant literature fails to provide even minimal answers to the important question of 
whether a ruling regime’s political ideology functions as a catalyst for terrorism.  
1.2 The Argument 
Terrorism is a relatively inexpensive mechanism of making a statement before a broad 
audience (Vittori 2009). Any thorough analysis of terrorism must start with the recognition that 
                                                 
1 Among the terrorist groups to form political parties are the National Military Organization (IRGUN), the Stern 
Gang (in Israel) and Lebanese Amal in Lebanon. See Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003).    
2 Among the documented cases are the Colombian Communist Party and the FARC in Colombia, Batasuna and ETA 
in Spain, and Sinn Fein and the IRA in Northern Ireland. 
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terrorism appears in various forms (Sprinzak 1991). Invariably, scholars recognize two broad 
types of terrorism, “old terrorism” and “new terrorism” which provide a way to explain the 
evident change in modes of operation, ideological motivation, and the intensity of attacks seen 
within the last twenty years (Laqueur 1999, 2000; Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006). Furthermore, 
variations of “culture, historical experiences, religious traditions, governments opposed and 
involvement of outside forces all make for plurality and multiplicity of terrorist action” 
(Sprinzak 1991, 51).  At the core of most discussions about recourse to terror by groups, is the 
question of how once peaceful political organizations become radicalized to the point that they 
turn to violent methods.  As the following chapters show, very few terrorist organizations were 
initially created to pursue terrorism (Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg 1991). Most modern political 
organizations that have evolved into terrorist organizations came about through a gradual process 
of radicalization (Crenshaw 2000). As Sprinzak (1991, 51) notes, “unprovoked people do not 
become brutal killers in the service of politics until they have experienced weaker methods of 
opposition and engaged in less intense forms of political action.” The use of terror is, therefore, 
not a decision that political organizations are eager to make but, rather, one that is utilized when 
other approaches seem useless or when they are unable to achieve organizational objectives 
through peaceful means.    
Extant literature is divided on what conditions produces terrorism and more so on what 
factors explain political parties’ turn to terror (Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). 
The literature also shows that political parties turn to terror as a mechanism for achieving their 
goals. In general, the research program investigating the link between political parties and terror 
organizations has failed to examine the domain in which political parties that create terror 
organizations function. Moreover, minimal attention has been paid to how available political 
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space influences a party’s organizational objectives, which may have a critical impact on 
decisions to turn to terror.  Instead, existing literature has focused on the outcomes--the terror 
group itself (Abrahms 2006; Bapat 2007; Harik 2004) -- or marginal issues such as the terror 
group’s political typology (Juergensmeyer 2003; Schmid and Jongman et.al 1988; Reich et al 
1990).  
The main argument of this study is that the ruling political party’s ideology produces 
institutional and organizational constraints for oppositional parties that account for the 
willingness of political organizations to engage in violent struggle rather than engage in peaceful, 
bona fide political processes. In other words, the nature of a ruling government ideology and the 
prevailing electoral system contribute greatly to how, when, and why some political parties 
create terrorist organizations. A common ideology is a critical factor for group mobilization. 
Simply stated, “an ideology is the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives--however ill-defined 
or tenuous-- by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims” (Drake 1998, 
53). The purpose of this dissertation is thus to investigate the role of political ideology in 
explaining the process by which political parties form alliances with or create terrorist 
organizations.  
1.3 Competing Explanations and Significance  
Historically, there have been several instances where political parties vying for power 
and influence have turned to terror as a mechanism to achieve their political goals. Extant 
literature illustrates a significant level of inconsistency as it relates to the success of using terror 
as a mechanism to achieve political goals. One group of scholars argues that the use of terror 
does not work (Abrahams 2006, Rapoport 1992). Still other scholars suggest that the use of 
terror is successful in achieving certain political objectives (Laqueur 2001; Indridason 2008). 
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Rapoport (1992) contends that terror groups have, in general, a short life span. He notes 
“perhaps as many as 90 percent [of terrorist organizations] lasts less than a year. Nearly half of 
those that persist beyond the first year are out of existence by the tenth [year]” (Rapoport 1992, 
1067).  In particular, acts of terrorism may often have varied responses from the public and the 
state. Abrahams (2006) and Schelling (1966) proclaim that terrorism does not work to advance 
political goals. More specifically, Abrahams (2006, 76) suggests that terrorism “mis-
communicates objectives because of its extremely high correspondence.” In most cases, 
governments infer the motives of terror groups “not from their stated goals, but from the short-
term consequences of terrorist acts” (Abrahams 2006, 76).  Moreover, governments that are the 
targets of terrorism, view the deaths of citizens and disruptions in the state caused by violence as 
proof that terrorist groups want to destroy their “societies, their publics, or both” (Abrahams 
2006, 76). Hence, governments are reluctant to compromise with terrorist groups irrespective of 
the nature of their demands when violence has already been used by the group demanding some 
sort of concession.   In general, this contention has some merit in that the success or failure of 
terrorists to achieve organizational objectives is dependent on two important circumstances.   
The first condition relates to the urgency of some organizations to achieve their goals. 
This condition is critical for some types of political organizations where organizational 
continuity is highly dependent on quick success. Thus, failure by a group that uses terror in the 
aforementioned condition may occur when targets possess the ability to endure high levels of 
cost without capitulating to terrorists’ demands. Moreover, failure in such a situation often 
results because the use of terror is not sustained over a long period to exact sufficient cost or pain 
on a regime in order to cause that regime to comply with terrorist demands (Abrahms 2008).  
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The second condition occurs where terrorist organizations attempt to function in 
exceptionally repressive regimes, such as the Soviet Union or contemporary North Korea.3
Nonetheless, the preponderance of evidence suggests that terrorism can influence 
domestic politics by altering the priorities of voters and politicians in some domestic settings 
(Indridason 2008; Laqueur 2001; Piazza 2010).  In general, when a political group adopts 
terrorism as a tactic the central aim is usually to undermine the public perceptions of a 
government’s ability to uphold order and the safety of citizens within a state, which is in essence, 
 In 
general, because the relationship between terrorism and political repression is not linear, 
differences in the intensity of repression may in fact condition the creation of terrorist 
organization in a state (Testas 2004; Blomberg et.al 2002).  In those regimes that terrorism fails, 
the failure is usually the result of lack of political space to thrive. In their analysis of protest and 
oppositional violence, Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) found that a high level of repression is 
effective in nondemocratic regimes in reducing opposition. Similarly, Crenshaw (1981), suggests 
exceptionally repressive regimes are more likely to crush fledgling terrorist organizations 
because in largely unconstrained, repressive military regimes, there is a general disregard for 
civil liberties.  In contrast, various scholars contend that in democratic regimes, where repression 
is not systematic and institutionalized, repression can lead to violent forms of protest, and that 
repression spurs violence in democracies (Lichbach 1987; Piazza 2006).  In general, where 
oppositional terrorism spurred by repression is successful is where the regime’s repression is not 
sustained and inefficient in such cases terrorism is doubly likely to result in gains (Crenshaw 
1981, 384). 
                                                 
3  While in some weak democratic or transitioning democracies rightwing and leftist ruling regimes exerts a 
tremendous level of repression, in general these regimes are less repressive than the classical communist or 
command societies such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, China and Cuba in their use of repression against 
oppositional groups. In almost every case, terrorists groups attempting to function in command societies failed to 
gain any considerable support and their members were prosecuted, executed, or fled the state. See Vittori (2009) 
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its primary security function (Chalk 1998).  The inherent value of terrorism is that it can be used 
to “disrupt the normal course of social interaction […] its overall aim is not simply to cause 
immediate destruction but, more intrinsically, gradually to eradicate the solidarity, cooperation 
and interdependence upon which social cohesion and functioning depend” (Chalk 1998, 376).  
The prevailing view in extant literature is that terrorism works and this fact has influenced many 
terrorist organizations and political parties to enter into alliances when other avenues seem less 
rewarding (Harik 2005; Piazza 2010; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).  
Research on political parties that create terrorist wings or organizations appears to fall 
into two schools of thought. The first is the structural approach. Here political parties are usually 
constrained by various institutional factors such as the nature of the electoral system or judicial 
decisions that prevents some types of political parties from engaging in politics. Therefore, these 
structural impediments explain why some political parties utilize terrorist tactics and why some 
terrorist organizations never adopt mainstream approaches (Crenshaw 1981; Hamilton 1978; 
Ross 1993; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). The second school of thought relates 
to the rational actor perspective. This perspective contends that the goals of terrorist groups 
determine whether they are willing to align themselves with a political party or remain outside 
the mainstream of political process.  
Although the literature on domestic terrorism highlights the existence of close alliances 
between political parties and terrorist organizations (Cameron 1999; Harik 2005; Ross 1993; 
Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003), there seems to be no clear or conclusive 
evidence why some political organizations are more willing to utilize violence as a means of 
voicing their demands, while other groups continue to use existing political processes to achieve 
their political objectives. Weinberg (1991, 426) points out, “some influential observers believe 
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this phenomenon defies explanation, while others look to idiosyncratic events for the creation of 
terrorist groups.” Recent perspectives suffer from many of the same shortcomings; they fail to 
adequately explain and empirically test why certain political parties within certain types of 
polities create terrorist organizations or, as in some cases, terror wings.  Most importantly, extant 
literature is silent about how the rightwing ideology of a ruling party in government may create 
organizational constraints for opposition parties and conditions whereby some political 
organizations feel compelled to use terror to achieve their organizational goals.   
This dissertation is significant for a number of reasons. First, it intends to evaluate factors 
that contribute to political parties’ decisions to turn to terror. Thus, this research attempts to fill 
an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issue. 
Second, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the literature by developing a new theoretical 
perspective that links rightwing regimes to an increased propensity of political parties’ turn to 
terror. Third, unlike extant research that utilizes qualitative or small N approaches, this research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative methods. This study aims to provide a more nuanced 
and complete explanation for why in some regimes political parties are willing to turn to terror.  
1.3.1 Plan of the Dissertation   
This dissertation consists of four additional chapters. The next chapter explores extant 
literature on political parties’ turn to terror. It also develops a new theoretical argument on why 
political parties adopt terrorist practices. Chapter 3 uses a Poisson random effect model for panel 
data of 31 states containing 105 political parties from 1960 to 2006 to tests the main hypothesis 
that rightwing regime ideology tends to produce greater numbers of political parties that turn to 
terror. This dissertation shows that rightwing regime ideology is positively correlated with the 
formation of terrorist organizations by political parties. Chapter 4 further analyzes the 
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predictions of the model by using four case studies. These cases are meant to evaluate the 
aforementioned hypothesis using three positive cases (Colombia, Japan, and Turkey), where 
political parties form terrorist organizations and one negative case (Costa Rica) with the same 
independent variables (Xs) to facilitate comparison.  Chapter 5 concludes with a brief discussion 
of the importance of the model and a brief overview of further research related to the topic.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Political Parties and a Turn To Terror 
The goal of this chapter is twofold. First is to examine and synthesize various theories 
that seek to explain political parties’ turn to terror. Second, this chapter also develops the theory 
that regime ideology is an important factor in the creation of terrorist organizations by political 
parties regardless of structural institutional constraints. This chapter starts with a few conceptual 
issues before moving to extant literature and theoretical development.   
2.1 Conceptual Issues: Political Parties and Terrorism 
Terrorism, and in particular domestic terrorism, remains a real and dangerous threat to 
states’ internal stability. Historically, some political parties have on various occasions aligned 
themselves closely with terrorist organizations or have created militant wings to espouse the 
group’s ideology or demands.  As Weinberg (1991), Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) and others 
have found, there is profound contrast in the number of political parties that choose terrorist 
methods and those that decide to continue with more legitimate peaceful “institutionalized” 
forms of political advocacy. In most cases, political parties that eventually turn to terrorist 
activities rarely revert to nonviolent political activities (see Abrahms 2008).      
Before exploring the nexus between terrorist organizations and political parties, a 
definition of political party is warranted. Extant literature illustrates a profound level of 
inconsistency in the manner in which political parties are defined (Duverger 1954, Gunther and 
Diamond 2003).  Gunther and Diamond (2003, 171) argue that the lack of conceptual and 
terminological consistency is partly the result of basing typology on one criterion, be it 
organizational structure, principal organizational objective or social basis of representation.  
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Notably, this has resulted in an excessive narrowing of the definition and focus of analysis, and 
the lack of systematic analysis of variations within each party type (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 
171).   
Following Gunther and Diamond (2003), this study emphasizes three criteria in defining 
a political party. The first criterion specifies the formal organization of the party (Gunther and 
Diamond 2003, 172). Invariably, no two political party bureaucratic command structures are the 
same. A number of political parties are organizationally thin, while others are organizationally 
complex and their objectives are well defined. Gunther and Diamond (2003, 171) write “while 
others develop large mass-membership bases with allied or ancillary institutions engaged in 
distinct but related spheres of social life; some rely on particularistic networks of personal 
interaction or exchange, while others are open and universalistic in membership and appeal.”  
The second important classification criterion relates to the party’s programmatic 
commitments. In general, some political parties’ programmatic platforms are well developed and 
well articulated. These include “ideologies rooted in political philosophies, religious beliefs or 
nationalistic sentiment; [however] others are either pragmatic or have no well-defined 
ideological or programmatic commitment; still others are committed to advance the interests of a 
particular ethnic, religious or social-economic group, or geographically defined constituency” 
(Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).     
The third criterion specifies the strategy and behavioral norms of the political party; in 
particular, whether the political party is tolerant and pluralistic or proto-hegemonic in its 
objectives (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).  Extant literature suggests that, “some parties are 
fully committed to democratic rules-of-the-game, are tolerant and respectful towards their 
opponents, and are pluralistic in their views of polity and society” (Gunther and Diamond (2003, 
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171). However, other political parties may be “semi-loyal to democratic norms and institutions, 
or explicitly anti-system, favoring the replacement of the existing pluralistic democracy with a 
regime that would be more uniformly committed to the achievement of their programmatic 
objectives” (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).  
Admittedly, the process of defining a political party is problematic, “for virtually every 
definition of a political party produced by political scientists, it is possible to find some 
institutions that are recognizable parties but do not conform [to] the definition in some 
significant way” (Ware 1996, 1). As the case of Hezbollah illustrates, some political parties 
engage in violent activities but at the same time may provide social welfare services such as 
community aid and political representation for a large portion of the electorate.4
Despite disagreements over what constitutes a political party, extant literature is 
consistent in regard to the importance of political parties (Lawson et.al 1988; Ware 1996; Ware 
1998). Ware (1996) notes that it is difficult to imagine polities without political parties, he 
suggests that since the early 20th century there has only been two kinds of states where political 
parties were absent (Ware 1996, 1). The first were small traditional societies, predominately 
 Moreover, the 
threshold for what is termed a political party may differ across polities. Following Ware (1996, 
5), a political party refers to “an institution that (1) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting 
to occupy positions in government, and (2) usually consists of more than a single interest in the 
society and so to some degree attempts to ‘aggregate interest’.”  This definition represents the 
lowest threshold of what can be considered a political party.  
                                                 
4 Prior to 1992, Hezbollah could not participate in Lebanese elections and did not. Hezbollah during the mid to late 
1990s transformed itself into a “political party with a resistant wing.” Although several scholars argue that 
Hezbollah is a political party –others do not.  Various scholars argue that Hezbollah does not “use legitimate means 
for pursing their ends.” Hence, the group does not satisfy an important criterion to be considered a political party.  
Furthermore, Hezbollah appears on various countries list of terrorist organizations, a reality that undermines the 
group’s assertion that they are in fact a bona-fide political party. See Ware (1996); Ayob (2004); Norton (2007). 
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ruled by royal families who were dominant in the regions they controlled long before the outside 
world recognized them as independent states (Ware 1996, 1). Second, are regimes where 
political parties were banned by very repressive military regimes or authoritarian rulers who had 
the support of the military (Ware 1996, 1).   
The literature suggests that even in polities where a party system has been established, 
interludes of party-less politics can result because of repressive regimes that institute 
authoritarian rule (Lawson 1988; Ware 1996). Nevertheless, Ware (1996, 1) points out, “the 
suppression of parties has proved to be feasible only as a temporary measure. As military 
authorities relax their grip on power, or as unpopular policies stir discontent, so parties start to 
re-emerge from underground.”  Among the paths taken by some political parties in an effort to 
reassert themselves is the use of terror (Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).  
Similar to political parties, scholars have differed on what is terrorism and what 
constitutes a terrorist act. Defining terrorism has long been a tedious and frustrating task for 
scholars. Schmid and Jongman (1988) found 109 academic definitions of terrorism, leading one 
scholar to remark “there are roughly as many available definitions as there are published experts 
in the field” (Victoroff 2005, 4). Indeed, extant literature provides a host of definitions that are 
based on concerns such as targeting, type of conflict, and intent. Most classical definitions of 
terrorism highlight a political or ideological goal as a basis for the use, or threat of, violence.  A 
classic illustration of such a definition is provided by Nieburg (1962). He defines terrorism as: 
Acts of disruption, destruction, injuries whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding 
circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have a political significance, that is, tend to 
modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social 
system (192). 
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As a concept, terrorism has remained a difficult and subjective issue further complicated 
by its evolving nature (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Central to 
the incongruence on what constitutes an act of terror relates to whether there is anything “in the 
nature of a right to inflict such misery on others and, if so, in whom it inheres” (Cooper 2001, 
885).  
For a significant number of Western states, new terrorism has become the focus of 
policymakers and scholars. New terrorism is synonymous to the rise of radical religious 
fundamentalism, most of which is associated with radical Islam. Within the last decade, various 
scholars have thus attempted to refine the definition and the scope of issues that relate to 
terrorism to reflect current security realities (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Indridason 2008; 
Laqueur 1999; Kydd and Walter 2006). Prior to the turn of the 21st century, scholars such as 
Crenshaw (1981) argued that terrorism should be considered a facet of secular modern politics 
principally associated with the rise of nationalism, anarchism, and revolutionary socialism 
(Crenshaw 1981, 380). Since the 1980s, perceptions of terrorism have changed. Notably, 
Laqueur (2001) points out that the world is now living in the period of new terrorism. He 
contends, “New terrorism is different in character, aiming not only at clearly defined political 
demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population” 
(p. 81). Unlike “old terrorism,” the goal of new terrorism is not to change the system, but to 
destroy the system itself (Cronin 2002; Laqueur 1999, 2001; Hoffman 2006). 
For Cronin (2002, 33), terrorism exhibits certain fundamentals. First, in addition to the 
political intent, terrorists are non-state actors who deliberately target the innocent. This 
distinguishes terrorism from state uses of force that inadvertently kill innocent bystanders. 
Second, “even when terrorists received military, political, economic, and other means of support 
 15 
from state sources,” terrorist organizations are still considered separate from the state.  “States 
can terrorize, but they cannot by definition be terrorists” (Cronin 2002, 33). Arguing along a 
similar line, Laqueur (1987, 1999) dismisses the idea of including the state as a perpetrator of 
terrorism. In general, while Laqueur concedes the idea of state-sponsored terrorism, he is less 
willing to call the state an agent of terror (Laqueur 1999, 158).  Laqueur (1987, 146) argues that 
atrocities committed by the state and acts of terrorism are two distinct issues.  He suggests that 
The case in favor of obliterating the basic difference between a regime of terror 
exerted by a state and terrorist activities by a ‘non-state actors’ is a very weak one 
indeed. Both kinds aim at inducing a state of fear among the enemy. But beyond 
this, there are no important similarities, as they fulfill different functions and 
manifest themselves in different ways, such as mass arrests, concentration camps 
and mass executions in the case of state terrorism. A study of the functions and 
techniques of the Gestapo is important, but it will be of no more help 
understanding the Baader-Meinhof gang than the study of Auschwitz or of Pol Pot 
would be for comprehending the IRA (p. 146). 
 
    Invariably, several critics (Falk 2002; Cooper 2001) argue that any effort that excludes 
all forms of violence by the state is regressive and statist.  Falk (2002) contends that the process 
of excluding government apparatus from the definitions of what constitutes terrorism illustrates a 
regressive and narrowing statist approach (299-300). He suggests that the “statist approach has 
been extended so far that it calls non-state attacks on military targets such as soldiers or warships 
terrorism, while not regarding state violence as terrorism even when indiscriminately directed at 
civilian society” (Falk 2002, 301). Cooper (2001, 882), in remarks about the current efforts to 
better define terrorism, notes that, “we ought not to confuse sophistry of refinement for the 
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process of definition.”  Moreover, the inclusion of the state as an agent of terror in recent 
scholarly literature (for example Falk 2002; Cooper 2001; Kisangani and Nafziger 2007) 
illustrates an ongoing divide in extant research in regards to conceptualizing terrorism.  
Given the discord that exists regarding the definition of terrorism, it is necessary to 
provide a conceptual definition of how the term is applied in this study. To this end, the contexts 
within which terrorism will apply pertain to the ideological or political motivations behind the 
act. Hence, terrorist organizations will be categorized as groups that are formed with the 
expressed intention of achieving political goals by violence, or threats of violence, outside of the 
monopoly on the use of violence assigned to sovereign states (Hoffman 2006, 40).  Weinberg 
and Pedahzur (2003, 3) contend that, “Terrorism is not an ideology but an activity […] an 
activity that a variety of political groups and organizations may engage in fulltime or 
sporadically. […] On some occasions terrorist activity may be sustained over long periods of 
time and then suspended or displaced by other forms or political activity.”  
Four types of terrorist organizations categorized mainly by their source of motivations 
currently operate around the world (Cronin 2002). They include “left-wing terrorist, right-wing 
terrorist, ethnonationalist/ separatist terrorist, and religious or ‘sacred’ terrorist” (Cronin 2002, 
39).   Admittedly, the above categories are not always well defined because terrorist groups often 
have varied objectives and nuanced ideologies.         
Leftwing terror groups are motivated by communist ideologies or driven by idealist 
political concepts, they tend to be revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, and maintain anti-materialistic 
agendas (Cronin 2002, 39).  Terrorist organizations that have leftist ideologies most often target 
the elite or those in authority and direct brutal campaigns involving kidnappings, murders, 
bombings, and arsons (Crenshaw 1995; Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Laqueur 1999).  
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In part, the political ideology for rightwing terrorist groups is associated with fascism or 
an opposition to immigrants or other ethnic groups (Cronin 2002). Rightwing terrorist groups 
target minorities or immigrants whom they believe threaten in some way their traditions, or 
position in a society (Cronin 2002; Klaus et. al 1998; Laqueur 1999).   
The objective of ethnonationalist or separatist terrorism is usually very distinct. 
Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist groups most often have very clear political or territorial aims 
that are “rational and potentially negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case” (Cronin 
2002, 40). As is the case with other categories of terrorism, they can be very violent over 
extended periods. Because of their “focus on gains to be made in the traditional state-oriented 
international system, ethnonationalist/ separatist terrorists often transition in and out of more 
traditional paramilitary structures, depending on how the cause is going” (Cronin 2002, 41). 
Unlike other categories of terrorism, ethnonationalist or separatist terror groups usually have 
broad regional support from the local populace of the same ethnicity with whom their separatist 
goals resonate (Cronin 2002, 41).  
Extant literature suggests that religious or ‘sacred’ terrorism poses the biggest threat to 
governments and the international system (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Pape 2003; Ranstorp 
1996).  Religious or sacred terrorism is motivated by either dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
system or a fear that a favored system might be overturned (Long 1990, 65).  Morgan (2004) 
describes the attitude of religious terrorism as indicative of the mindset of the “new terrorist.” 
Thus, religious or new terrorist “don’t want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and 
everyone sitting at it” (Morgan 2004, 30). With loose networks and a greater emphasis on 
religious radicalism, this form of terrorism is much more dangerous and far more difficult to stop 
or reason with. Cronin (2002) suggests that religious terrorists consider themselves to be 
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unconstrained by secular values or laws. They most often display “a complete sense of alienation 
from the existing social system. They are not trying to correct the system, making it more just, 
more perfect, and more egalitarian. Rather they are trying to replace it” (Cronin 2002, 41).  What 
is important for many religious terrorist groups is to please the perceived commands or teachings 
of a deity.    
Following Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 28), the parameters used to define political 
parties engaged in terrorist activities will include two groups. First, is a set of groups described 
as either “terrorist” or “urban guerilla.” Second, groups that are engaged in activities such as 
assassinations, bombings, kidnappings or skyjackings, either threatened or carried out, in order to 
achieve a political purpose or aim beyond harming the immediate target. This definition follows 
more recent efforts to refine what acts of violence are deemed terror (Hoffman 2006, Cronin 
2002, Laqueur 1999). 
To examine the relationship between terrorist organizations and political parties requires 
establishing the domain in which these entities operate. According to Enders and Sandler (2005), 
terrorist acts can be placed into two broad groups, domestic and transnational. They contend that 
“Domestic terrorism begins and ends in the host country: the perpetrators and targets are 
homegrown [...] Moreover, domestic incidents have domestic ramifications for only the host 
country” (p. 261). The authors argue that when a terrorist incident in one country involves 
citizens, targets, victims or institutions in another country, such acts are assumed to be 
transnational. According to this view, terrorism that involves political parties has historically 
occurred within domestic settings (Harik 2005; Indriadson 2008; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and 
Pedahzur 2003).  Yet, while political parties and terrorist groups tend to ally in domestic settings, 
it is not an exclusive situation. Many groups, such as Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and 
 19 
Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), conducted their operations across international borders 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, even though they had specific political goals, which pertained 
to their respective host countries.  
Extant literature shows that there are distinct differences between the willingness or 
desire of one terrorist organization (for example, Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 
Northern Ireland) to end its pursuit of political objectives through violent measures and another 
(for example, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia)5
 
 to continue 
armed struggle. Few approaches have been able to provide reasons for the above variation across 
polities as well as when political organizations are willing to use violent measures instead of 
continuing to utilize peaceful democratic processes. Furthermore, scholarly literature is silent on 
how political ideology of a ruling party within a given state, creates organizational constraints 
for opposition parties and conditions whereby some political organizations feel compelled to use 
terror to achieve their organizational goals.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Proponents of the rational choice and structural cause approach, offer several similar but 
insightful arguments aimed at illuminating the issue. In general, the rational choice approach 
provides various logical reasons why some political parties without access to the political 
process may at times create militant wings or transition into bona fide terrorist organizations. 
Moreover, rational choice approaches model the political party as an actor who chooses among 
the best options to achieve organizational goals. Similarly, structural cause approaches explain 
                                                 
5 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is the Spanish translation for the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Columbia.     
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political parties turn to terror as the result of institutional and/or organizational constraints placed 
upon the political party that forces the organization to turn to other violent methods to meet 
organizational goals.      
2.2.1 Structural Cause Approach 
The structural cause approach provides three major arguments about the link between 
terrorist organizations and political parties. First, institutional barriers, such as regime types and 
electoral systems, create grievances in some democracies for individuals who belong to 
marginalized political organizations; these grievances cause them to ally with or create militant 
wings that engage in terrorist activities (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Second, leftist leaning parties are 
more susceptible to overtures by terrorist organizations (Ross 1993, 323). Third, the literature 
suggests that military interventions and/or domestic conflicts can influence the formation of 
terrorist groups (Li 2005; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).  
Terrorists in democratic polities tend to be elitists. In fact, they claim to know better than 
the masses what is best for them (Laqueur 1999, 91). In such cases, orchestrated acts of terror 
represent the displeasure of a fragment of the elite towards a political system who may take it 
upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority whom they believe are unaware of their plight 
or unwilling to express dissent (Crenshaw 1981, 396). There appears to be great levels of elite 
discontentment within certain types of electoral systems.  
Huber and Powell (1994) and Li (2005) argue that majoritarian systems create single-
party majority governments, which ignore the interest of minority groups. In contrast, the 
proportional system produces cabinets and legislatures that often represent the interest of most 
citizens. In her analysis of the impact of democratic systems on the onset of civil wars, Reynal-
Querol (2002) found that proportional systems have a lower probability of group discontent and 
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rebellion than majoritarian systems. In short, regimes with electoral systems that restrict access 
to power and the airing of grievances create dissatisfaction. Crenshaw (1981) contends that in 
situations where paths to legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime’s 
repression is inefficient, terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and direct causes coincide.  
The type of electoral system, more so than any other permissive factor, is seen as 
important to how alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations occur (Abrahams 
2006; Braithwaite and Li 2005; Hamilton, 1978). More generally, the inherent characteristics of 
democratic polities are thought to facilitate alliances between political parties and terrorist 
organizations Ross (1993) provides several reasons why this phenomenon occurs. He suggests 
that:  
The legacy of a colonial or semi-colonial past that has not been adequately 
resolved […], nationalist, separatist, and ethnic conflicts that cannot easily be 
resolved (e.g. Basques in Spain) […], guarantees of fundamental civil liberties 
promoting freedom of movement, access to media, and the free expression of 
unrest and dissent thereby accommodating diverse political values and demands 
[…] the proliferation of narrow based social issues; and the existence of police 
forces which are generally law-abiding (p. 322).    
 
Thus, when political parties consider using violence within a democracy, they are usually 
cognizant that democracies have institutionalized guarantees and methods of political expression. 
Moreover, dissenters may express their policy preferences by seeking redress and 
accommodation (Ross 1993, 322; Chenoweth 2010). Intuitively, groups harboring grievances 
should be less likely to resort to terrorist violence in expressing their discontent where freedom 
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of expression is encouraged (Chenoweth 2010). However, checks and balances that are supposed 
to serve as a normative reminder to disgruntled groups that there are alternatives to terror often 
lead groups to seek other means such as violence to meet their organization objectives (Ross 
1993, 322).   
 Finally, the structural literature argues that military activities influence levels of 
terrorism. Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 18) note that where there is a crisis of disintegration 
such as when a country deteriorates into civil war, a turn to terror by political parties increases. 
They suggest during civil wars, leaders of major political parties representing their respective 
community “play the roles of warlords.”  In various cases, political parties utilize not only 
militias created by their own party, but also employ other militias to carry out terrorist attacks, 
assassinations and bombings (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 18).  In contrast, Li (2005, 287) 
contends that military conflict involvement reduces the number of terrorist incidents in the 
country.  He argues that while external military conflict creates grievances and opportunities for 
terrorists it often leads to tightened domestic security measures, raising the cost of terrorist 
activities (Li 2005, 287).         
While the structural theory provides evidence of a close relationship between political 
parties and terrorist organizations, the theory does not offer a complete discourse on how the 
political ideology of a ruling regime influences political parties’ associations with terrorism.  As 
a theory, structural cause fails to identify sufficient common features that explain a turn to terror 
by political parties across polities. Importantly, it ignores the role played by rightwing 
government ideology.  At best, it only provides institutional explanations such as electoral types, 
conflict (external and internal) and that most political organizations that become or create terror 
groups have a leftist ideology.    
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An important issue that is seldom discussed within structural literature is the role the 
Cold War era had on political parties and their decisions to turn to terror. The structural cause 
theory argument on terrorism encompasses ideas based, in part, on Cold War rivalry in the 
international system. However, as a general approach to understanding political parties and 
terrorist organizations, Cold War influences on the formation of terrorist organization by 
political parties have largely gone untested.  
 Cold War politics and rivalries appears to have had immediate effects on the dynamics 
of political parties and terrorist organizations, which could explain the higher ratio of leftist 
parties turning to terrorist activities during the 1960s to early 1990s and a corresponding hard-
line approach by right-wing governments. As other studies have shown, especially as it relates to 
democratic peace,6
The global landscape within which these struggles occurred [had] been 
conditioned by the impact of US-Soviet relations. Because the superpowers have 
 the Cold War profoundly affected the political structure of several societies. 
Anecdotal evidence provided by Weinberg (1991) and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) suggests 
the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties reached its zenith during the period 
from 1960 to the late 1980s, a period when many new democracies were being created and 
during the height of the Cold War. It is conceivable that Cold War rivalry between the super 
powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, helped embolden groups in various states with 
political ambition to adopt terrorist tactics as a mechanism to achieve their goals (Long 1990). 
According to O’Brien (1996), it became customary during the Cold War in places such as Latin 
and Central America for groups with political ambition and groups who opposed a ruling 
government to create armed groups that perpetrated terrorist acts. He suggests that 
                                                 
6 Several scholars have found varying evidence as it relates to the impact of the Cold War on the democratic peace 
theory (Cederman 2001; Gleditsch 1992; Ray 1997; and Walt 1998).  
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shaped the environment within which terrorists operate, the role they have played 
and the responses they have made (p. 322). 
 
Cline and Alexander (1984) infer that with the support of the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War era, many political parties facing rigid and sometimes corrupt regimes, gradually 
adopted terrorism as part of their policy to achieve their goals. While there are a few scholars 
who appear to recognize the role of the Cold War, thus far, none has incorporated this dynamic 
in a quantitative study that illuminates its role in helping to explain why political parties 
transition into terrorist organizations.   
2.2.2 Rational Choice Approach   
Although it is often posed as an alternative to the structural perspective (Ross 1993), the 
rational choice or strategic approach can be thought of as a complement to the structural 
perspective. After all, non-state groups making the decision to use terrorist tactics make cost-
benefit or strategic calculations against the backdrop of existing organizational barriers such as 
state institutional structures. The opportunities afforded and limitations imposed by these 
structures are a fundamental component of such strategic decision-making.    
The rational choice approach argues that decisions to turn to terror are made based on 
prevailing cost-benefit calculations of the participants and on response to regime repression 
(Ross 1993, 317; Crenshaw 1981, 387). Second, when other less costly choices become 
available, groups (or political parties) will usually disband armed terrorist wings. According to 
Klitgaard et.al (2006, 291), contemporary rational choice perspectives argue that governments 
supply a number of private benefits and terrorists should be seen as interest groups pursuing 
benefits (i.e. as rent-seekers). 
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Rational choice proponents routinely employ the strategic model (a subset of rational 
choice) as a mechanism to explain the dynamics that prevails within terrorist organizations 
(Abrahms 2006).   Abrahms (2006, 78) contends that the strategic model has been the “dominant 
paradigm in terrorism studies […]. [It] posits that terrorists are rational actors who attack 
civilians for political ends.” Moreover, the model assumes that terrorists are political utility 
maximizers. People use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs 
outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest action (Abrahms 2006, 78).  
The strategic model when applied to terrorism is guided by three core assumptions. First, 
terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences. Second, terrorists 
evaluate the expected payoffs of their available options or at least the most obvious ones. Third, 
terrorism is adopted when the political return is superior to those alternative options (Abrahms 
2006, 79).  
The strategic model serves as a useful decision-making mechanism in regard to 
explaining how political parties at times end up as terrorist organizations or employ terrorism as 
a major tool. As noted above, a central assumption of the strategic model is that motivated 
individuals weigh their political options and resort to terrorism as it is in many cases the best 
preference when alternative political avenues are blocked (Abrahms 2006, 80). As is the case 
with political organizations such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and IRA factions in Northern 
Ireland, the model suggests that choosing to develop a terrorist wing is a matter of last resort.  
Therefore, weighing the expected costs versus the expected benefits for many political parties 
becomes an easy decision when the alternative of not choosing violent measures does not 
produce any net positive payoffs. Based on the model, it is assumed that if a group or political 
party consistently fails to coerce policy concessions, or when superior political options arise, the 
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party most often abandons violent measures (Abrahms 2006, 81). In this regard, the model 
appears to provide plausible reasons why some political parties, when given access to the 
political process, may disband an armed wing or abandon the use of terror as a political tool.  
In general, the strategic model has been heavily criticized by Abrahms (2006) on several 
grounds. First, it does not take into consideration evolving priorities that are inherent in volatile 
organizational structures. Abrahms (2006) argues that while the strategic model locates the 
motives of the terrorist organization and the tradeoff it makes, the model does not provide direct 
insights into members’ incentive structure. Second, as is the case with political parties, leaders 
within terrorist organizations already make tradeoffs by regularly prioritizing the maintenance of 
the group over the advancement of its official political agenda, which is a contradiction of the 
strategic model (Abrahms 2006, 102). Third, people’s political preferences are not always 
consistent and stable in the long-run. Often, people adjust their expectations in the context of 
events (Kisangani and Nafziger 2007).  Despite its limitations, the strategic model provides 
plausible explanations about the decision-making process that individuals in political parties 
undergo before decisions to use terrorism are made.   
2.3 Theoretical Development: Ideology and Terrorism 
I argue that while both the structural and strategic perspectives add important insights 
into political parties’ turn to terror, they both overlook an important intervening variable: the 
political ideology of the governing party. Let it be clear that this analysis is not claiming that 
political ideology is the sole factor for why all political parties turn to terror. Importantly, this 
research merely posits that over the period covered by the data, there is evidence consistent with 
an explanation that incorporates this variable.  While it might not seem crucial at first glance, this 
variable helps to explain why avenues of political participation are restricted from the structural 
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perspective and why excluded political parties may perform cost-benefit calculations supporting 
the use of violence. Put simply, when rightwing political parties gain political power, political 
freedoms and access to government tend to be curtailed, which fundamentally alters the strategic 
calculus of opposition parties. My analysis thus emphasizes a heretofore-overlooked variable that 
rests at the nexus between the structural and strategic approaches and that enriches our 
understanding of political parties’ turn to terror.    
In general, when political parties contest elections, they construct platforms and develop 
“ideological signifiers that are most likely to successfully put them and keep them in office” 
(Piazza 2010, 105).  While these ideological signifiers help to hardened support among party 
members and supporters they often can alienate and in some cases spur violent dissent by those 
in opposition.7
Extant literature on political parties and their alliances with terrorist organizations 
focuses almost exclusively on leftist parties as the major proponents of terror and, as such, the 
ones most likely to create or ally with terrorist organizations (Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003). 
According to Weinberg (1991), regional political parties, especially those on the left, are most 
often willing to turn to terror or become a terrorist organization to serve the interests of those 
they represent (Weinberg 1991, 426). While there is some merit to this argument, (especially in 
light of data from the late 1960s to early 1980s that show a preponderance of leftist parties allied 
 This is especially so when the party in power cuts off what had been legitimate 
political access for opposition parties. 
                                                 
7 One of the major issues this dissertation examines the impact that the governing political party’s ideology has on 
the propensity of opposition parties to use terrorist tactics. This could also be conceptualized as the ideology of the 
regime in power, or regime ideology. The critical argument in this dissertation follows Piazza (2010) in presuming 
that it is the ideology of the political party that takes power that shapes regime ideology and the policies adopted by 
an administration. Typically, the political party in power holds a set of ideological beliefs before taking office, and it 
carries these beliefs into government. Part of what this dissertation seeks to test whether it is this complex of beliefs 
that opposition parties respond to rather than variables inherent within the government that remain constant as 
governing parties enter and leave office.    
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with terrorist organizations) what most scholars overlook is the role played by the political 
ideology of a ruling regime and the effect it has on leftist leaning parties that turn to terror. Thus, 
the ideology of a ruling political party, and by extension the ruling government, has a profound 
impact on the likelihood that a political party will turn to terror.  
In general, heuristic evidence, mostly in historical scholarship, points to the 
preponderance of violent oppositional groups residing mostly within regimes that have a rightist 
ideology (Goodman 1992; Pinkney 1990; Sprinzak 1991). In particular, there appears to be some 
correlation between right leaning regimes and the formation of terrorist groups, especially within 
anocracies and young democracies8
Extant literature suggests that understanding and classifying a political party as rightwing 
is done by reviewing “both their political ideology and the attitude toward the political system as 
reflected in the party’s manifestos” (Knigge 1998, 251). Most extreme right political parties 
“either openly or in subtle ways, advocate beliefs and procedures diametrical to established 
political culture and system [they] endorse an authoritarian and hierarchical governmental 
structure and aggressive nationalism. Further, they frequently adopt an ethnocentrist or racial 
outlook” (Knigge 1998, 251).     
.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, a definition of right-wing political party follows that 
provided by Eatwell and O’Sullivan (1990) and Pinkney (1990). Eatwell and O’Sullivan (1990) 
and Pinkney’s (1990) definition of right-wing regimes follows a checklist rather than a restrictive 
definition, mainly because of the fragmented nature of right-wing ideology. Therefore, the major 
                                                 
8  Anocracies generally fall between -5 and + 5 on the Marshall and Jaggers (2003) Polity Scale. In definitional 
terms, an anocracy is a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition groups, but has 
incomplete development of the mechanisms to redress grievances (Benson and Kugler 1998; Hegre 2002). Young 
democracies are polities that have recently undergone regime change in a democratic direction. They may have 
democratic institutions, but these may not be entrenched to prevent a reversal to autocratic forms of rule. See 
Pickering and Kisangani (2005).  
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characteristic of a right-wing regimes are: (1) appeals to traditional values extolling such 
institutions as the family, or past national glory; (2) claims to legitimacy based on the need for 
order without any reference to the social causes of disorder; (3) close links with civilian landed 
and capitalists elites, a preference to the private sector; (4) a free market economic policy, in the 
internal economy and/ or in relation to foreign capital; and (5) the exclusion from power, or 
repression, of working-class groups or groups favoring greater equality (Pinkney 1990, 14).    
In general, the literature on political parties that turn to terror has mostly pointed to leftist 
parties as the major linchpin for creating terror groups. Various scholars allude to an inherent 
characteristic present in leftist parties that makes them predisposed to creating terrorist groups. 
While such conclusions may be plausible, most scholars ignore the issue that certain types of 
cabinets and leaders within regimes create the conditions, which are intolerable for normal 
political process. However, what most scholars fail to recognize is that the formation of leftist 
terror groups may most likely be a reactionary response to the repressive nature of rightist 
governments.  
As previously noted, the Cold War exerted a tremendous polarizing impact on the nature 
of politics within and across states. Cold War politics influenced the attitude of leftist parties and 
their leadership and provided an important explanation for why ideology became such a driving 
force for parties on both sides of the political spectrum. To most scholars of political conflict, 
violence perpetrated by political parties is seen as the “disordering side of politics” (Lawson 
et.al. 1988).  Importantly, when violence occurs in democracies, the causes of such disorder are 
commonly regarded as “pathologies the most serious of which either reveal some kind of 
injustice or result from the malfunction of representative institutions” (Apter 1988, 196). In rare 
cases, leaders of some political parties who turn to terror are driven by pure lust for power and 
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monetary benefits. However, in most cases, “political groups are motivated by an ideology” 
(Drake 1998, 54).   
As pointed out earlier, a common ideology is a critical factor for political parties’ 
mobilization. By far, most political parties that decide to create terrorist wings or transform into 
full-fledged terrorist organizations maintain their ideological bases (Drake 1998, Weinberg and 
Pedahzur 2003). Drake (1998) suggests that while there may be distinctions between the 
professed ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of various members, the leaders of political 
groups tend to have specific ideologies with clear political objectives. Therefore, those persons 
and institutions whom the terrorist organizations “deem guilty of having transgressed the tenets 
of the terrorists ideological-based moral framework are considered to be legitimate targets which 
the terrorist feel justified in attacking” (Drake 1998, 53).   
Importantly, where ideology may not always be the singular factor that serves as a basis 
for group mobilization, it generally provides an initial range of legitimate targets and means by 
which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves (Drake 1998, 
53). Political ideology of the group identifies the “enemies” of the group by providing a measure 
against which to assess the ‘innocence or guilt of people and institutions’ (Drake 1998, 54).   
The preponderance of literature on terrorism suggests that most terrorist groups come 
from the left (Cronin 2002; Cline and Alexander 1984; Waldman 2005: Weinberg 1991; 
Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).  Historically, most 19th  century and 20th century (old terrorism) 
terrorism originated from either nationalist-separatist motivations or groups that were 
ideologically leftist (for example, Marxist-Leninist). The period from the 1960s to late 1980s, 
saw the height of leftist political parties turning to terror.  In part, many leaders of leftist leanings 
political parties, especially in the developing world, were influenced by a perception (sometimes 
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unfounded) that the capitalist system and rightist regimes were not sympathetic to the plight of 
the lower class (Sprinzak 1991, 1998).   
However, Laqueur (1999, 81) contends that most individuals who form leftist political 
parties and later terror groups tend to come from higher social classes and are better educated 
than members of rightwing terror groups. They also see the world and politics in terms of deep 
ideological divides. Leaders and members of leftist leaning parties frequently contend that 
rightist government and especially those with capitalist driven economies exploit the lower 
classes (Cohrs et.al 2005). They also argue, that, within communist states, lower and middle 
class citizens attain more equitable economic and social rewards than their counterparts in states 
that had capitalist economic systems.  
Extant literature provides two explanations for why leaders of various leftist political 
parties decide to turn to terror. First was the desire for revolution that was cultivated as part of 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology. This ideology fueled many left leaning political parties during the 
Cold-War period (for example Shining Path in Peru or the FARC in Columbia)9
 The ideology for violent revolution to overthrow capitalist cabinets and governments 
during the 1960s and 1970s was for many leftist political parties and splinter groups a part of 
their mantra. Commenting on the rise of left-wing terror during the 1960-70s, Chalk (1998) notes 
. The second and 
more important factor builds on the rational choice perspective of rewards and costs. To meet 
organizational objectives of the political party, the use of violence was perceived as necessary by 
many leftist party leaders who felt compelled to make the tactical decision to turn to terror in the 
face of repressive and, at times, economically insensitive policies of many right wing regimes. 
                                                 
9  According to Chalk 1998; Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, most leftist leaning political parties in the 
1960s to early 1980s were inspired by the political ideology of Marx and Lenin.    
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the following in describing the general attitude that prevailed in much of the leftist movements in 
Europe and much of the Western world: 
In response to the inherent contradictions and perceived injustices of the post-
World War II era, students had begun increasingly to identify with all-embracing 
anti-Western and anti-Nato ideals. Not only did these dogmas provide a sense of 
purpose for otherwise bored and undirected intellectuals, they also satisfied an 
idealism and need for prompt action that was derived from a youthful impatience 
[…] this atmosphere of protest and opposition reached critical proportions as 
hundreds of thousand participated in student-led marches against the Vietnam 
War, nuclear weapons, neo-colonization and what was seen as an exploitative 
Western capitalist order (p. 378).  
For many left-leaning political parties, rightist leaning regimes (such as those in Italy 
1969-74) were seen as the embodiment of the capitalist domination of the lower class. Rightwing 
government policies of stifling political opposition from the left, which were sometimes labeled 
as socialist or communist, forced many political parties to go through a metamorphosis that often 
resulted in a party creating a terrorist wing, or worse yet—becoming a terrorist organization. 
Sprinzak (1991, 52) refers to this radicalization of leftist political parties into leftist terror groups 
as a process of extensional delegitimation10
                                                 
10 According to Sprinzak (1991), the process of extensional delegitimation differs from the usual radicalization 
process. Importantly, because in the case the former the process occurs much faster and bears the hall-marks of deep 
opposing ideological differences that often lead to violence, there is often an inability of the opposing sides to 
compromise on their opposing ideological differences.   
. In general, while Sprinzak (1991) does not 
specifically point to rightwing regimes as the catalyst for extensional delegitimation, many of the 
oppressive political, economic and social programs common in rightwing regimes help promote 
the identical circumstances described below. He outlines this process as follows: 
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Extensional delegitimation—a process of radicalization which starts when an 
existing opposition movement, or an old dormant sentiment of opposition, is 
radicalized quickly against the ruling authority and reaches terrorism without 
many psycho-political inhibitions. […] it may also appear in the context of a 
struggle against an autocratic and violent regime. It involves a radicalization of 
one or more segments of an existing nationalist or leftwing movement. The 
terrorism, which is produced by the abridged process of delegitmation, is often 
one strategy of combat among many non-terroristic ones.    
 
The role that rightwing party ideology plays as a motivator for terrorism has not received 
considerable attention from scholars. Nevertheless, extant literature illustrates that the policies of 
rightwing governments tend to be associated with higher levels of prejudice, ethnocentrism 
(Altermeyer 1996; Lubbers et. al 2002) and support for interstate and intrastate conflicts (Cohrs 
and Moschner 2002 McFarland, 2005). In addition, in regimes where rightwing political 
ideologies prevail, there is greater support for the restriction of human rights than in other types 
of regimes (Altermeyer 1996) and “laws limiting civil liberties like freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press and the right of assembly” (Cohrs et.al 2005).   
Pinkney (1990) expounds on the behavior of rightwing governments arguing that 
governments that govern along ideological right principles have historically placed great 
emphasis on blocking the demands of the working class and other groups demanding greater 
political participation and economic equality (Pinkney 1990, 2). In particular, in developing 
countries, the constituency for the left will often always be larger than for the right, hence it is in 
the interests of the right to shut off access to the political process in a way that is not true in the 
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same way for the left. An ideal example of such efforts by rightist governments to repress 
popular leftist parties was evident in Central and South America during the 1960s to the 1990s. 
The formation of Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemaletca (UNRG)11
An important issue that must be highlighted relates to why many leftist political parties 
would resort to terror as their preferred method of violence. For many leftist political parties, 
especially those in Latin and South America, opposition towards their efforts came from 
authoritarian rightwing regimes (Premo1981; Pinkney 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; 
Malloy et al., 1987). Many right-of-center authoritarian governments viewed leftist parties as 
dangerous to their existence and attempted to curtail the activity of leftist organizations through 
repression and other forms of institutional barriers. In Chile for example, “before leaving office, 
Pinochet appointed supreme court justices, mayors, regional governors, and one-fifth of the new 
senate. These appointments [were designed] to block or delay the policies of the incoming 
democratic government” (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 271).  The repression meted out by 
 in Guatemala in the late 1960s provides two examples where a 
repressive right-wing government created the circumstances where political parties felt 
compelled to turn to terror. In the late 1960s, the Guatemalan government (in concert with the 
military) had effective control over which parties could contest elections. This power was used in 
subsequent electoral cycles to suppress left-of-center reformist parties (Premo 1981; Malloy et 
al., 1987; Waldman 2005). These restrictions were employed in the 1966 election to restrict the 
number of participating parties to three: the extreme rightist National Liberation Movement 
(MLN), the president's own center-right Institutional Democratic Party (PID) and the centrist 
Revolutionary Party (PR) (Premo 1981; Malloy et al., 1987).  
                                                 
11 Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemaletca (UNRG) is the Spanish translation for The Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity. 
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rightwing regimes became a self-fulfilling prophesy: “it triggered crises of legitimacy and 
terrorism all over the sub-continent [of Latin America]” (Sprinzak (1991, 62).  
In various cases, rightwing regimes at times can be more repressive than certain types of 
left leaning regimes and may negatively influence the functioning of leftist terror groups.12 As 
previously pointed out, several studies have suggested that the relationship between the level of 
terrorism and that of political repression may be nonlinear (Testas 2004; Blomberg et.al 2002). 
In general, studies show inconsistencies as per the relationship between repression and the 
incidence and intensity of terrorism (Piazza 2006). According to Piazza (2006, 167) “Repression 
and ‘^Repression’13
Invariably, as the inconsistency in the extant literature suggests, it may be plausible to 
conclude that repression by itself does not always equal terrorism. Rather, as Testas (2004) 
infers, while levels of terrorism may vary among regime types, it is important to note that while 
political repression initially decreases terrorism in the long term it increases it
 may be either positively or negatively related to terrorism.”   
14
                                                 
12 Many rightwing regimes have been known to wage systematic genocide and utilize death squads.  However, 
extant literature is inconsistent as to how this may affect leftist political party’s willingness to turn to terror.  
. Therefore, what 
separates a repressive rightwing regime from repression under left leaning regimes is not only 
the intensity of repression but also the nature of the repression and the target group. Importantly, 
in most polities, new and especially authoritarian emerging rightwing regimes, act on the behalf 
of a few wealthy elites. As part of their agenda, they promote economic and political policies that 
exclude large working-class groups or groups favoring greater equality from power (Pinkney 
1990, 14). Invariably, for most left leaning political parties these groups form an important 
constituent of the party’s support base and they may exert tremendous pressure on left leaning 
13 The ^ Repression measures follows that of Piazza (2006) and is the degree of change of a country’s political or 
civil freedom during the period 1960-2002. See Piazza (2006) for a detailed discussion of the Repression indices. 
14 Testas (2004) examination of the nexus between repression and terrorism relates to terrorism in general and not 
specifically directed at political parties who turn to terror.   
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political parties to act in their interests. Hence, leaders within leftist political parties may feel 
compelled to act violently under the weight of this form of directed repression when other 
mainstream political avenues are closed. Commenting on economic and social class exclusion 
and its role in stimulating terrorism, Testas (2004, 260) notes “failure or unwillingness by the 
state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the 
political system which in turn may lead to terrorism.”   
Unlike mass populist revolutions such as those that led to the Bolshevik revolution in 
Russia or the sustained guerrilla movement that brought Mao Zedong to power in China, leftist 
political parties facing opposition from rightwing regimes are often driven by elite level protest 
and as such then often fail to generate that mass level unrest that is sufficient to spur revolutions 
(Sprinzak (1991). Furthermore, in many cases, leftist political movements were not seeking 
nationalist goals: that is, they were not aiming to drive an imperialist power from their territory. 
Rather many political groups sought to remove regimes that were opposed to their movements 
(Sprinzak (1991). Therefore, mass support is not readily available for many leftist parties to 
conduct sustained levels of violence such as a guerrilla movement (Sprinzak 1991; Waldman 
2005). According to Sprinzak (1991, 63), the main difference between nationalist terrorism and 
its anti-authoritarian variant is that “the latter rarely gets the support of the masses. It is, of 
necessity, less sophisticated and strategic.”  He argues that while nationalist movements “can 
apply terrorism along with other strategies of combat, because it has the support of the masses, 
terrorism of a small anti-authoritarian group is usually its only remaining method of struggle” 
(Sprinzak 1991, 63).  Moreover, a turn to terror is seen as the most viable mechanism for many 
leftist political parties with limited options that operate in repressive rightwing polities.        
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Indeed, what existing evidence seems to suggest is a greater propensity for political 
parties to form terrorist groups within right-leaning regimes. To this end, it is necessary to 
account for political ideology, especially in right-leaning regimes, when looking at the reasons 
why political parties, especially on the ideological left, turn to terror.    
The preponderance of the theoretical evidence suggests that the existence of institutional 
and organizational constraints help create the conditions necessary for political parties to become 
terrorist organizations or form terrorist wings. In particular, a ruling government’s ideology 
appears to have a tremendous impact on how disgruntled groups choose to voice their 
dissatisfaction. However, while providing heuristic and anecdotal arguments about possible links 
between rightwing governments and oppositional violence, none of the aforementioned research 
(Goodman 1992; Pinkney 1990; Premo 1981; Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg 1991) has provided 
empirical evidence that links rightwing regimes to political parties turn to terrorism. In addition, 
no existing research has specifically examined the nexus between rightwing governments and 
terrorism beyond 1992. Importantly, unlike previous research this study aims to achieve these 
goals.  
 The working hypothesis of this dissertation seeks to understand and explain the causal 
parameters which encourage leftist political parties to turn to terror. My hypotheses follow:  
H1:  Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right 
position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other 
types of regimes.  
H2:  Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically left 
position will expect to have less numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of 
regimes.  
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H3:  Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically 
centrist position will expect to have less numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other 
types of regimes.  
2.3.1 Religious Political Parties and A Turn to Terror  
 
In their study, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 31) proclaim, “It is uncommon for ties 
between parties and terrorism to emerge when the cause involved is religious in nature.”   In 
general, the role played by political parties engaged in acts of terror in regimes governed by a 
religious ideology has been largely ignored. Historically, most scholars discount their activities 
as an aberration. Only recently has the issue become a concern to policymakers and scholars. 
However, what remains largely unexplained is whether religiously governed regimes promote a 
turn to terror more frequently than other types of ideological regimes.   
In this dissertation, religious political parties fall into the category of proto-hegemonic 
religious party, or religious fundamentalist party (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 182). According 
to Gunther and Diamond (2003, 182), “the fundamentalist party seeks to reorganize state and 
society around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles, while denominational-mass 
parties are pluralist and incremental in their agenda.”  Invariably, this categorization eliminates a 
significant number of moderate Christian, Hindi, Buddhist, and Islamic political parties.  
There are two reasons for the fundamentalist political party approach. First, extant 
literature on religious political parties does not provide a rich source of information on either the 
definition or the activities of religious political parties that utilize terror. Even more 
disappointing, there are very few consistent or reliable directions on what categories or types of 
parties qualify as religious political parties. In most cases, the literature focuses on party families 
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or classifications that exist in Western European states (Gunther and Diamond 2003). These 
classifications include divergent parties such as the Christian Democrats in Germany and other 
variations of “religious parties” that have plural interests and shared ideology with rightwing or 
some left-of-center parties (Duverger 1954, Gunther and Diamond 2003).  As Rosenblum (2003, 
25) points out, “merely vestigial reference to ‘Christian’, say, in party names does not suffice as 
a marker of religious parties. To count, parties must appeal to voters on religious grounds and 
draw their inspirations from religious values if not theology.” Therefore, to avoid 
conceptualization inconsistencies and coding problems among parties it was necessary to remove 
all denominational-mass parties from fundamentalist political parties because they do not have 
platforms or motivations that are singularly religious.  Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that 
many of the current Christian religious parties with their pluralist interests and platforms decide 
to turn to terror because of anti-secular motives.   
Second, much of the skepticism in regards to the peacefulness of religious political 
parties has not been directed at Christian political parties, but rather, towards those where Islam, 
Judea, Hindi, Buddhist and Sikh beliefs are the dominant theme of the party’s platform and used 
as the mechanism to appeal to voters (Rosenblum 2003, 24). Therefore,  fundamentalist party 
will serve as the proxy for religious parties especially since they are largely the point of focus in 
regards to parties that utilize terrorism during the post Cold War era. However, by focusing on 
fundamentalist parties, this study does not imply that Western Christian parties do not engage in 
acts of terror. As Juergensmeyer (2003, xii) suggests “violent ideas and images are not the 
monopoly of any single religion. Virtually every major religious tradition-Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist-has served as a resource for violent actors.”   Indeed, as the 
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case of Northern Ireland clearly points out, political parties with Christianity as their guiding 
ideology can, and do, engage in very violent acts of terror.     
The decades following the end of the Cold War has seen the rise of issues concerning 
lifestyle, cultural diversity, nationalism, immigration, and religion across the international system 
(Robinson et.al 2006). Extant literature suggests that religious political parties provide important 
representation for their members in many societies (Rosenblum 2003). They play a role not just 
in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing political identity (Rosenblum 2003; 
Kalyvas 1996; Zakaria 2004). With globalization, there has been an increase in the rate of 
secularization across societies. As a result, several traditionally powerful religious political 
parties and organizations in some societies now see their authority challenged by secular political 
parties and governments (Ranstorp 1996). Although “some religious nationalists have already 
achieved a great deal of political influence in their countries, others have not and never will” 
(Juergensmeyer 1993, 4). Consequently, a number of religious political parties find themselves 
less often as part of ruling governments and cabinets. In most cases, religious political parties 
that  are in such precarious positions often form coalitions with other political parties, broaden 
their appeal or in some cases harden their fundamental positions to appeal to disillusioned 
intellectuals and those who oppose the secularization of society (Juergensmeyer 1993; 
Rosenblum 2003; Zakaria 2004).        
Recent literature suggests that as other peaceful methods fail, religiously motivated 
political parties have increasingly reacted to their reduced influence in society by turning to other 
means such as terror to achieve their organizational objectives (Ranstorp 1996). Within the 
terrorism literature, there is a belief that since the end of the Cold War, incidents of religiously 
based terrorism have become more frequent than ever before (Cronin 2002; Juergensmeyer 1993, 
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2003; Ranstorp 1996). Hoffman (1997) reports that by 1995, over 50 percent of terrorist 
organizations were based on religion. More importantly, this belief has led various scholars to 
deduce that religiously based regimes (especially those that are non-Christian and non-Western) 
are more likely to turn  be a hotbed for all forms of terrorism. Hence, it follows that some 
policymakers conclude such regimes create conditions whereby political parties, especially those 
that are secular in their organizational platform, may turn to violence to achieve their objectives.            
The motivation for forming religious political parties bears many of the same similarities 
as those of secular political parties. At a minimum, religious political parties seek to advance the 
interests of their members or electorate. Religious groups, like many other groups, often create 
political organizations in reaction to perceived threats (Rosenblum 2003, 25).  In most cases, 
when a religious group decide to form a political party, the impetus and “sustaining idea behind 
[the] religious party is not purely self-protective […] a necessary condition is the conviction that 
religious doctrine or more abstract religious values should guide every aspect of life” 
(Rosenblum 2003, 26). In addition, religious political parties are in most cases motivated by the 
belief that “public ideals may be defended more persuasively and obligations motivated more 
dependably on religious than secular grounds” (Rosenblum 2003, 26).  
Interestingly, it is this rigid attitude held by various religious parties that they are the only 
viable panacea for society’s ills, which on many occasions leads to radicalization and friction 
between the organization and the state. While religion and politics in some polities may have a 
peaceful cohabitation, diverging ideologies are also the source of incipient violence.  Zakaria 
(2004, 13) contends, “The combination of religion and politics has proven combustible. Religion, 
at least the religion of the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), stresses moral 
absolutes. But politics is all about compromise. The result has been ruthless, winner-take-all 
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attitude towards political life.” Moreover, when there is opposition from the state such as the 
banning of religious political parties in Algeria and Turkey, some religious parties may conceive 
such action as a direct affront to their cause and may undertake fanatic or radical means of 
achieving their organizational objectives.15
Fundamentalist political parties do not all start their political life in opposition to the 
government (Ranstorp 1996). However, many of these parties may eventually turn to violence 
due to poor showings at electoral polls and/or institutional barriers such as court decrees 
mandating dissolution of the party. Their use of violence is aimed at continuing with a cause that 
the party believes is just. In part, decisions by extremists within the political party to utilize 
violence are conditioned by the political context within which the organization operates 
(Ranstorp 1996).  According to Ranstorp (1996), “most active terrorist groups with a religious 
imperative were actually propelled into existence in reaction to key events. These events either 
served as a catalyst or inspirational model for the organization or gravely escalated the 
perception of the threat of foreign secularization, or for messianic […] groups, a heightened 
sense that time was running out” (p. 3). For many religious motivated groups that turn to terror, 
the decision to use violence is seen as necessary in their all-out struggle to resist secularization 
from within the state and from outside forces (Ranstorp1996, 3). Moreover, extant literature does 
not provide conclusive evidence that there are regime types or electoral systems that forestall 
religious political parties from engaging in acts of terror in a consistent manner.   
   
As previously pointed out, religious terrorism does not share many of the same 
ideological motivations as leftwing, rightwing and ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism. Extant 
                                                 
15  On January 11, 1992, the Algerian military halted the country’s electoral process and deprived the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) an assured victory at the polls. Similarly, in 2001, Turkey’s high court banned the pro-Islamic 
Virtue Party-the main opposition to the government because of perceived anti-secular activities. 
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literature suggests that religious political parties with extreme platforms and ideologies are 
unlikely to change their position even if they are democratically elected (Langohr, 2001). The 
argument also goes that they will use their newfound freedoms to subvert democracy (Langohr, 
2001).  
According to extant literature, what has become apparent in the post Cold War period is 
the upward trend of religious based terrorism across all types of regimes (Hoffman 2006; Cronin 
2002; Enders and Sandler 2005; Juergensmeyer 2003). A number of scholars infer that religious 
based political organizations (for example Hezbollah and Hamas) are fast becoming major 
sources of terror (Cronin 2002, Enders and Sandler 2005). In general, there has been a noticeable 
upward trend of religious based parties aligning themselves with terror organizations. Cronin 
(2002) contends that there is an increasing hyper-religious motivation of small terrorist groups 
enabled by an environment of bad governance, non-existent social services and poverty (38). 
Thus, “sacred terrorism is becoming more significant” especially in young democracies (Cronin, 
2002, 39). However, the literature on religiously based political parties allied to terrorist 
organizations has remained sparse.  
Cronin (2002) suggests that religious based terrorism, and in particular, Islamic 
fundamentalism poses a tremendous threat to fledgling democracies. According to Enders and 
Sandler (2005), “by the 1990s the driving force of terrorism […] is religious based 
fundamentalist less constrained by norms” (262). Scholars contend that, since 1980 religious 
based terrorist groups have grown 64%.16
                                                 
16 Enders and Sandler (2005) report on the growth of religious groups based on data from Iterate data set.   
  Indeed, while there are no official figures to confirm 
the assessment that there has been an increase in religious based political parties engaged in 
terrorist activity, what is evident is the increasing visibility and impact of political parties with 
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ties to terror organizations. Political parties such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Shiv Sena (Army of Shiv) in India, and Hamas in Palestine 
have engaged in acts of terror.  
Moreover, what is significant about religious political parties is their unpredictability. 
Unlike, leftists or rightwing parties, religiously motivated parties are highly unstable and often 
prone to abandon mainstream politics and use of violence in an effort to achieve goals. As 
Cronin (2002) points out, “religious terrorists may not be as constrained in their behavior by 
concerns about the reactions of their human constituents […] they are not trying to correct the 
system […] rather they are trying to replace it” (p. 42).   
Despite prevailing opinions, there are no systematic empirical studies showing that 
religious political parties are more or less likely than rightist and leftist parties to turn to terror 
since the end of the Cold War. At most, what the scholarly literature reveals is a lack of insight 
in regards to the motivations of religious based political parties, and their willingness to utilize 
terrorism as a tool.  In general, the literature is relatively silent on religious based political 
parties’ motivations, their targets, and the internal dynamics of religious based political parties.  
The fourth working hypothesis of this dissertation seeks to understand and explain the 
causal parameters which encourage religious political parties to turn to terror. The fourth 
hypothesis follows:  
H4: Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs based on a particular religious 
ideology will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other 
types of regimes.  
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CHAPTER 3 - Cross-sectional Time Series Analysis  
An empirical analysis is designed to test the above hypothesis. This dissertation uses both 
quantitative and case study approaches. Mahoney and Goertz (2006, 237) note that the scope and 
causal generalizations are greater using quantitative approaches than they are when qualitative 
methods are applied. Despite a historical disdain for using quantitative approaches to study 
terrorism by many within the field, quantitative approaches are fast emerging as vital tools in 
terrorism research. Silke (2001, 9) contends that, “social science researchers typically have to 
work with very ‘noisy’ data where there are potentially a vast number of factors exerting an 
influence on any one behavior, event, or trend.”  Statistical analysis has emerged as a way for 
researchers to determine which factors genuinely are important. Thus, statistical approaches 
permit a broad picture of the relationship between multiple explanatory variables and allow for 
the evaluation of various variables and findings that can be replicated. In this chapter, a 
multivariate statistical approach will be used to test the two hypotheses.  
This chapter proceeds as such: the following section details the process of 
operationalizing formation of terrorist organization (dependent variable) and regime ideological 
character (right, left, center, and religious regime). The first section also includes an overview of 
the data, the data generating process, and the unit of analysis. In the following section, an 
analysis and discussion of the methodology, empirical analysis, and statistical findings is 
presented.  The findings of my regression analysis are presented in Table 3.2. The final section 
of this chapter provides a summary of the chapter as well as additional statistical support 
presented in the form of Figures 3.1 through 3.6.    
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3.1 Research Design and Methods 
 
1. Cross-sectional-time-series design. This dissertation utilizes  cross-sectional time 
series data of 31 countries from 1960 to 2006, (a list of countries used in this dissertation can be 
found in Appendix A). Data availability issues have restricted this research to 31 states. The 
choice of time, from 1960 to 2006 was selected for two reasons. First, the early 1960s to early 
1990s, as the expanded literature points out, is the period when most political parties formed 
alliances with or created terrorist organizations. Figures 3.2 illustrate the trends in the formation 
of terrorist organization by political parties. Second, the choice of 1960 to 2006 allows sufficient 
time to measure Cold War and post Cold War effects that may account for changes in the link 
between legitimate political parties and terrorist organizations.   
2. Operational definitions. This research analyzes the process whereby political parties 
create terrorist organizations. The dependent variable (Y) is the formation of terrorist 
organization and the independent variable is a regime’s ideological character (X).   
(a) Dependent Variable: As outlined in the literature, terrorism is not an ideology but an 
activity (Danzell 2011; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). The operational definition of terrorism is 
a count variable that measures the following: any group formed by a political organization or 
acting on its behalf, or its members, and that deliberately engages in bombings, explosions, 
arson, fires, rocket attacks, killings, attempted killings, shootings, sieges, violent attacks, and 
similar violent actions is considered a terrorist group. It shows the number of terrorist groups 
formed per state each year.  
Because this study seeks to identify only terrorist organizations formed by political 
parties, existing datasets on terrorist incidents (such as ITERATE) are inadequate. Such extant 
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data do not provide information on whether the terrorist groups counted were directly connected 
to political parties. In addition, many existing datasets are constructed to measure transnational 
terrorist incidents and are thus ill-suited for this study, because the unit of analysis in this 
research is domestic terrorism per state year.    
As a way of addressing these shortcomings, this research uses a newly created dataset17 
that only counts cases where terrorist groups are affiliated with political parties. The dataset for 
the dependent variable was drawn from three sources. The first comes from the Terrorist 
Organization Profiles (TOPs) collected by the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB).18
The second source of data on terrorist organization formation by political parties is the 
RAND End-of-Terror Dataset (1968 to 2006). Unlike the ITERATE collection, the RAND End-
of-Terror Dataset contains information on terrorist group formation and survival. The End-of-
Terror Dataset includes data on 648 active groups between 1968 and 2006. The dataset also 
includes information on economic conditions, regime type, size, ideology, group goals, and 
affiliation that affect terrorist group survival.  The third source is Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003). 
These scholars provide a list of more than 122 cases (from 1910-1990) where political parties 
and terrorist groups are affiliated.  
 The data 
contained in TOPs provides background information on more than 850 organizations that have 
been known to engage in terrorist activities around the world during the last four decades. 
Importantly, TOPs provides detailed information on bases of operations, organizational strength, 
ideology, goals as well as political organizations or governments tied to these terrorist groups.  
                                                 
17  This new dataset extends Danzell (2011) to cover the period 1960 to 2006. The dataset also improves on Danzell 
(2011) dataset by including several states that were not covered in the initial dataset used in his study.   
18 The TOPs database is presently maintained by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) that also maintains the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). During the period 2004 
through 2008, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided support for the 
creation and ongoing maintenance of the Terrorism Knowledge Base. See START for a full discussion of the 
database.  
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From these sources, and as a way of identifying relevant cases, only terrorist 
organizations that were affiliated or formed by political parties were selected. Painstaking effort 
went into ensuring that the creation of political parties preceded the formation of terrorist 
organizations. Where possible this was done by tracing the order of the political affiliation 
between political parties and terrorist groups based on case write-ups in TOPs dataset and 
Weinberg and Pedahzur’s (2003) listings and write-ups.  
 (b) Independent variable. A regime’s ideological character is operationalized by 
creating an ideological variable.19
Six sources are used to create the independent variables. The first comes from the 
Comparative Political Data Set II and III 1960-2006 (CPDS) (Armingeon et.al. 2006).  The 
CPDS I and II provide a collection of political and institutional data for 35 OECD and EU 
member countries. Among the contents included in the database are variables specifying 
governments, elections, party systems and the percentage of seats won by  each party that make 
up the cabinet and their political ideology on the left to right spectrum. The second source comes 
from the Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological 
Group in Capital Democracies 1950-2006 (Swank 2006). This dataset is similar to the CPDS. 
 First, gov_right counts the total cabinet positions for members 
who come from right wing parties. The second coded, gov_left, measures the percentage of 
cabinet positions held by leftist political parties.  The third variable coded gov _cent counts 
center parties in percentage of total cabinet posts. The fourth variable coded gov _rel counts 
religious political parties in percentage of total cabinet posts.  
                                                 
19 Party classifications are  based on (Francis and Mair 1984; Pinkney 1990; Goodman 1992 and Gunther, 
Richard, and Larry Diamond 2003). The classifications are as follows: Right: far-right (e.g., neo-fascist, right-wing 
populist), classical liberal, European conservative Christian Democratic, and the other various right-wing parties; 
Left: communist; socialist, social democratic, and other various left-wing parties (e.g., left-libertarian parties); 
Centrist: non-conservative European Catholic parties, secular non-conservative parties of the center; Religious: 
Islamic, Sikh, Buddhist, and Hindu political parties.   
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The Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group 
provides a list of political parties from left to right and includes ideological variations such as 
left, right religious, centrist, and the percentage of seats and votes won by parties across 21 
countries. The third source is Castles and Mair (1984), which provide a schema for countries as 
well as data on party activity for the years post-1980.  The fourth source comes from Mallory 
(1960-1967). The fifth is collected from Banks et.al (1969-2006). Mallory, Banks and associates 
provide information on political parties and cabinet composition for various states.  The final 
source is Tachau (1994). This source gives a comprehensive guide to the political activities, 
genealogy and electoral results of significant political parties in more than 23 countries in the 
Middle East and North African regions between 1949 to 1992.  
(c) Control variables. Extant literature provides several variables that may foster the 
formation of terrorist organizations. This research uses four control variables identified in the 
literature to explain the creation of terrorist groups. First is the electoral system. It acts as a 
measure of institutional constraints on political parties (Li 2005). This dissertation uses three 
indicators for electoral system. According to extant literature, these measures include 
majoritarian, proportional representation, and mixed electoral system. These influence the 
dependant variable by creating varying levels of institutional constraints on political parties’ 
access to the political system. The second control is Cold War, a dummy variable, meant to 
measure the effect of the Cold War on the formation of terrorist organizations.  
The period between 1960 to 1989 was coded 1 for the Cold War and coded 0 thereafter 
up to 2006. The third control variable is conflict, drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch 2009). Following Li (2005), conflict was coded 1 if a state is engaged in an 
interstate military conflict or war and 0 otherwise. The fourth control variable highlights the 
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strategic choice idea of cost. Repression operationalizes the cost of terrorist group formation 
(negatively correlated). Repression implies that abuses of civil liberties (rights such as 
executions, imprisonment and political murders/brutality) exists within the regime and provides a 
measure of the extent of governmental repression in a given regime. To measure repression, data 
from two independent sources are used.  The dataset is based on human rights violations and 
follows Gibney, Cornett and Wood (2007). These are collected by two organizations, Amnesty 
International, available from 1962 onwards and the United States Department of State, available 
from 1976 onwards.  Each of the variables has a political terror scale ranked 1 to 5. The 
maximum value of the two series was taken in any given country and year.  A threshold of 3 and 
above was used to classify repression and coded as 1, and below 2 as 0.       
 
3.2 Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides the mean, standard deviation, and the range for each of the variables 
used in this paper. The dependent variable terrorist group has 1449 observations, with a 
minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 3. In terms of the frequency of terrorist groups formation 
by political parties in a given year, there were 216 cases where one terrorist group was formed by 
a political party, 35 cases where 2 groups were formed by a political party, and 5 cases where 3 
terrorist organization were formed in a given year.  The mean, which is the average or the 
common measure of tendency is .2077. 
The key independent variable gov_right contains 1293 observations, with a minimum 
score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The variable had a mean score of 50.81. The independent 
variable representing government of the left (gov_left), has 1293 observations, with a minimum 
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score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The variable has a mean score of 23.6692. The other 
important variable that this research evaluates is governments whose ideology is based on 
religion. The variable gov_rel has 1293 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a 
maximum of 100. Its mean score is 4.2379. The variable for centrist governments (gov_cen) has 
1293 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The mean measures 
20.2371. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Terrorist group 1449 0.2077         0.4834 0 3 
Gov_right 1293 50.8102      44.4511 0 100 
Gov_ left 1293 23.6692 36.6842 0 100 
Gov_rel 1293 4.2379  16.7043 0 100 
Gov_cen 1293 20.2371 34.4164 0 100 
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3.2.2 Statistical Analysis 
Before analyzing the statistical results, an assessment of the influence of multicollinearity 
is performed by estimating the variance inflation factor (VIF). When employing multiple 
regressions, it is desirable to have explanatory variables that are highly correlated to a response 
variable. However, to obtain reliable estimates, it is not desirable for explanatory variables to be 
correlated with each other (Wooldridge 2006). Where multicollinearity is present, the standard 
deviation of the regression coefficients may be disproportionately large, the coefficient estimates 
may also be unstable, and the regression coefficients may not be interpretable (Gourieroux et al., 
1984; Wooldridge 2006; Long 1997).   Multicollinearity is a concern when estimates average is 
above 1 and the VIF for the model is above 10. The VIF scores of the models suggest that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in the estimates20
An important limitation of the Poisson model is that it may fail to account for 
overdispersion and can result in spuriously small standard errors of the explanatory variables 
(Gourieroux et al., 1984). The choice of the Poisson model used in this paper is based on a 
standard test of fit ( Land, McCall and Nagin 1996). A significant alpha test indicates that there 
are no problems of overdispersion. The following descriptions of test statistics provide further 
guidance in choosing the best estimator fit. Random effect Poisson was chosen based on two 
factors. First, the fixed effect Poisson estimator is conditional, suggesting that observations in 
. Because terrorist groups’ formation is in the 
form of a yearly count, a Poisson regression is used (Cameron and Tivendi 1998). The Poisson 
model estimates the probability of terrorist group formation from political parties in democratic 
and partly democratic regimes each year.  
                                                 
20 The composite VIF score of 4.17 suggests multicollinearity is not a factor in the estimates 
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which the dependent variable is unchanged are not used for the estimation purposes (Wooldridge 
2006). Eliminating observations reduces efficiency.  Second, various specifications and model fit 
tests conducted (using STATA 10.0) confirmed random effect Poisson as the most suitable 
estimator based on fit.21
Table 3.2 presents the results of the statistical analysis. The first model listed in Table 3.2 
represents the standard test of hypotheses 1. The hypothesis states that regimes whose leader or 
ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have greater 
numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.  
 All four models presented in Table 3.2, have highly significant Wald 
chi-squares suggesting that the models fit the data well. 
The most notable result concerns the central hypothesis about an ideologically right 
government. The model includes the dependent variable (terrorist group formed) and four 
explanatory variables that the literature argues affect the formation of terrorist groups 
(majoritarian democracy, Cold War, conflict, and repression). The variable representing 
government of the right is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The coefficient for 
Gov_right variable is .0078, which suggests in states with decidedly right leaning cabinets the 
likelihood of political parties forming terrorist groups’ increases the mean by .78 percent, 
holding other variables constant. Additional evidence is shown in Figure 3.3, which provides a 
graphical illustration of the regression analysis. Figure 3.2 illustrates the intensity level of 
terrorist groups formed by political parties when there is a right-leaning government in power 
during the period 1960-2006. This figure shows that under right-wing government there was a 
significant level of terrorist groups formed especially during the early to mid-1970s. Figure 3.2 
also shows a peak of about 13 terrorist groups being created during the early to mid-1990s. The 
                                                 
21 Tests for goodness-of fit diagnostics include log likelihood ratio chi-square –countfit, and Alpha test confirmed 
that random effect Poisson is an appropriate estimator (Long 1997;Long and Freese 2003).   
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results supports hypothesis one that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a 
classical ideologically right position are likely to have greater numbers of political parties that 
turn to terror than other types of regimes.  
In general, most control variables behaved as predicted following the findings found in 
the extant literature. The variable representing majoritarian democracy in model 1 is statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level. The coefficient for the majdemoc variable is .6817. Thus, in 
countries with political systems that are majoritarian, the likelihood that political parties will 
create terrorist organizations increases by almost 68 percent holding other variables constant.  
This finding supports that of Crenshaw (1981) and Li (2005). The Cold War variable is also 
statistically significant and the coefficient for the Cold War variable is .5054. Thus, the Cold 
War environment increases the likelihood of terrorist group formation by political parties by 51 
percent.  The variable representing repression is statistically significant at the p<.10 level. The 
coefficient for this variable .3481, thus repression is shown to be significant in increasing the 
likelihood of terrorist group formation by political parties by 34 percent, holding all other 
variables constant. This finding follows the conclusion drawn by Testas (2004) and Blomberg 
et.al (2002) who found that repression’s effect on terrorism is indeterminate as it may sometime 
either positively or negatively relate to terrorism.     
With the initial regression complete, the analysis shifted to determine whether leftist, 
religious, and centrist governments influence the formation of terrorist groups.  A second 
regression, Model 2, was run specifying variables for left ruling cabinets. The coefficient for 
Gov_left is -.0050 at the 05 level of significance. In interpreting these figures, political parties 
within left leaning regimes were .50 percent less likely to be associated with the creation of 
terrorist organizations. As in Model 1, the Cold War and majoritarian system variables are 
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positive and statistically significant at the .01%, and .05% levels respectively. As is the case in 
Model 1, repression was found to be statistically significant at the .10 level. The coefficient for 
repression is .3851 suggesting repression increases the likelihood of terrorist group formation by 
political parties by 39 percent, holding all other variables constant. All other variables were 
found to be statistically insignificant. Figure 3.4 illustrates the intensity level of terrorist groups 
formed by political parties when there is a left-leaning government in power during the period 
1960-2006. As shown the overall incidence is significantly lower than that of right-wing 
governments.  The mean incidence of political parties creating terrorist organization when a left-
leaning political party is slightly over 4 incidence per year. 
The third regression model tests hypothesis 2 that seeks to determine whether regimes 
whose leader or ruling cabinet governs based on a particular religious ideology will expect to 
have fewer numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes. Unlike the 
two previous models, the independent variable in this model (Gov_rel) is statistically 
insignificant. This finding appears to be consistent with other research (Weinberg and Pedahzur 
2003) that found no observable relationship between governments that have close ties to religion 
and a higher level of terrorist organization created by political parties. Thus, regimes with 
cabinets dominated by religious parties do not appear to have higher levels of terrorist groups’ 
formation by political parties. Consistent with the previous models, the Cold War variable is 
significant at the .01 % level, the variable representing majoritarian electoral system is 
statistically significant at the .05 % level, and the variable representing repression is statistically 
significant at the .05 % level.  All other variables are statistically insignificant. Figure 3.6 
illustrate the overall incidence of terrorist organizations when a government is in power and 
whose ideology is based on religion. As shown in the figure, except in the mid to late 1970s and 
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early 1980s when opposition political parties in Lebanon and Iran created terrorist wings, Figure 
3.6 shows that political parties rarely create terrorist organization under governments that are 
religiously based. In Iran by the mid-1980s under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini regime almost 
political parties such as the leftist National Democratic Front and the moderate religious Muslim 
People’s Republican which had created terror groups were eventually silenced by the very 
effective and repressive state security apparatus (Hiro 2005).  
The final estimates in Table 3.2, (Model 4) focus on the relationship between 
governments and ruling cabinets that are decidedly centrist.  The variable for centrist leaning 
cabinets (Gov_cen) is statistically significant. The coefficient for Gov_cen is -.0052 at the .05 
level. In interpreting these figures, political parties within centrist leaning regimes were .52 
percent less likely to be associated with the creation of terrorist organizations. This is consistent 
with other studies on violent conflicts that show centrist governments are less likely to encourage 
violent upheaval by dissatisfied groups. This is consistent with the cases presented in previous 
models, the Cold War variable was highly significant as illustrated in the findings at the .01 
level. The variable majoritarian electoral system is also statistically significant at the .05 level.  
Also consistent with the other models is the statistical significance of the variable specifying 
repression, which was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. All other variables are 
insignificant. The results of the estimates in Table 3.2 lend considerable support to both 
hypotheses tested in this dissertation. Overall, all models behaved as expected and lend support 
to the  key hypotheses that political parties create far more terrorist organizations when a right-
leaning governments is in power than is the case with other types of governments.  
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Table 3.2 Poisson Regression Estimates for Terrorist Group Formation 1960-2006 
     
              Model 1  Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
 
Gov_right  .0078***         
   (.0018)        
 
Gov_left     -.0050**     
     (.0021)     
 
Gov_rel       .0021   
        (.0061)     
 
Gov_cen         -.0052** 
          (.0025) 
 
Cold War  .5054** * .5752***  .5631*** .5321*** 
   (.1445)  (.1422)   (.1428)  (.1434) 
 
Majdemoc  .6817** .5352**  .5423** .6552** 
   (.2931)  (.2820)   (.2783)  (.2817) 
 
 
Repression  .3481*  .3851**  .3964** .3850** 
   (.1924)  (.1903)   (.1895)  (.1873) 
 
 
Conflict  .1671  .1897   .2184  .1958  
   (.2173)  (.2164)   (.2141)  (.2141) 
 
 
Constant  -2.6864*** -2.1845***  -2.2861*** -2.2118*** 
   (.2461)  (.2311)   (.2331)  (.2264) 
 
 
Alpha   .4711** * .4462***  .4471*** .4253*** 
   (.1541)  (.1480)   (.1517)  (.1444)  
 
Wald chi-square 40.4400*** 27.0800***  21.7200*** 25.51*** 
 
 
Log-likelihood  -642.40171 -649.7082  -652.7103 -650.5281 
 
N    1234     1234   1234  1234 
 
*  ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the p<.10 p<.05 and p<.01 level. One tailed test. Note: 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. 
 
 58 
3.2.3 Discussion of the Findings  
 In general, political parties creating terrorist organization is most often a rare event as 
shown in Figure 3.1, however when faced with certain types of government policies, political 
parties are more likely to turn to violent means of protest action. As the statistical results 
indicate, random effect Poisson models provide empirical support for the hypothesis that regimes 
whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position should expect 
to experience greater numbers of political parties turning to terror than other types of regimes. 
This finding holds even after controlling for the effects of Cold War, the country’s electoral 
system, state repression, and external conflict are controlled for in the estimates.  Thus, the 
models suggest that decisions by opposition political parties to utilize terror are conditioned by 
the political ideology of the ruling cabinet. In particular, where leaders in a regime choose to 
adopt classical rightwing approaches and policies during their tenure in office, opposition parties 
at times turn may to terror. Interestingly, the influence of the variable repression showed 
dramatic improvements over those by Danzell (2011), Testas (2004), and Blomberg et.al (2002) 
who found the role played by repression to be inconsistent across types of political parties, type 
of governments, and levels of democratization. Given the extensive period under examination, 
this dissertation provides the most reliable examination of the role of repression on terrorist 
group formation by political parties.  
This chapter addressed the role played by political parties’ ideology in the creation of 
terrorist groups. The statistical findings lend support to the hypothesis in regards to the activities 
of ruling rightwing political parties promoting the conditions that allow for the creation of 
leftwing terrorist groups by political parties with left leaning ideology. As noted in the literature, 
leftist terror organizations are not created in a vacuum (Danzell 2011). They require a catalyst. It 
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seems that the policies of conventional rightwing political parties in power create the conditions 
that spur left-leaning parties to form terror groups.  
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Figure 3.1 Total Terroist Groups Formed by Political Parties 1960-2006 
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Figure 3.2 Total Terroist Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Right-leaning Governments 
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Figure 3.3 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Left-Leaning Governments  
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Figure 3.4 Total Terror Groups Formed When Religious Governments are in Power 
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Figure 3.5 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Centrist Governments  
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Figure 3.6  Frequency of Terrorist Groups formed by Political Parties 1960-2006   
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CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to the Qualitative Approach 
This dissertation uses a dual qualitative-quantitative approach to examine the explanatory 
power of rightwing regimes and their effect on political parties who turn to terror. Chapter two 
advances the hypothesis that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical 
ideologically right position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to 
terror than other types of regimes.  Chapter three tested this hypothesis to see if this proposition 
holds as well as whether there was any similar relationship with leftist, centrist, and religions 
leaning cabinets.  The statistical results presented in chapter three show a strong statistical 
relationship between rightist cabinets and greater number of political parties creating terrorist 
organizations than other types of ideological cabinets. As  argued in the theoretical and 
quantitative chapter, the sometime harsh policies of traditional rightwing regimes often 
undermines sometimes more peaceful oppositional approaches used by left leaning and centrist 
political parties.  
In this chapter, I detail the process for examining the micro-level factors that explain how 
some rightwing regimes influence leftist and centrist political parties to turn to violence. A “most 
different case” comparative design is employed to test the hypothetical implications of the 
model, the predictions made in the theoretical chapter, the initial findings of the quantitative 
chapter and to provide depth22
The chapter uses a case comparison approach and examines whether my hypothesis about 
rightwing regimes and their impact on leftist and centrist political parties holds when using a 
more in-depth analysis. Although leftist political parties that operate within rightwing political 
 to the research.   
                                                 
22 According to Gerring (2001: 104) depth fulfills a central goal of social science. It is able to tell us as much as 
possible about the empirical world—by peering deeply into small portion of that world. One might also call it 
informativeness, completeness, richness, thickness, or details.  
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party ruled polity do not always turn to terror, the policies of rightwing regimes often lead to a 
radicalization of political parties when there is a strong leftist ideology.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, an explanation of the utility of using case 
study approaches and the case selection process is presented. Second, an examination of the 
structured focused comparison method presented. Following this section, a third and fourth 
section discussing the case selection process and the process tracing using critical junctures 
approach (Slater and Simmons 2010) is discussed.   
4.1 Research Design and Methods 
4.1.1 Qualitative Approach  
In general, quantitative and qualitative research is dissimilar.  On one hand, quantitative 
research uses statistical methods. This approach focuses on numerical measurements of specific 
aspects of phenomena.  It abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test 
casual hypothesis; it seeks measurements and analyses that are easily replicable by other 
researchers (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 3).  On the other hand, qualitative research covers a 
wide range of approaches, but importantly, none of these approaches relies on numerical 
measurements (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4).  Instead, qualitative work tends to focus on 
one or a small number of cases and often relies on “intensive interviews or in-depth analysis of 
historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with rounded 
comprehensive account of some event or unit” (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). Despite 
utilizing a smaller number of cases, qualitative researchers generally unearth enormous amounts 
of information from their studies (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). Moreover, when applied 
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with precision, qualitative/historical research can be analytical and used to evaluate alternative 
explanations through a process of valid causal inference (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 5).    
 Overall, qualitative methods and, in particular, the case study approach has historically 
been the method of choice for most researchers in the field of oppositional terrorism (Schmid 
1983; Ross 2004). As Ross (2004) notes, the amount of quantitative studies on oppositional 
political terrorism pales in comparison to the number of those that depend on qualitative 
methods. Interestingly, his observation about the ratio between quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the study of terrorism has not changed much in the past six years.   
There are two major reasons a preference for qualitative approaches remains. The first 
lies in the unavailability of data. Statistical data, in particular data on political terrorism, are 
generally unavailable to the public, “dated, or limited to international or transnational events” 
(Ross 2004, 29).  The second, and perhaps a more cogent reason, resides in the widely held 
belief by many within the field that qualitative approaches provide more in in-depth explanation 
about the motivation and internal dynamics at play in terrorist groups. In addition, there is some 
concern that in complex dynamics such as what prevails in terrorist organizations, many of the 
volatile interactions cannot be meaningfully formulated in ways that permit statistical testing of 
hypothesis with quantitative data. In essence, the argument follows that statistical modeling 
cannot adequately capture certain micro features of terrorist organizations.      
One of the qualities most often touted in regards to qualitative/ historical approaches is 
the ability to flesh-out socio-psychological dynamics. Put simply, qualitative approaches are 
touted as offering unique mechanisms to help understand the psychology of participants and the 
social setting in which actors who engage in terrorism operate (Ross 2004, 26). Intuitively, 
qualitative research provides a useful dimension over that offered by quantitative approaches. 
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The approach provides what King Kehone, and Verba (1994) argue is “richness” and “thickness” 
of “depth” not offered by statistical approaches.   King, Kehone, and Verba (1994) note that an 
advantage to “in-depth case study is that the development of good causal hypotheses is 
complementary to good description rather than competitive with it” (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994, 45). Moreover, by employing the case study approach, it helps in contextualizing the 
material that is developed using quantitative methods (Ross 2004, 26). 
 As previously noted, by far, the bulk of terrorism research utilizes qualitative methods. 
However, what is noteworthy about this trend is that a large number of these studies have been 
largely descriptive accounts of terrorism, their targets, and measures used to combat these 
actions (Ross 2004; Silke 2002). Not often evident are qualitative studies that attempt to uncover 
the causal relationships that explain acts of terrorism. More often, research using qualitative 
approach has been marked by theoretical generalizations that are not based on solid cases or 
methods (Ross 2004).   
In addition, even where extant qualitative studies have followed strict methodological 
practices, these studies often focus disproportionately on specific types of terrorist incidents. The 
most frequent areas of research utilizing case studies have been works on hijackings, hostage-
taking, and nuclear/biological threats (Joyner 1974; Aston 1986; Allison 2004).  In general, these 
works have largely been what Ross (2004, 25) refers to as “rich in details [but] is often too 
biased in the authors’ perspective.”  More critically, where there have been significant criticisms 
in regards to the use of the case study approaches in the field of terrorism, these critiques have 
been made based on application of poor methodological practices. Noteworthy, examples are in 
the areas of establishing and testing casual links and relationships between the dependent 
variable (terrorism) and a host of independent variables advanced by various scholars.  Indeed, 
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what is at fault is not the case study approach, but rather poor application of qualitative methods. 
Among the frequent problems evident in various qualitative works in the field of terrorism are a 
range of methodological problems such as tautological, circularity, and endogeneity.  
Nevertheless, despite various ongoing methodological shortcomings in the field as it 
relates to the proper utilization of the case study approach, many scholars in the terrorism 
research program maintain that qualitative approaches offers more veracity than other 
approaches in understanding the complex dynamics at play in the topic of terrorism (Ross 2004).    
Proponents of qualitative approaches within the field argue that because of the 
psychological, sociological, clandestine, and volatile dimensions of terrorism case studies and 
comparative approaches, especially those that utilize process-tracing, are critical in providing 
greater insights (Hackler 1976; Sprinzak 1990; Ferracuti 1981). Indeed, as pointed out in the 
theoretical chapter, the causes of terrorism and the structural, organizational, and ideological 
factors are complex and may differ across polities. Hence, there is a need to assess at the micro-
level what are the causal factors at work. Comparative studies allow for more detailed analysis 
and comparison of cases (Bryman 2006, 108).  Gerring (2006, 157) points out that “all 
knowledge is comparative […] In order to know one thing, we must know neighboring things, 
perhaps even things that are quite different from what we set to talk about.” Proponents of the 
case study approach have complained about the recent trend in terrorism research, which only 
utilizes quantitative techniques.  Various scholars (Sprinzak 1990; Ferracuti 1982; Ross 2004) 
point to an absence of depth in quantitative research used by many within the field of terrorism 
as justification for why quantitative study is not sufficient by itself to examine behaviors that are 
related to terrorism.  
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4.1.2 Structured Focused Comparison:  
To test the explanatory variable this dissertation uses a structured focused comparison 
design23. As pointed out in the extant literature, an important facet of good qualitative research is 
that the approach illustrates the hallmarks of comparability.24 Structured focused comparison is 
important because the issue under investigation falls under the scope of “theory testing and 
development.”  It thus requires a greater threshold of precision for establishing validity (George 
and Bennett 2005, 75). The method encompasses two main elements; it is “structured” and 
“focused.” Invariably, structure implies that the study of cases chosen should be undertaken with 
very specific objectives and a directed theoretical focus appropriate for that particular objective 
(George and Bennett 2005, 70). In applying “structure,” the researcher writes general questions 
that reflect the research objectives; these questions are asked of each case under the study to 
guide and standardize the data collection (George and Bennett, 2005).  It is “focused” because it 
deals only with certain aspects of the cases examined (George and Bennett 2005, 68).  As a 
requirement for a structured focused comparison, both structure and focus should be applied 
equally to individual cases25
                                                 
23 Structured focused comparison mirrors closely qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The QCA main hallmarks 
are similar to structured focused comparison in that causes and outcomes must be coded dichotomously 
(present/absent, strong/weak, etc). This process allows the researcher to identify common variables that illustrate a 
positive effect on the dependent variable. See Gerring (2001) and Ragin (1992)  
 “since they may be joined later by additional cases” (George and 
Bennett 67, 2005). In addition to the previous two steps is the final but important component of 
comparison.   In general, there are few convincing arguments that can be made for not comparing 
cases when there are comparable cases available (Gerring 2006, 172). Systematic comparison 
facilitates the cumulation of findings (George and Bennett 2005, 68).  It provides a basis for 
assessing whether a phenomenon is not isolated to one particular instance or period. An ideal 
24 Comparability infers characteristics such as unit homogeneity, equivalence, and cross-case validity. See Gerring 
2001 for a discussion of comparability.     
25  At best, each case causes and outcome should be treated as a dichotomous variable. See Gerring (2001, 207).  
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comparative study using structured focus comparison should employ “standardized set of 
questions in a controlled comparison […] to assure comparable data from the several cases” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 62).  
The advantage of structured focused comparison over other techniques lies in its level of 
standardization. The approach used in structured focused comparison fosters validity and 
reliability while allowing the variables to be assessed across cases. The decision to use structured 
focus comparison is an important one that sets this dissertation apart from other works in the 
field of terrorism research. As outlined earlier, many past qualitative studies in the field rarely 
applied sufficient methodological consistency across cases. Invariably, where cases are not 
guided by a well-defined theoretical and methodological process, they often do not contribute 
much in terms of theory development as they lack a clearly defined and common purpose 
(George and Bennett 2005, 70).      
For this dissertation, questions formulated for structured comparison will emphasize four 
issues relevant to the research objective. First is the ideology of government. The theoretical and 
the quantitative chapters illustrate that a political party’s ideology is an important consideration 
that explains the attitude of government towards the electorate. However, extant literature only 
emphasizes left leaning ideology as a sufficient cause for terrorist group creation. Therefore, it is 
important to assess the role of ruling party’s ideology as rightwing ideology has been shown in 
the previous chapter as an important regressor that explains the creation of terrorist organization 
by political parties.   
The second theme is the nature of the electoral system. Extant literature illustrates 
observable differences in the level of overall terrorist groups’ formation in polities that utilize 
majortarian systems.  As was illustrated in chapter three, a majortarian system is positively and 
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statistically significant indicator that explains the creation of terrorist organizations by political 
parties. Based on this finding, it is critical that questions are geared towards investigating this 
particular theme.  
The third theme is the influence of the Cold War. Li (2005) points to differences in 
overall terrorist groups’ formation during the Cold War. Based on his study and similar findings 
detailed in the quantitative chapter, this research will examine the cases based on this issue to 
ascertain whether the Cold War explains the nexus between political parties and terrorist 
organizations. The final question relates to the role of repression during the period under 
investigation. As pointed out in extant literature, repression has so far had an indeterminate 
impact on the onset of terror. The quantitative chapter also shows those shifting effects that 
repression has on terrorism. Therefore, it is important to assess whether at the micro-level there 
is any relationship between repression and the creation of terrorist organization by political 
parties. The next section will detail the cases and the selection process. 
4.1.3 Case Selection 
Selecting cases for a comparative study is a critical process as it determines theory 
building and ultimately how valid/ reliable the findings are in a particular research (George and 
Bennett 2006; Gerring 2001). At best, cases should not be chosen simply because they are 
“interesting” or because ample data are easily available study (George and Bennett 2006, 69). In 
selecting cases, the researcher should above all else be wary of the persistent problem of 
selection bias26
                                                 
26 Selection bias is most often described as occurring when there is a deliberate selection of cases that results in 
inferences, based on resulting sample that are not representative of the universe of cases and which can produce 
indeterminate or unreliable results (Collier 1995). 
, in essence, the aim is to avoid the deliberate selection of cases. Ideally, cases 
 74 
should be selected that provide the necessary controls and variation required to address unique 
research questions (George and Bennett 2006, 83). 
In an effort to examine the central issue of this research, this dissertation evaluates the 
hypothesis by using three positive cases (Y) where political parties formed terrorist 
organizations27
An important methodological issue that must always be considered when choosing cases 
is that they be representative (Gerring 2001, 181). As extant literature points out, random 
selection of cases is not generally appropriate in small-N research (King, Kehone, and Verba 
1994; Gerring 2006; Collier 1995). Nevertheless, disregarding the process of random selection 
altogether ensures some level of biasness. King, Kehone, and Verba (1994, 128) notes “the most 
obvious example is when we, knowing what we want to see as the outcome of the research […] 
subtly or not so subtly select observations on the basis of combinations of the independent and 
dependent variables that support the desired conclusions.”  
 and one negative case with the same independent variables (Xs) was chosen to 
facilitate comparison. The cases satisfy various fundamental characteristics of goodness in case 
selection (Gerring 2006; King Kehone and Verba 1994).  
Among the important issues that should be considered when choosing cases for a case 
study analysis is deciding on the ideal number of cases. Importantly, while single or “deviant” 
cases can be very useful for heuristic purposes of identifying new theory, single case research 
can more often suffer from selection bias or over-generalization of results (George and Bennett 
2005).  Importantly, very few theories can be extensively evaluated by studying one case. King 
et.al (1994, 210) surmise the following reason why: 
                                                 
27 George and Bennett (2005, 75) argue that for theory testing it is vital that the parameters of cases used be 
identified.  
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For three reasons we doubt that a crucial-observation study can serve the explanation 
purpose assigned to it: (1) very few explanations depend upon only one causal variable, 
the investigator needs more than one implication observed; (2) measurement is difficult 
and not perfectly reliable; and (3) social reality is not reasonably treated as being 
produced by deterministic processes, so random error would appear even if measurement 
were perfect.  
 
Ideally, plenitude 28
  An important element in the case selection process involves choosing cases that provide 
substantial variation
 in a sample is desirable; the more cases there are to demonstrate a 
posited causal relationship the “more confidence we are likely to place in the truth of that 
preposition” (Gerring 2006, 165). To address the issue of plenitude, this dissertation uses four 
cases in assessing the role of the explanatory variable. The unit of analysis is states: the positive 
cases are Colombia, Turkey, and Japan the negative case is Costa Rica.  The inclusion of four 
cases satisfies the criteria of plenitude as the number allows ample room for comparison of cases 
without falling into what Slater and Simmons (2010) term the process of “continual regress” 
where too many cases might inevitable reduce precision. In addition, the number satisfies the 
plenitude requirement without limiting the research design so that it becomes less distinctive and 
less precise (Gerring 2001, 207).         
29
                                                 
28 The criterion of plenitude relates to how many cases are used in the sample. While plenitude is more often cited 
when conducting large-N research design, it is also important when conducting research using small-N designs to 
include as many cases within the parameters of the research objectives so as to maximize the possibility for variation 
and validity. Refer to Gerring (2006)   
 on the relevant positive cases (Y) and (Xs). Importantly, the cases in this 
dissertation (Colombia, Turkey, Japan, and Costa Rica) provide a host of areas in which they 
29  The concept of variance incorporates the range of variation in a sample. In this dissertation, it is important that 
variation is located on the outcome of interest and the relevant causal variable.     
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vary (population size and level of heterogeneity, wealth, and location). At most, the choice of 
cases bears similarities to other cases among other regions of the international system; hence, 
they can be used to postulate certain general principles. The cases also illustrate variation over 
time. The period for these cases is varied, 1960-1990s. This was done intentionally to reduce the 
findings being challenged from a temporal perspective; in essence, does the causation for the 
formation of terrorist groups of the 1960s resemble those of the 1970s and 1990s.30  To some 
extent, providing such a level of variation bears the hallmark of a most different system 
approach.31 The approach of this research design deliberately seeks cases of a particular 
phenomenon that differ as possible, “since the research is to find similar processes or outcome in 
diverse cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 165).  For instance, Costa Rica represents one of many 
negative cases where there were several causal variables (i.e. positive cases) but where political 
parties did not create a terrorist organization.32
4.1.4  Process-Tracing/Historical Causation.  
 Importantly, all cases are chosen on the basis that 
they are theoretically useful cases as they can be used to replicate or extend existing theories by 
addressing conceptual categories (Eisenhart 1989, 553). 
In qualitative research, as is also the case in quantitative studies, identifying the cause(s) 
that ultimately influence a particular outcome is essential for understanding and explaining that 
phenomenon.  In an effort to define the causes of a phenomenon, it is critical that we “analyze 
                                                 
30 Gerring (2006, 145) suggests that a causal argument necessarily assumes a good deal about the world-namely, that 
it continues to revolve in about the same way over the temporal scope of the inference. In essence, variation across 
time may be as critical as across cases.    
31 A most different system approach/design deliberately seeks cases of a particular phenomenon that differ as much 
as possible. Variation on the x values is prized. Ideally, one discovers a single x that remains constant across cases—
signaling a causal relationship. See George and Bennett (2005, 165) for future explanation. 
32 Negative cases are important for variation. However, the appearance of a single negative case is not sufficient to 
reject a given hypothesis. As Lijphart (1971, 686) points out, it is a “mistake to reject a hypothesis because one can 
think pretty quickly of a contrary case. Deviant cases weaken a probabilistic hypothesis, but they can only invalidate 
it if they turn up in sufficient numbers to make the hypothesized relationship disappear altogether.”   
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causal relations not only in terms of an event that constitutes the cause and event that constitutes 
the effect, but also in terms of a causal process that connects the two events and explains their 
relationship” (Simon 1979, 361). In qualitative research, a major hurdle faced by researchers is 
the process of specifying a causal sequence of some sort “connecting the punitive cause with the 
effect” (Gerring 2001, 195).  Establishing a distinction between a cause and a particular 
outcome, (what Hume calls the cement of the universe) is often a “blurry” and difficult endeavor 
(Gerring 2001; George and Bennett 2005; King et.al 1994).  As Simon (1979) points out: 
Mechanisms and laws are theoretical constructs that are derived inductively from 
empirical evidence but are not derivable deductively from that evidence. We can never 
show that a particular mechanism did, in fact, cause certain mechanism; we can only 
show that a particular mechanism could have produced the phenomena--- that, if the 
mechanism had been at work, the phenomena would have appeared” (Simon 1979, 379). 
 
 Nevertheless, the ability to delineate the causal path or process that illustrates how an 
independent variable influences the dependent variable is critical in establishing and explaining a 
phenomenon beyond mere chance. For many studies that employ qualitative methods, the 
process of identifying a causal link is achieved via process tracing.33
To indentify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out 
which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple 
  Goldstone (1991) calls 
process-tracing a critical mechanism that can illuminate issues of confounding variables. He 
suggests: 
                                                 
33 Process tracing is sometime also referred to as discerning, process analysis, pattern-matching, microfoundations, 
causal narrative, congruence, colligation, contiguity, and intermediate process. See Gerring (2001; 195) for a further 
discussion or process tracing synonyms.    
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principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the 
observed sequence of events (Goldstone 1991, 57).   
 
Most important, “process-tracing  is a methodology well-suited to testing theories in a 
world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of 
two or three independent variables--- precisely the world that more and more requires case 
studies and historical scholarship”(George and Bennett  2005; 206).  George and Bennett (2005, 
153) suggest “it seeks to uncover a causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent 
variables and evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by a theory.”  Moreover, process 
tracing can be used to test whether the residual differences between two similar cases are causal 
or spurious in producing a difference in these cases’ outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). At 
best, process-tracing attempts to identify the causal chain and causal mechanism that exists 
between an independent variable or variables and that of the outcome ---the dependent variable 
(George and Bennett 2005).       
Process-tracing offers a critical mechanism within this dissertation. As previously noted, 
the theory advanced in this dissertation has largely gone untested in both quantitative and 
qualitative research. As is often the case with the testing of a new theory, there may be multiple 
rival explanations or paths that explain a particular phenomenon.  Process-tracing provides an 
indispensable tool that helps to account for equifinality.34
                                                 
34 Equifinality is common issue germane to theory testing, it implies the need to consider multiple paths through 
which an outcome could have occurred.     
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  Within this study, the process of tracing the causal relationship between the independent 
variable and dependent variable will be couched in a detail narrative35
In many instances, factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture combine in a casual 
sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes. 
 form. As pointed out in 
extant literature (Gerring 2001; Goldstone 1991; George and Bennett 2005; King et.al 1994), 
process-tracing takes several different forms.  In this dissertation, process tracing will follow 
Slater and Simmons (2010), critical antecedent approach.  Critical antecedents are “factors or 
conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating 
during that juncture to produce divergent outcomes” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887).  
Interestingly, a significant number of “political scientists increasingly recognize that [the] 
biggest ‘why’ questions cannot be adequately answered without careful attention to the question 
of “when” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887).   Proponents of critical antecedents contend that 
causal inference, its path, and knowledge accumulation can be hindered when researchers 
truncate their casual analysis at a “crucial juncture” or a specific point in history when cases 
began to diverge in path dependent ways (Slater and Simmons 2010; Collier and Collier 1991). 
Importantly, researchers have come to recognize that by assigning all causation at the point of a 
critical juncture severely limits the causative possibilities. Indeed, what often occurs by limiting 
causal path to just the moment of critical juncture, is temporal truncation.  Indeed, while most 
qualitative researchers attempt to trace an incident from its immediate departure or “critical 
juncture” the ideal process is perhaps to trace the causal path prior to the critical juncture. Slater 
and Simmons (2010) note: 
                                                 
35 According to George and Bennett (2005), the detailed narrative is the simplest variety of process tracing. The 
style of process tracing involves a detail narrative or story presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw 
light on how an event came about.  
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These critical antecedents shape the choices and changes that emerge during critical 
junctures in causally significant ways […]. Our point is not that critical junctures are not 
indeed critical. It is not everything that is causally critical takes place at the critical 
juncture [critical antecedents reduces] transcending debates over the timing of causal 
processes […] and establish a more realistic basis for controlled comparisons in a 
political world “where natural experiments” are few and far between” (887-88).  
 
In general, most studies that include process tracing often ignore or lump together 
conditions preceding a critical juncture. However, by tracing factors or conditions preceding a 
critical juncture or perceived point at which a variable influences the dependent variable, the 
process of explaining what factors are crucial in explaining or producing a long-term divergence 
in outcome can be better predicted.  In the four cases that would be compared (Colombia, 
Turkey, Japan, and Costa Rica), process tracing begins before the point of departure or critical 
juncture.  Moreover, as part of the detail narrative the development of each case begins well 
beyond the point of departure and attempts to examine antecedents that may have later 
influenced the dependent variable. In the following four cases, (beginning with Colombia) in 
combination with a detailed narrative approach, each case will employ Slater and Simmons 
(2010) approach to help establish the causal chain and causal mechanism that led to the outcome 
in each case.  
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CHAPTER 5 - Colombia  
“The FARC is a mouse that uses terrorism to try to roar like a lion. We are going to keep 
    chasing that mouse until it no longer breathes.” 
 
                            Juan Manuel Santos-Colombian Defense Minister 
 
Chapter two developed a theoretical argument positing that—regimes whose leader or 
ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position would expect to have greater 
numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes. Chapter three 
supported this hypothesis. This chapter uses Colombia as the first case to evaluate the model’s 
accuracy using a qualitative design by examining the immediate period prior to 1900 up to the 
1970s.  This chapter demonstrates the evolutionary process leading to the formation of terrorist 
organizations by political parties. While the literature has focused on a few historical and social 
science studies that hinge terror affiliation to class and ecclesiastical dogma (Levine and Wilde 
1977; Garcia 2004), the argument here is distinct from these views.  Instead, this chapter focuses 
on a case study of extensional delegitimation, a catalytic process whereby opposition political 
parties undergo a process of radicalization ending in the use of violence when faced with hard-
line policy promoted by ruling right-leaning governments. 
In the following sections, I examine Colombia’s political and socioeconomic background, 
in particular, the freedoms allowed to political parties in the polity. In the next section, I examine 
the critical antecedents, factors that contributed to later outcomes of political party violence. The 
third section examines the critical junctures, where political parties because of a host of 
institutional barriers lead some parties to undergo radicalization and turn to terror. The final 
section concludes the chapter.   
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5.1 Background  
Historians and political scientist specializing in the Latin American region have heralded 
Colombia as a standard for democracy and civilian rule in the Latin America region (Sanchez 
and Bakewell 1985, 789). This lofty and perhaps questionable characterization of Colombia’s 
political processes is borne out of a belief that despite the state’s history of internal violence, the 
ideals of democratic rule remain a constant aspiration among citizens (Martz 1968, 9).  Indeed, 
more so than many of its neighbors, much of the violence in Colombia is akin to civil strife 
rather than the result of ruthless dictators (Williamson 1965).   However, for a considerable part 
of its history Colombia has been plagued by internal violence (Sanchez and Bakewell 1985: 
Bergquist 1992). A former colony of Spain, the state possesses several crosscutting cleavages.  
Among the issues that divide the Colombian society are issues of race, class, religion, and most 
importantly political ideology (Henderson 1985; Dix 1967).  In general, these characteristics are 
often synonymous to countries with a legacy of domestic upheaval. As the fifth most populous 
state in Latin America36
Since the mid-1970s, terrorist violence in Colombia has often been tied to the illicit drug 
trade (Steinitz 2002, 4). However, for much of the country’s early history, violence was akin to 
political parties’ activity. In particular, the period spanning the early 19th to mid 21st century 
marked some of the highest rates of politically motivated violence in Colombia (Payne 1968; 
Martz 1962; Dix; 1967; Henderson 1985).  From the mid-1800s to the late 1960s, Colombia 
experienced dozens of examples of political violence, which were later acknowledged as terrorist 
, the country illustrates many of the same internal fissures that have 
destabilized many of its neighbors (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 112).   
                                                 
36 Invariably most states lying to the South of United States in the Western hemisphere are referred to as Latin 
America. The populations by states in descending order are ranked Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia.  
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activity37
In addition to the national-level acts of violence, there have been numerous acts of 
community-based political violence. The community-level violence stemmed from local election 
campaigns in 1922 and from 1946-48.
. From the mid-1800s to the mid-1950s, “on a scale of political deaths per generation, 
Colombia had one of the highest levels of political conflict in the world; in nearly 190 years 
since independence, the country has been racked by ten national civil wars: 1830-31, 1839-41, 
1851, 1854, 1860,-61, 1876, 1885, 1899-1902, and the covert guerilla war of 1949-53” (Payne 
1968, 4).   
38 As extant literature on Colombia shows, for most of its 
modern period the state has not experienced harmonious politics. However, it is evident that 
political violence before the 1960s mostly occurred at the mass-level and was often 
uncoordinated. Importantly, prior to the-1960s, political violence frequently took the form of 
sporadic uprisings and, in most cases, sudden reactions to unfavorable political developments 
(Payne 1968, 4-9). As Maullin (1973) demonstrates, the fanatic supporters of the two main 
political parties, known as the Liberals and Conservatives, carried out much of the violence 
during the pre-1960s period. He argues that in many cases simple party identification served as 
the pretext for violence. Often “national leaders [of  political parties did] not always exercise 
close control over grass-roots caudillos39
                                                 
37The phrase “terrorism” used to describe political violence in Colombia only became popular at the later phases of 
“La Violencia” and more broadly used in the 1960s to describe violent leftist groups. See Bergquist, Penaranda and 
Sanchez’s Violence in Colombia.    
, whose quasi-ideological followers sometimes acted in 
violent disregard of national directives” (Maullin 1973, 14).      
38  Many of these are cited in German Guzman Campos “La Violencia en Colombia,” which was based on 
government data and first person accounts. 
39  “Caudillo” is roughly translated to mean leader. In the Latin American context, Caudillos were local 
administrators or “leaders” who often took it upon themselves to institute laws and practices sometimes without the 
full knowledge of state leaders in their district or region of the state. In many cases, they utilized the local police 
force to carry out their objectives.  
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Political party violence between the Liberals and Conservatives revolved around issues of 
class, religion, ethnicity, and political ideology. Despite claims by many historians’ and political 
scientists about the history of democracy in Colombia, as one of the best in Latin America, the 
parties often found it difficult to cooperate on most issues.  Overwhelmingly, Colombian 
political parties have been “reluctant to subordinate [their] singular individualistic philosophy to 
an acceptance of compromise and negotiation. The ruling political parties mirror the one-sided 
view of democracy. By-products have included an unwillingness to cooperate with one another” 
(Martz 1962, 11) 
 Violence between the two parties began early on when the two parties were created—the 
mid-19th century—and centered on the political elites’ desire to impose their opposing 
ideological beliefs on Colombia’s political system (Maullin 1973, 5).   As is the case with many 
post-colonial Latin American countries in the 19th to 20th century, the initial cause of elite 
political conflict between the political parties originated from concerns about ecclesiastical 
powers. The sharp division over the role of religion pitted supporters of anti-clerical rationalists 
(Liberals) against the pro-clerical defenders of the church (Conservatives) (Maullin 1973; Martz 
1962). 
The issue of internal governance of the state served as another important divisive matter 
that crystallized the conflict between supporters of the two main parties.  On the one side, the 
Liberals argued for local control of measures such as economic development and political 
patronage (Maullin 1973, 5-7).  On the other side, Conservatives often favored central control of 
the economy and political patronage.40
                                                 
40 The issue of centralism or federalism shifted from party to party later in Colombia’s history (especially post 
1902). In theory, there was only a slightly greater tendency for Liberals to favor a federalist and Conservatives to 
support a centralists type of constitutional organization. However, there were also Liberal centralists and 
 Up to the early 1880s, supporters of both political parties 
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routinely clashed, at times violently, over the ecclesiastical role of the government and over its 
economic policies. However, by the late 1880s under the leadership of Miguel Antonio Caro and 
Rafael Nunez, the Conservatives gained considerable ascendency over the Liberals and held 
most of the important positions in government (Garcia 2005, 145).  
Before coming to office, Caro had “long been an advocate of the Catholics' right to resist 
the secularizing policies of the parliamentary legislative state created by the Liberals” (Garcia 
2004, 145). Not surprisingly, one of Caro’s first acts as president was to enacting legislations that 
ensured the church’s place in an administrative role in the state.  Beginning with the amendment 
of the constitution in 188641
                                                                                                                                                             
Conservative federalists. See Maullin 197 and Bushnell in Bergquist and Sanchez’s Violence in Colombia for a 
detailed discussion.  
 and the concordat the following year, the Conservatives were able to 
gain a stranglehold on Colombian politics. With this added strength, they enacted legislation that 
gave the church “an exalted, protected status in Colombian society” as well as placing in the 
hands of a few Conservative party elites enormous ability to control political patronage and 
therefore appoint their supporters to crucial administrative posts throughout the state (Levine and 
Wilde 1977; Maullin 1973). Importantly, these steps paid dividends, as the Conservative Party 
was able to remain in power almost uninterrupted until the early 1930s. Beginning with Caro and 
continuing with many of his Conservative successors, the Conservative Party adopted a 
decisively unrelenting policy of discouraging or, in some cases, denying the masses participation 
in the Colombian political process. Indicative of the party’s rightist policies, the ruling elites 
often took steps to limit the role of workers’ movements while at the same time moving to 
institutionalize the primacy of the Conservative party. The ruling party achieved these steps 
through several constitutional changes, which strengthened the powers of the presidency and 
41 The 1886 constitution was drafted by the Conservative Miguel Antonio Caro in cooperation with the then 
president of the Conservative party Rafael Nunez.   
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centralized the state. More specifically, the Conservative government, added to the executive 
office almost unlimited domestic and foreign policy powers. Among the president’s new powers 
was the ability to “promulgate repressive legislations that allowed the president to declare, by 
means of his extraordinary faculties, who and what the state's foreign and domestic enemies 
were. Through the introduction of other far-reaching legislation, Caro and many of his 
successors used their newly acquired powers to stipulate an arbitrary criterion for democratic 
citizenship” (Garcia 2004, 146). While all these steps were seen as critical for the success of the 
Conservative Party, they had a chilling effect on opposition political organizations.   
For the ruling elite within the Conservative Party and a few elites in the rival Liberal 
Party, there was an enduring fear of citizens in the lower socioeconomic strata becoming 
politically organized. In general, the ruling elites of the Conservative government believed that if 
the lower strata of society were allowed to participate in the electoral process they would surely 
make moves to undermine the social and economic policies of the right leaning regime (Garcia 
2004, 163).  Even during the first 50 years of Conservative rule, Caro differentiated between 
citizens who he  believed were not worthy of being part of the political process mostly on the 
basis of education, class, and those who rejected his own exalted view of the role of the church. 
He disregarded the notion that lower class individuals and those with leftist or left of center 
beliefs could ever be a truly democratic body.  Moreover, he did not believe them fit to rule:  
“Neither has [they] been nor is an organized body, but a mass rabble [no ha sido ni es 
sociedad organizada, sino masal.]" So the appointment ["plebeians /plebeyos] to positions 
of responsibility would be illegitimate under the democratic regime [resulta ilegitimo 
bajo el rigimen democritico]" (La libertad de imprenta 114).  
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In particular, Conservatives elites were concerned about the ambitions of groups with 
socialist sentiments (Martz 1962, 23).  As is the norm with many conservative or right leaning 
political parties, there was immense opposition and even hostility towards labor movements or 
political organizations with platforms that included labor rights. The Conservative Party garnered 
much of its support from the ruling class, a group in Colombia traditionally “hostile [towards] 
labor organization; both government and employers have opposed the formation and evolution of 
trade-unionism” (Martz 1962, 21).     
During the Conservative Party rule up until the 1930s, a dissatisfied Liberal elite and a 
growing communist minority increasingly attempted to challenge the authority of the ruling 
Conservative party. Most notably, the 1922 civil unrest was a result of growing resentment from 
opposition groups excluded from the political process because of economic, social, and 
institutional barriers put in place by the Conservatives (Levine and Wilde 1977).  Unresponsive, 
the Conservative Party intensified measures (especially during the first twenty years of the 1900s 
and again when they regained power in 1946) aimed at reducing at least, the ability of political 
parties outside of the institutionalized establishment (two party model) from access to the 
political process (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52). 
Following the collapse of Conservative Party rule, which was in part due to internal 
differences among elites in the party, the Liberals came to power in 1930.  Several factors played 
a role in the Liberals’ success at the polls. The major factor being splits among key Conservative 
leaders.  However, societal problems also played a role in the Liberals’ victory. First, among 
these societal factors was an overall discontentment towards the state of the economy, alongside 
lower and middle class dissatisfaction with the failed promises made by the Conservatives for 
equitable land redistribution.  For the most part, the Liberal Party claimed to advocate on behalf 
 88 
of the poor in its electoral campaign. The Liberals targeted the working class with promises to 
adopt more socialist programs.42
During its rule, the Liberal Party offered only a slight variation in its fiscal and political 
policies to those of the Conservative Party. Initially within the incoming Liberal Party, there 
were several socialist leaning members.  Yet, because of the internal pressures generated by the 
Liberal Party, socialists eventually discarded many of their core beliefs or joined the Communist 
Party (Bergquist et.al. 1953).  As Dix (1967, 89) points out, for many “the socialism of their 
youth gave way to the political realism of maturity and, perhaps, to closer examination of new 
doctrines. Their enduring importance was to launch […] several varieties of Colombian leftist 
thought, from Communism to rather mild reformist Liberalism.”  Because of the Liberals’ 
continuance of conservative policies with only slight variations, fervent socialists felt that “the 
reformist Liberal leadership ‘betrayed the masses’ frustrating their aspirations for a more just 
social and political order” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52).  
 Among some of the issues that were part of the Liberal Party 
platform were efforts toward land reform, and moderate changes in the repressive attitude of the 
state towards labor movements (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52). However, once in office, the Liberals 
pursued economic and social initiatives with a closer penchant for right-leaning policies. As 
mentioned above, the Liberal party mostly differed with its rival in regards to the role of the 
church and federalism rather than the role of central government in the polity. Similar to the 
Conservative Party, the Liberal Party socioeconomic policies often favored the elites and very 
little was done to limit institutional constraints on third party participation in the state’s political 
machinery.   
                                                 
42 These socialist programs were mostly relegated to some minor cases of land programs. See Departamento 
Admistrativo Nacional de Estadistica (Dane). 1966-1972 “Colombia—Reforma agrarcia e institionciones: Resultas 
polititicos.” Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. Bogota 1972. No. 283:69.  
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With overall growing resentment by many over the Liberal Party betrayal of the socialist 
platform, the political party lost a significant number of its base supporters going into the 1946 
presidential elections. The dire situation of the Liberal Party in 1945-46 was compounded by a 
major split in the Liberal Party over its two presidential candidates who pursued contrasting 
programs. Critically, the Liberal Party’s instability led to a Conservative Party victory and 
control of the executive office in 1946 (Bergquist et.al. 1953).   However, with the return of the 
Conservatives to power in 1946, many groups within Colombian society were apprehensive 
towards another period of rightwing policies that did not promote the development of the middle 
and lower classes.               
5.1.1 Critical Antecedents: From Two Party Dominance to La Violencia  
The period coming out of the mid-1930s had seen only modest positive labor policies 
aimed at easing the plight of the lower class facing a fall in coffee prices. However, as the global 
economic recession began to retreat, Colombia ruling party’s temporary sensitivity to the 
working class was replaced by decidedly right leaning policies that intended to cripple union 
movement and socialist objectives.  In general the “recovery of the national and world 
economies by the late 1930s allowed Colombia’s […] ruling class to gradually reverse the 
reformist social policies with which it first had responded to labor militancy and the world 
economic crisis” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 69).  As part of a discernable and steady process towards 
a right leaning  national government, between 1938 and 1946, Colombians experienced  “first a 
halting of reform and then the actual reversals of the land and labor laws that had been passed in 
the early and mid-1930s” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 69). The Liberal Party had fashioned policies 
that were reminiscent of the more hard-lined Conservative period under the Caro regime.   
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In 1945, despite harsh policies meted out by President Alberto Lleras Camargo against 
union workers and alleged communist sympathizers, the Colombian state was not in a 
revolutionary mood.  However, the arrival of the left leaning Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on the political 
scene provided the spark that would later result in widespread violence. Gaitan promoted a 
populist platform and was supported by several members of the Partido Socialista Democratico 
(Colombian Communist Party or PCC) as well as left leaning members of the Liberal Party.43
Interestingly, the leftist Gaitan rhetoric and policy platform also worried many in 
Washington.  Gaitan frequently called those in power in Colombia the “oligarchy”
 
His political stance created serious internal problems for stability in the Liberal Party. Various 
right leaning elites within the Liberal Party preferred to support the “safe” and “anticommunist” 
presidential candidate, Gabriel Turbay (Henderson 1985, 101).   
44
 As of possible interest to you, the following concerns information received from a 
reliable confidential source, relative to a recent decision on the part of the Partido 
Socialista Democratico (Colombian Communist Part) […]  The elections are scheduled 
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repeated calls for their removal, though he did not advocate open violence. The U.S. and State 
Department officials and intelligence agencies often pressed their contacts in Colombia to 
monitor Gaitan associates, his growing popularity, and his ties with the Communist Party. In a 
memo sent from Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Frederick B. Lyon, Chief of the Division of 
Foreign Activity Correlation in the Department of State, by John Edgar Hoover Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hoover warned of Gaitan’s ties to the Communist Party in 
Colombia.  In his memo dated April 18, 1946, Hoover stated: 
                                                 
43 Prior to joining the Liberal Party Gaitan had belonged to the Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionara (UNIR) a 
grassroots party that promoted the rights of peasants and small coffee growers in Tolima and Cundinamarca—states 
with large agriculture base in rural Colombia. See FB 1946 memo and Bergquist (1992, 78).  
44 In a speech at the Bogota Bull Ring September 23, Gaitan repeatedly referred to the ruling elites as oligarchy. 
Dispatch No. 5 1108 of November 9, 1945, from the American Embassy, Bogota Colombia.   
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for May 5, 1946 and the opponents of Turbay are Marino Ospina45
 
 (Perez) and Jorge 
Eleiciter Gaitan, conservative and independent  candidates respectively […]. At the 
General Assembly of the Partido Socialista Democratico held in Bogotá, Colombia April 
12, 1946, Carlos H. Pareja (Gamboa) opposed the Communist Party’s support of Gabriel 
Turbay. He described Turbay as ‘representative of the Bourgeoisie and of imperialism’ 
and urged support of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on the grounds that Gaitan told the Colombian 
people to be ready to take over the government (U.S. Department of State memo April 
18, 1946).  
Local members of the Conservative Party, who became increasingly concerned about the 
ambition and rhetoric of Gaitan and his movement, were just as alarmed as the American 
intelligences agencies.  Nevertheless, many in the lower economic strata of Colombian society 
saw Gaitan as a champion of the middle and lower classes. Those who were frustrated in the far 
left ranks of the Liberal Party viewed Gaitan as the answer to a more democratic government. 
Many of the more radical party members saw Gaitan as the inheritor of democratic task 
postponed or left inconclusive (Maulin 1973; Bergquist 1992; Henderson 1985).  The faction 
supporting Gaitan in the Liberal Party leading up to the 1946 Colombian Presidential election 
posed a serious threat to the party’s presidential hopes. The establishment within the party was 
fearful that Gaitan candidacy would split the votes among Liberal supporters and hand the 
Conservatives a victory reminiscent of their own victory over a divided Conservative Party in the 
1936 elections. Therefore, elites in the Liberal Party tried in vain to convince Gaitan to withdraw 
from the presidential race (Henderson 1985, 101).    
                                                 
45 Various historians refer to Ospina Perez Gomez as he was often called in Colombia as Ospina.  
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As feared by many within the Liberal Party, it was announced on May 5th 1946 that the 
Conservative candidate Ospina won a plurality vote with just over 41% of the vote. Ospina 
gained 566,000 votes and the Liberal candidates Gaitan received 359,000 votes and Turbay 
441,000(General control agency of the republic 1946)46.  The Liberals were slow to accept 
defeat.  In particular, many of Gaitan’s supporters refused to concede. Rather than serving in a 
Conservative ran administration, they resigned their posts.47
From 1946 to 1948, the Conservative Party regained control of many of the institutional 
positions of power throughout the central government. However, the rural regions of Colombia, 
especially Tomlina, remained solidly behind Gaitan. This popularity and the constant criticism of 
the Opsina government began to weigh heavily on hard-line members of the Conservative 
government. There was an overall sense of uneasiness throughout the country, which came to 
fruition with a growing level of sporadic violence in Bogota and parts of the countryside 
(Henderson 1985).   
  While the new Conservative 
government did offer some political positions to conservative Liberals to serve in the 
Conservative controlled government, the olive branch was not extended to Gaitan. For Ospina, 
Gaitan remained a constant threat because of his radical leftist policies. For his part, Gaitan 
continued to criticize the ruling government often referring to them as the illegitimate oligarchy. 
Early April 1948, the Conservative government sponsored by the U.S. government 
planned to sign an anti-Communist declaration with other signatories from various Latin 
American heads of states.  The Ospina led Conservative Party was determined to keep Gaitan 
and any other socialist or communist out of the conference. Just weeks before the conference, 
                                                 
46 This data was translated from its primary source—Contraloria  Generald e la Republica Revista de la Contraloria 
General (Bogota, 1946). This agency provides statistical data on election results both at the provincial and 
presidential levels.   
47  Turbay discontent with the outcome of the presidential elections burned his personal archives and left the country 
for Europe never to return. See Henderson (1985, 101). 
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several Liberal Party members who were loyal to Gaitan’s cause were removed from the 
Conservative government.48
Diplomats from the U.S. also had an unsavory and uncomfortable attitude towards 
Gaitan.  In a telegram sent from a field intelligence agent to Secretary of State in Washington, 
dated March 22, 1948, there was a clear concern that Gaitan’s supporters and communists in 
general would try to sabotage the conference. The agent suggested: 
   
 
There are numerous indications that communist and Left-Leaning Liberals will endeavor 
to sabotage [the] Inter-American Conference in order to embarrass Colombian  [the] Govt 
[…] A riotous group identified as Liberals last Friday attacked the Presidential auto in 
which the Ecuadorian Ambassador was riding. […] Recent replacement of [the] coalition 
cabinet by an [all]-Conservative cabinet may have effect of increasing overt opposition to 
the government and efforts to sabotage conference (U.S. Department of State memo 
March 22, 1948).   
       
As shown above, there was clear uneasiness about the activities of the far left. Despite 
seemingly careful planning by the Conservatives to ensure a peaceful conference, the sudden 
assassination of Gaitan by “an obscure fellow named Roa Serra who was lynched on the spot, 
and his mutilated corpse dragged,” left many Colombians upset. Indeed, what was initially a 
slow burn of an angry lower class resentment sparked into a nationwide violent uprising 
(Bergquist 1992, 83).  The pillage and physical attacks were further provoked by communists 
eager to usher in a revolution, angry peasants unhappy with the slow process of land reforms, 
                                                 
48 There is no evidence to suggest that these members were actually supporters or loyal to Gaitan, in fact most left 
leaning liberals had long resigned their positions in the government. 
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lower classes angry over the high cost of living, and Gaitan supporters’ belief that the rightwing 
Conservative government was responsible for his death (Bergquist 1992, 83; Henderson 1985; 
Maullin 1973; Martz 1962).  
La Violencia, as the period of blood letting from 1948 to 1958 was called resulted in over 
200,000 deaths and millions of dollars in damage to the country’s infrastructure (Bergquist 1992, 
83-86).  Towards the end of La Volencia, Colombia experienced the rise of military rule led by 
Gustavo Pinilla.49
 
  Pinilla overthrew the Conservatives in 1953 and replaced the Colombian 
constitution with one that provided justification for his rule under the pretext of restoring order in 
Colombia. For the next four years, Colombia was governed by the military. After Pinilla’s rule 
ended,  Rojas briefly controlled Colombia by a military junta, but the Catholic Church, business 
community, the Liberals and Conservatives ended his regime in 1957 (Dix 1980, 307). With 
Rojas’ removal from office, a military caretaker government ran Colombia for another year until 
ultimately democracy returned in the form of the National Front in 1958.    
5.1.2    Critical Juncture: From Constitutional Amendment and National Front to 
Terror    
 
By 1958, Colombian society and economy had endured years of sporadic violence. 
Throughout the countryside where much of Colombia’s large coffee plantations and the engine 
of the state’s economy existed was severely destroyed by almost a decade of incessant violence. 
According to Henderson (1985, 133), the “Bogotá riot of April 9, 1948 resolved any doubts 
                                                 
49 The rule of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was plagued with corruption and excessive military spending. Rojas himself 
personal fortune outside of Colombia was alleged to be $10, 000, 00. It is this backdrop that Liberals and 
Conservative worked to engineer his removal from office. For a more extensive discussion on Rojas, see Business 
Week, June 1, 1957, p10 “Fast Comeback in Colombia”    
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Conservatives may have entertained that subversion was a real and imminent danger.”  Notably 
among the discourse in 1958 period was the belief that the assassination of Gaitan and 
subsequent decade of turmoil was the result of communist infiltration and instigation (Bergquist 
1992; Payne 1968).  Directly following the assassination of Gaitan there were immediate 
assertions that the Communist Party was at fault.  As direct evidence from U.S. sources point to 
this assertion: 
Conservatives and Liberals […] are seeking to discover some political motivation for the 
murder. The liberals, particularly the ardent Gaitanistas, are hoping to prove that the 
Conservatives were responsible, and the latter are attempting either to fix the blame on 
the Communists or to involve Gaitan and the Communists in a plot to overthrow the 
government” (Department of State Memo November  9th 1948).  
 
Well into the 1950s, there was a concerted effort to blackball the Communist Party or 
factions of the Liberal party that are considered part of the radical left. As a memo from the U.S. 
State Department shows, there were still ongoing accusations in the early 1950s that the 
communist were responsible for Gaitan’s death. Other conspiracies entertained by the 
Conservatives were that a radical faction of Liberal Party members along with communist 
sympathizers had formed a pact with Gaitan to overthrow the Colombian government.  
Moreover, the Conservatives propaganda follows that it was because of Gaitan’s indecisiveness 
he was killed by other members of the pact.  However, the State Department memo clearly finds 
no merit in this argument: 
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With reference to Embassy’s Dispatch No. 398 of April 10, 1950, entitled “Events and 
Press Comment Surrounding Observance of Second Anniversary of Gaitan’s 
Assassination,” I have the honor to report that Conservative EL Siglo
 
 continued to 
editorialized during the week following the anniversary on the importance of revelations 
by rear Admiral Hillenkoeter, made before Congressional Investigating Committee, 
concerning the Communist involvement in the assassination of Liberal leader, Jorge 
Eliecer Gaitan […] in each of these articles there is developed the thesis that Gaitan was 
conspiring with ‘international agents of Moscow’ in preparation for a liberal uprising to 
take place in Bogotá during the Panamerican conference; that when Gaitan was forced to 
make public statement regarding the attack on the Ecuadoran Ambassador, he chose to 
repudiate this attack and any other attempt to disturb the Conference, and was eliminated 
by his own fellow Liberals and the Communists, who alone stood to gain from a popular 
uprising at that time (U.S. Department of State memo 426, April 17 1950).   
Importantly, while the U.S. State Department and Admiral Hillenkoeter report 
demonstrated no evidence to substantiate the Conservatives’ claims, the aforementioned 
accusation during the mid-1950s became an almost a factual summary of events that were the 
cause of  La Violencia (Henderson 1985, 133).  As Henderson points out, although it was never 
proved that communists killed Gaitan, or planned the pillage that eventually lasted over ten 
years, the communists’ “conspicuous” absence at the moment of Gaitan’s death reinforced in the 
minds of many who were already suspicious of the communists that they were guilty. It is this 
wanton distrust for anything communist, and lessons learned from La Violencia, that fostered 
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what would have been considered before 1957 as an unholy alliance between Liberals and 
Conservatives. 
As the apparent process of preventing at all costs a repeat of La Violencia gained 
momentum, the Liberals and Conservatives entered into dialogue about the political way forward 
for Colombia. Among the many ideas entertained during the early days of negotiation was 
amending the Colombian constitution that was discarded by Rojas. On July 1956, former 
president Dr. Laureano Gómez50 who had been forced into exile in Spain during the Rojas 
regime signed the Benidorm Pact with Alberto Lleras Camargo.51
During this critical period, various moderate members of the Communist Party now 
remerging from the yoke of Rojas regime and who had officially been banned along with other 
small political parties in 1956 lobbied for a seat at the table (Pizarro 1980).  In light of a seeming 
return to democracy, it was believed by some among moderate communist members that they 
could finally achieve some semblance of recognition as part of the political process.  Many 
believed that the new environment offered the “possibility of a peaceful road to revolution” 
(Pizarro, 1980, 172).   However, whatever belief these more naïve communist members had 
about a future in Colombian politics was quickly dashed when they were altogether excluded 
 The document became the first 
institutional step towards an exclusive power-sharing arrangement between Liberals and 
Conservatives (Martz 1962).  However, initial disagreements among members of Gomez ultra-
Conservative camp about serving on a bipartisan commission threatened to derail in finalizing of 
the terms of the new political arrangement. Several members of the Gomez faction were unhappy 
about their roles and wanted greater concession in the new political compromise.  
                                                 
50 Member of the Conservative Party and was initially opposed to signing any power-sharing agreement with the 
Liberals. See Dix (1980, 306-308) for an extensive discussion.    
51 Moderate member and leader of the Liberal Party  
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from all politics within the state by a series of constitutional moves engineered by the more 
center-to-right Liberals and Conservatives.   
Believing that a critical juncture was slipping away Camargo made a final overture to 
Gomez.  To smooth things over, Camargo met with Gomez in Sitges Spain and the two men 
signed a new agreement on July 20th 1957 that would come to be known as the Sitges Agreement 
(Martz 1962, 259). The agreement was greeted with overwhelming popular affirmation in the 
plebiscite on December 1, 1957 (Dix 1980, 308). As part of the agreement, the following was 
enacted into law to guide the practices of the new Frente Nacional (National Front) government: 
 
1. Seats in all "public corporations" in the nation (the Senate and the Chamber of 
Representatives, departmental assemblies, and municipal councils) were to be divided 
equally between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and only those parties. Within each 
party, seats were to be allotted by proportional representation lists that might be presented 
by various factions of the two parties.  
2. All cabinet offices (with the exception of military appointees), as well as positions on 
the Supreme Court, were to be distributed according to the proportion of seats held by the 
parties in the national Congress (that is , equally).  
3. All government officials and all employees in the various branches of the public 
administration (including the departmental and municipal levels) were to be appointed on 
the basis of parity between Liberals and Conservatives. Exceptions were those falling 
under career service regulations (in practice, very few) and military personnel.  
4. The approval of nonprocedural measures w within all elective bodies was to be by two-
thirds vote (Dix 1980, 308).  
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In addition to the above conditions, further amendments made in 1958 between the two 
parties stipulated that the presidency would alternate between political parties and that the 
arrangement known as the National Front be extended to sixteen years (Dix 1980, 308). The 
immediate effect of the National Front is that the parties moved decidedly more to the right. 
Their economic and political policies illustrated a greater emphasis on satisfying the desires of 
the political elites, wealthy landowners and significant U.S. investors who now had a greater 
economic and political interest in the welfare of Colombia (Dix 1980).  The National Front 
government illustrated a dramatic convergence of political ideology, one that tilted to the right. 
The dramatic swing to the right incensed many left leaning Liberals within the National Front 
government.  As pointed out all seats in all public corporations as well as elected positions in 
government were only granted to members of the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party. In 
essence, this meant that members of opposing political parties including the communist were 
barred from government. As Jaramillo et.al (1999, 7) suggests, the National Front through the 
legislative process guaranteed a stranglehold on power by ensuring other political parties were 
virtually illegal entities.  
Importantly, even within the National Front government, socialists’ platforms such as 
those that included land reform and expansion of economic programs were discouraged.    
Prominent left leaning members of the Liberal Party such as Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, who 
were continually opposed by the National Front’s predominately right leaning members, became 
disillusioned with the political climate and eventually broke ranks from the ruling National 
Front. A memo from a State Department field agent detailed Lopez split from the Liberal Party: 
The recent statements of leftist Liberal leader Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, the 
pronouncements in the weekly La Calle, of which he is Director, and the Actions of the 
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handful of his followers in the House of Representatives, all serve to emphasize one 
important fact: the Liberal Party is now split, although the leftists appear to be in a 
definite minority, and the chances are not very great that the situation will be corrected in 
the near future.[…] At this point it is worth noting that CAS52
 
  has received reports, 
which it considers probably true, to the effect that the Communist Party has decided to 
give López limited support; that is, the Communists plan to back López in his attacks on 
alternation, the National Front Government (this apparently representing some shift in 
Communist strategy) and on foreign capital they plan to use their machinery and know-
how in organizing and publicizing his campaign. López, of course, backs a machine of 
his own. Tending to confirm these CAS reports are other CAS reports, plus a report from 
the Consulate in Barranquilla, that the Communists organized, and were much in 
evidence during a rally for López in that city (Department of State, dispatch 76 August 12 
1959).  
Paramount in his decision to leave the ruling faction was Lopez’s belief that Colombia 
was facing serious social, political, and economic problems and enough was not being done to 
address these issues. On July 15th 1959   Lopez openly criticized the National Front government 
“economic policy, and attacked it as a mechanism incapable of developing Colombia 
economically and socially, and criticized the government for trying to apply "northamerican" 
capitalism to an under-developed country such as Colombia” (Department of State July 26 
1960).   
                                                 
52 CIA Covert Action Staff. 
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Lopez’s decision to leave the ruling Liberal faction meant that in theory the left leaning 
non-communist would not have a voice in the political process as only the two established 
parties had a constitutional seat at the political table.  Contrary to most of the CIA and State 
Department reports there was no evidence in 1959 he had converted to being a member of the 
Communist Party.  In 1960, Lopez prophetically warned his former colleagues in the National 
Front that the political and economic polices of the ruling regime that denied opportunity to a 
significant group of Colombians would ultimately lead to a return of violence.  As he implored 
the members of the ruling coalition that the “the cause of social justice must not fall into 
Communist hands” (Department of State July 26 1960).   
The glaring denial of other political parties, in particular, the far left factions and the 
more radical Communist Party from the political nexus did not go unnoticed by many of their 
members who immediately objected to having their democratic channels and status now 
constitutionally barred from the political process. Importantly, years of exclusionary policies 
directed at the far left and the Communist Party was testing the resolve of the leadership of these 
parties to maintain a peaceful approach. Critically, not only had their hopes of political 
opportunity following the removal of Rojas been dashed, but also the Liberals and Conservatives 
had in essence made a mockery of the political process. Indeed, while the 1958 and 1966 
elections did include smaller parties such as the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), The 
Christian Social Democratic Party (PSDC), and Lopez’s Liberal Revolutionary Movement 
(MRL) these parties were in general factions of the Liberal and Conservative Party who still 
campaigned under Liberal and Conservative symbols (Dix 1967, 140-146).  
Mirroring the earlier warnings of former Liberal Party member Alfonso LOPEZ 
Michelsen, some members within the Communist Party began to advocate violence as an 
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organizational approach. Part of this new vision was borne out of a rational organizational 
decision making process. Once the present institutional barriers remain, parties such as the 
Communist Party would continue to loose members. Indeed, other groups had already begun to 
challenge the Communist Party’s commitment to end whatever means the political monopoly 
enjoyed by the National Front.  In response, to the more radical elements’ calls for the party to 
act, moderate leaders of the Communist Party struggled to maintain their non-violent stance. In a 
1958 statement by the party’s leadership in the Tribuna, the party’s newsletter, the leaders of the 
party called for peace and nonviolent measures in the face of the National Front’s creation and a 
denial of peaceful political for the Communist Party.  The statement suggested that: 
Under these new conditions, when our party has declared at various meetings that it is 
decidedly in favor of the peaceful, constitutional, and legal route of development in the 
social struggle, it would be contradictory to maintain in the platform that we propose to 
overthrow the government by means of a revolutionary uprising by the Colombian 
people. On this matter, our platform must bring together the lessons given us by our 
people, learned at the cost of great sacrifice, and apply, to our concrete situation, the 
thesis of the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This means 
that we must consider the advantage of inserting into the Party platform, in place of the 
call to overthrow the government, 53
                                                 
53 Italicized in the original version.  
a call for peaceful revolutionary struggle through the 
progressive democratization of the country, the strengthening and unity of the workers’ 
movement and the worker-peasant alliance (Viera, Gilberto 1959, trans Pizarro 1980, 
173).  
 103 
 Unimpressed by the leadership of the Communist Party, rival left leaning groups mocked 
the Communist Party’s ineffectiveness.  As Pizarro (1980, 173) points out, by 1959 “ the radical 
urban groups denounced the Communist Party as a lame organization and advanced new political 
options that would end the Communist monopoly of the revolutionary opposition in the country.” 
During the early period of the 1960s, a few political parties/organizations voraciously voiced the 
end of peaceful means of political agitation. Several had gone through nearly two years of 
peaceful process with little rewards in terms of political representation. In addition, the rightwing 
National Front partly at the behest of the United States government had become even more 
brazen and had launched several military attacks in rural regions considered leftist strongholds54
In essence, leading up to the early 1960s various parties underwent a gradual process of 
extensional delegitimation in part the likely outcome of the political, economic, and social 
programs of the National Front. Among the first groups to create a terrorist wing, was the 
Peasant-Student Workers Movement (MOEC), which was formed in the early 1960s.  Initially, 
the group was oriented towards the task of urban political mobilization. The more moderate 
members of the group had called on the government to broaden the political process and reform 
conditions among workers in the state. Overtime some members within the political 
organizations such as the radical students Eduardo Aristizbal, Max Santos, Robinson Jimenez 
and Larotta advocated using violence to achieve their objectives (Maullin 1973, 29-31). 
Influenced by the successes of other movements such as in Cuba, the group began by 1960 to 
engage in violent attacks on government figures and their supporters. Larotta himself also 
.  
Several urban groups, partly fearing a loss of membership, took what seems a rational step to 
create armed or terrorist wings.   
                                                 
54 The rural region of Villarricia was frequently raided by government forces in the pretext that its inhabitant was 
seeking to subvert the government and initiate another civil war. See Maullin (1973, 28). 
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attempted to join forces in the department of Cauca with several political “bandits but was 
killed” (Pizarro 1980, 176) 
Some hardliners within Communist Party by 1964 had become disillusioned and had 
already begun to take steps towards creating an organized violent response to the political 
climate. Indeed, while some members of the party had since the La Violencia period began to use 
violence as a tool, such activity was largely uncoordinated and rural in nature. Furthermore, as 
illustrated by statements in the Tribuna during the early 1960s most members of the Communist 
establishment still did not condoned violence.    
In the case of the Communist Party, the final decision to turn to violence was the result of 
two issues. The first relates to some external factors in particular the Cold War. As outlined in 
the extended literature and tested in chapter three, the politics of the Cold War contributed 
greatly to social political movements. In particular, developments in the Soviet Union and more 
importantly, the successes of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba influenced hardliners in the 
Communist Party that violence could be an effective tool for regime change.  According to 
Maullin (1973, 29) “the full political context of that period included much concern about the 
Cuban Revolution, both as a threat to conventional Colombian politics and as a model for 
violent, rapid socioeconomic change.”   
The second issue relates to the central hypothesis of this dissertation, that is, rightwing 
government’s socioeconomic policies often provide the impetus for a violent transformation of 
political parties.  The 1962 and1964 elections had been particularly unfavorable for those 
Communist leaders who had taken the steps to run under the banner of the MRL.55
                                                 
55 The MRL was in theory the left flank of the Liberal Party, while it members rarely received positions in Liberal 
control National Front governments, the party remained tied to the Liberal Party and  listed candidates for various 
positions. These positions were often times in the rural districts or local departments. See Dix 1967, 257-259).  
   Unable to 
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gain any institutional recognition, the Colombian Communist Party allied itself “tacitly to the 
MRL, although in contrast to the other groups it did not form an integral part of the movement. 
Rather the PCC gave its electoral and propagandistic backing to the MRL. A few PCC members 
were included on MRL electoral lists, the MRL and the PCC sometimes held joint rallies” (Dix 
1967, 259).  The MRL however performed badly in the 1962 and 1964 elections with some 
members of the MRL pointing fingers at the PCC for dragging the party down the party political 
opportunities (Dix 1967, 264).  Indeed, Lopez often vacillating between support for and denial of 
the PCC, eventually and emphatically disavowed the Communist Party and opposed their further 
involvement under an MRL umbrella (Dix 1967, 266).   
Almost immediately following the 1964 general elections in Colombia, members of the 
Communist Party in various rural and a few urban zones56
     As Guaqueta (2003) points out, the FARC aimed to break the rigid hierarchical 
socioeconomic structure of the Colombian society and construct a socialist one in its place. As 
Table 5.1 shows, the elections of 1965 only included parties with ties to the Liberal and 
Conservative parties.  Under the  agreement between the Liberals and Conservatives to alternate 
the presidency under four-year terms during  1958-76, and the passing of other restrictive 
legislations,  the Frente Nacional, ensured that there was no avenues for participation in the 
electoral process by parties that advocated socialist and communist political ideologies.  
 seemingly dissatisfied with their 
political outlook and harassed by government policing and military campaigns launched by the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that year (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).     
                                                 
56 The particular zones include Marguetalia, Riochiquito, and the South of Tolima where various government forces 
engaged peasant “guerillas agrarian groups who were dissatisfied with working conditions. The government often 
used the justification that these groups were aligned to Communist factions or were endeavoring to destabilize the 
state. See Pizarro (1992, 181) Maullin 1973, 29-36).     
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At most, the Colombian government and its security forces, was seen as proxies of U.S. 
hegemony by Communist Party affiliates such as the FARC (Guaqueta 2003).  Stated simply, the 
FARC emerged as a direct response to the National Front sociopolitical and economic policies57 
. Under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda58
As Maullin (1973, 27) points out, the changes in the PCC approach demonstrated efforts 
by the Colombian Communist party to  become the tutor, coordinator, and finally patron of 
resistance activities.  For the entire life of the National Front, the FARC carried out terrorists’ 
attacks and guerrilla styled warfare in urban and rural districts of Colombia. Under similar 
conditions other terrorist groups such as the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation 
Army or ELN) and the M-19 (April 19 Movement) were created by political organizations. Both 
groups had ties to the Communist Political party  with ELN being formed by Victor Medina 
Moron regional secretary of the Communist Party in the Santander district, and M-19 being 
formed later in 1972 by factions of the Communist Party and ANAPO. Similar to the FARC, the 
groups argued for the end of the National Front, better working conditions, greater political 
inclusiveness and the setting up of a socialist political model. However, in contrast to the FARC, 
both the ELN and M-19 agitated for nationalistic policies instead of the more regional policies 
advocated by the FARC (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 127-129).   
, the group functioned as a direct proxy of the 
Communist Party.  
What is evident is that the formation of cohesive terrorist organization by political parties 
can be traced directly to the efforts by the elites to create a system of rule –conservative in 
form—that would enable that ruling class “to retain for itself the essential levers of power” (Dix 
1967, 11). As pointed out by Brown (2001, 17), the decisions and actions of domestic elites often 
                                                 
57 FARC activities were especially concentrated in rural areas.  
58 Marulanda also known as Tiro Fijo (sure shot). 
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determines whether political disputes veer towards war or peace. In the Colombian context, the 
rightwing policies of Conservative and Liberal governments who comprised the National Front, 
restricted political freedoms and access to government for its political opponents who held leftist 
and in some cases centrist ideology. As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, when parties on the 
left face the combination of the factors that are often akin to rightwing regimes and outlined 
above, they may often turn to violent measures.   
It seems, that the right leaning policies of the Conservatives and Liberal political party 
created various institutional barriers that denied opposition parties any opportunities of a 
meaning chance of securing a position in government offices.  In so doing, many of the political 
organizations went through a process of extensional delegitimation. Invariably, this process was 
of metamorphosis gained additional momentum by internal organizational conflict were 
hardliners won the arguments over the response of parties facing repressive policies by rightwing 
governments 
In summary, as Figure 5.1 shows, under the rightwing party leadership, the constitutional 
amendments of 1958 put into place the institutional barriers that eliminated access for 
oppositional leftist political parties in the Colombian state. In essence, this decision served as a 
critical antecedent that set in motion what would lead to later violent outcomes. Critically, 
following the election to power of another National Front government in 1962 (critical juncture), 
greater limits were placed on leftist parties. In response and because of their own internal 
organizational discontent with leadership, many leftist parties began creating violent terror wings 
to challenge the state. In essence, the creation of groups such as the FARC, EPL, and M-19 can 
be traced back to the point at which the National Front took office and began disenfranchising 
parts of the electorate who supported leftist leaning political parties.      
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Table 5.1 Colombia Parties and National Factions, 1965 
Source: Payne (1968, 187)  
*Includes 14,090 votes for independent Liberal candidates. 
** Registered in the 1964 elections as Movimiento de Izquierda Liberal; existed only in Cundinamarca.  
***Includes 8,282 votes for independent Conservative candidates.  
  
 
 
 
  
Leader 
 
Votes in 1964 election  
LIBERALS:   
Liberal Oficialista* 
Movimiento 
    Revolucionario 
    Liberal, 
    Linea Blanda 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
 
 
 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen 
752,527 (33.3%) 
 
 
 
284,952 (12.6%) 
Movimiento   
    Revolucionario   
    Liberal,   
    Linea Blanda Alvaro Uribe Rueda   96,895 (4.3%) 
Movimiento   
    Independiente   
    Liberal** Fernando Mazuera Villegas    7,129 (.3%) 
   
CONSERVATIVES:   
Conservador   
    Doctrinario   
    (Laura-alzatistas) Alvaro Gomez Hurtado  
Conservador  802,282 (35.5%)*** 
    Unionista   
    (Ospinista) Mariano Ospina Perez  
 
THIRD PARTY: 
  
Alianza Nacional   
    Popular Gustavo Rojas Pinilla  
    from lists registered as Conservative                            293,183  
    from lists registered as Liberal                              16,495  
        Total ANAPO  309,678      (13.7%) 
 Blank and Void Votes     7,727          (.3%) 
 Total Vote 2,261,190 (100.0%) 
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Figure 5.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Colombia 
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CHAPTER 6 - Turkey 
 
“I don't think you will find any other people and organization that are as thirsting for 
peaceful methods as us." 
 Abdullah Öçalan—Leader of the PKK 
 
 
This quote provides a cogent summary of the motivation behind the Workers' Party of 
Kurdistan’s (PKK) decision to change its modus operandi of peaceful political dialogue and 
instead turn to violent terrorist activity against the Turkish state and people. As this chapter 
intends to show, for a significant segment of the Kurdish people and the PKK in particular, 
generations of Turkish governments ignored the rights of their group and political aspirations in 
favor of promoting a rigid Turkish rightwing nationalist agenda.  Consequently, consecutive 
Turkish governments have intentionally created institutional barriers that reduce or in some cases 
exclude altogether the ability of left leaning, ethnic based, as well as a few religious leaning 
political parties from participating in the democratic process.     
In the previous chapter, it was shown how the ruling rightwing governments of Colombia 
focused on imposing their rightwing political ideology on matters of class, economics, 
ecclesiastical issues, and constitutional interpretations. In this chapter, the ruling rightwing 
governments of Turkey especially from the early 1960s to early 1990s are examined. As was the 
case in the previous chapter, in response to classical rightwing policies such as banning workers 
unions and political parties with left leaning ideology as well as an uncompromising disregard 
for the rights of minority ethnic groups and those wishing to represent them several political 
parties created terror groups in Turkey.   
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In the subsequent section, I examine the history of Turkey paying special attention to its 
political and socioeconomic background. In particular, I examine the how the founding statist 
principles of Kemal Ataturk help influence early rightist principles. In the following section, I 
examine the critical antecedents, the various institutional factors that contributed to later 
outcomes of political party violence. The third section examines the critical junctures, where 
political parties because of a host of institutional barriers created by rightist regimes lead some 
parties to undergo radicalization and turn to terror.  The final section provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
6.1 Background  
In chapter two, it was pointed out that rightwing governments and parties illustrate 
certain characteristics. Among these salient identifiers are appeals to traditional values extolling 
such institutions as the family, or past national glory, claims to legitimacy based on the need for 
order without any reference to the social causes of disorder (Pinkney 1990).  In addition, most 
have close links with civilian landed and capitalist elites, a preference to the private sector, 
discouragement of popular participation in politics, repression of groups favoring greater 
equality, and importantly a willingness to pursue policies that lead to greater social inequality 
(Pinkney 1990, 96).  
A major issue that ultimately led to various political parties turning to violence was the 
behavior of successive ruling regimes in Turkey, in particular the adoption of rightist policies 
that were stated as necessary for the security and protection of the state. Admittedly, asserting 
that the Turkish governments’ post 1960 were rightist in ideology is perhaps a less clear 
argument than those of the other cases in this study.  This is an issue that Pinkney (1990, 96) also 
points out, “the left-right divide in Turkey is complicated by the country’s long history of 
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centralized state control.”  In addition, Turkey’s political elite preference for rightwing policies 
was cultivated by an active military (Pinkney1990, 96-99). Unlike the other cases in this study, 
Turkey, especially post 1950s, illustrates consecutive ruling regimes where a:  
centralized, secular bureaucratic state which the military had done much to fashion 
 might be considered as ‘conservative,’ while emerging groups of urban merchants, 
 industrialists and market-oriented farmers, who were by-products of modernization but 
 largely excluded from the military—intellectuals—bureaucratic elite and the patronage 
 dispensed by it, might be called radicals (Pinkney 1990, 96).  
The modern history of the Turkish state illustrates remarkable change in the political 
discourse and policies of the state.  Following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the founders 
of the Turkish state were Ottoman intellectuals, military officials, and civilian bureaucrats (Ergil 
2000). For the founders “aware of the multicultural nature of their society, they chose to call 
their new state the Republic of Turkey, referring to the geographical region in which all the 
peoples of Turkey lived, rather than to name it after the dominant ethnic group” (Ergil 2000, 
124).   From Ottoman times to the present, Turkey has enjoyed a remarkably high degree of 
‘stateness’ and a strong state tradition (Ozbudun 2000, 5).  However, by the mid-1980s, such 
stateness coupled with a strong rightist ideology would be challenged by a relatively small but 
militant Kurdish political organization under the banner of the PKK (Ozbudun 2000, 5). 
Beginning in 1923 under Mustafa Kemel Ataturk, the state took on a more nationalist tone, by 
the late 1920s, Armenians were driven out of Turkey and much of the Greek population of 
Anatolia fled to Greece (Ergil 2000).   
Although under the leadership of Ataturk, the Turkish government had sought to promote 
the ideas of republicanism and secularism and “adopted a liberal nonracist definition of 
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nationalism,” in practice not all groups were treated fairly or evenly (Tachau 1984, 29).  Within 
decades of the formation of the new republic, its multicultural, pluralist basis was beginning to 
be abandoned (Ergil 2000, 124).   
During the post-Ataturk era59
As shown in Table 6.1 by 1950, the opposition Democratic Party (DP) obtained a 
majority within the new multiparty proportional electoral system. Under the Democrats, 
economic development was fostered in the form of large amounts of foreign capital to the 
agricultural sector. Initially, the DP promoted economic and social policies that increased the 
economic disposition of almost all economic classes.  The DP encouraged a policy of free 
enterprise and “the Democrats traditionalist populism plus exuberant slogans of ‘enrich 
yourselves’ found their expression in the charismatic leadership of Adnan Menderes” (Birand 
1980, 10). However, as the party became entrenched, the level of authoritarianism increased.  
 the political dynamic within Turkey dramatically changed.  
In 1946, the Ismet Inonu government under the Republican People’s Party, which controlled 
Turkey under a one party rule, allowed other political parties to be formed and compete for 
power in general elections (Dodd 1979). However, several political parties such as the Party For 
The Defense of Islam (IKP) and Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) were banned, the former for 
mixing religion with politics and the latter for advocating policies that “threaten” the security of 
the state (Tachau 1994, 560-585). Unlike several states in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, Turkey 
has no totalitarian past (Ozbudun 2000, 5). Beginning in 1946, Turkey experienced its second-
wave of democracy. During this period, the state had twelve free and mostly competitive general 
elections for several levels of governments (Ozbudun 2000, 13). 
                                                 
59 Ataturk died in 1938.  
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 Importantly, the “newly powerful Democrat Party government before long began to 
restrict various of the freedoms of its political opponents in questionable ways, but did not seek 
to abolish them” (Dodd 1979, 9). In practice, this was largely done by constitutional amendments 
to limit the number of parties that could participate in elections and to discredit candidates on a 
range of dubious and at times hastily enacted laws.  
Table 6.1 Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1950-57:  Political Parties of Turkey 
 
ELECTIONS 
  
DP 
 
RPP 
 
Inds and Other parties 
1950 % of vote 53.3 39.9 7.9 
 Seats won 396 69 10 
 % of seats 
 
83.8 14.2 2.0 
1954 % of vote 56.6 34.8 6.3 
 Seats won 490 30 15 
 % of seats 
 
91.6 5.6 2.8 
1957 % of vote 47.3 40.6 10.9 
 Seats won 419 173 10 
 % of  seats 69.6 28.7 1.7 
 
Source: Tachau (1994, 560). 
 
 NOTE: The total number of seats varied from 487 (with twelve vacancies) in 1950, to 610 (with eight vacancies) in 
1957.  
 
In general, a critical indictment of the DP was a perceived shifting of the party’s 
economic and social policies from its right of center initial stance, to60
                                                 
60  Tachau (1994, 558-560) describes the DP as a moderate right of center to centrist party, while others (Ahmad 
1977) suggest at least initially the party was slightly right of center in its policies. The origins of many of the party’s 
founding members were from within the RPP. However, the party attempted to fashion itself as a mass party 
promoting secularism, free enterprise and by the late 1950s religious expression in the pubic domain by allowing 
Muslim’s call to prayers sounded in Arabic, which had been forbidden under the previous RPP administration.  
 a more left of center on 
the political spectrum. In theory, the party was opportunistic in adopting rigid rightist policies to 
satisfy some of its base supporters, these included adopting social policies at times to gain 
support in the poor rural areas of Turkey where some upper class landowners resided. However, 
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by the 1960s, the party frequently extended overwhelming financial support to peasantry in the 
form of massive farming subsidies to capture and secure this “reservoir of electoral support” 
(Birand 1980, 10).  At other times, the party was able to maintain support from some wealthy 
elites by appointing several among the elites to plumb positions in the bureaucracy.  The political 
and economic policies of the DP led to “mounting resentment within what could be broadly 
described as the ‘Kemalist coalition—the civil service, the academic and intellectual 
establishment and, more ominously, the armed forces” (Birand 1980, 10).  Over time, the party’s 
earlier pledge to maintain democratic principles gave way to authoritarianism (Birand 1980).  To 
compound the situation, the DP further alienated the country’s military by attempting to suppress 
the military’s hierarchy in various high-handed measures such as forcing older generals into 
retirement and appointing Chiefs of Staff that were regarded as weak and ineffective (Birand 
1980, 10).  Importantly, while the party allowed greater religious and ethnic minority’s 
expression in the public sphere, the DP used various authoritarian methods to suppress the 
formation of rival political parties that sought to represent the views of the more left of center 
groups. In particular, Kurdish and Muslim based political parties were suppressed.      
Following the controversial elections of 1957, where the DP was accused of “rigging” 
elections by changing the electoral rules two days before the votes where cast, there was an 
escalation of bitter confrontation among members of various opposition parties towards the 
ruling regime. The May 1960 coup by junior officers was a forceful response by junior officers 
signaling their unhappiness with the discord in the country and the inherent weakness with the 
senior members of the Turkish military. Through a union with secular intelligentsia, Kemalist 
civil servants, RPP politicians, and wide public support the DP was forced out of power and a 
new “mildly social democratic” constitution was enacted in 1961 (Birand 1980; Tachau 1994).   
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Several of the top leaders and many of the senior members of the old Chiefs of Staff were tried, 
convicted, and jailed for “infringing the constitution,” and at least fifteen received death 
sentences (Birand 1980, 11).   At best, the 1960 coup by the junior officers, although including 
other motivations, “might be regarded as an attempt to replace a petit bourgeois government 
committed to a market economy with one committed to left-wing virtues of centralized 
planning” (Pinkney 1990, 97). Importantly, “democracy was restored relatively quickly and 
smoothly, suggesting that the soldiers’ intention in 1960 as it would also be in 1971 and 1980 
was more of a moderating coup rather than the creation of a lasting military regime” (Ozbudun 
2000, 13).  
The outcome of the 1961 constitution with all its new civil liberties now in effect, was a 
transformation of the political dynamic in Turkey. As  Birand (1980, 11) points out, “one of the 
most important features of the decade was the emergence of trade unions and  a Turkish left 
which gradually redefined the terms of the political debate.”  However, the 1960s was to witness 
another period of violent radicalization, as the revamped DP now called the Justice Party (JP), 
under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel, won the 1965 elections. The new leadership 
complained, “that the 1961 Constitution made the country ungovernable,” and took steps to 
sidestep the efforts towards liberalization enshrined in the 1961 Constitution.  The now left of 
center RPP, Marxists and a host of other left leaning politicians accused the “Demirel 
governments of reneging on the principles of social justice and reform enshrined in the same 
constitution” (Birand 1980, 12).  
6.1.1 Critical Antecedents: The Development of an Exclusionary Party System  
As previously mentioned, the party system of the post-1950 Turkey was mostly akin to a 
multiparty system. The representation of political parties in parliament was done along the lines 
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of a proportional representation model based on large constituencies (Gunes-Ayata and Ayata 
2001).  Nevertheless, despite having a proportional system which Reynal-Querol (2002) and 
Huber and Powell (1994) found to be not consistent with civil conflict, the post-1961Turkey 
experienced increased levels of violence by political organizations (Harris 1985, 144). A major 
reason for the civil discord was the frequent and subjective banning of mostly left and religious 
leaning political parties from participating in the political process under the guise that such 
organizations threaten the security of the state.   
Extant literature on Turkey suggests that while party competition existed in the state, 
there were many among the elites who attempted to discourage some forms of political parties 
(Tachau 1994).   In almost in every instance, there were some elites in the ruling political parties 
whether these were members of the Democrat Party, Republican Party, Justice Party or other 
right of center political parties who were opposed to the deepening of the political process to 
include minority parties (Aydinli 2002, 211).  In general, the argument presented by some elites 
involved debates between greater liberalization, on the one-hand, and state security concerns, on 
the other. Among the right leaning elites “any form of power relocation or diffusion to societal 
elements was determined to be fatal to the state and the regime owing to the fragmented nature 
of the society” (Aydinli 2002, 211).  Indeed, while the Turkish state did experience occasional 
violence in the late 1960s, the approach of the ruling regimes61
                                                 
61 Ruling regime here includes the military, who often applied a conservative approach to rule. See  
 to limit the creation of regional 
political organization was in most cases an overreaction. Indeed, as was customary during the 
Cold War period in many states, right leaning regimes implemented harsh policies to deter what 
they believed were leftist threats to the security of the state. From post World War I, various 
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conservative Turkish governments sought to disband various political parties that they believed 
threatened the security of the state.   
Among the many casualties of Turkey’s right leaning governments was the Communist 
Party of Turkey (CPT).  As early as 1927,62 “the CPT’s leaders and activists were either jailed or 
exiled from Turkey, and its publications were seized” (Tachau 1994, 556). Moreover, even 
following the 1960 and 1971 military coups the party remained a serious threat to state security 
in the eyes of Turkey’s right leaning governments (Tachau 1994, 556). During the early 1970s, 
most of the establishment leaders within the CPT rejected violence as a means of gaining access 
to Turkey’s electoral process. The more peaceful members of the party consisted of intellectuals 
“including some students and some workers; the intellectuals apparently predominated, at least 
in decision-making positions” (Tachau 1994, 556).  The party’s activities occurred largely 
underground and involved the creation of party pamphlets, leaflets, and journals that were 
clandestinely distributed.  As would be expected and given the numerous competing factions in 
the CPT, the party faced criticism from many, for its more radical members and from other leftist 
leaning party who believed the party was not taking enough robust action to achieve its 
organizational goals. As Tachau (1994) points out, “consistently fighting” 63
In general, because the party remained banned by the Turkish government and many of 
its more senior members refused to use force as a mechanism for change, the party lost many of 
its younger members. However, as is the case with several cases in this study, not all members 
 other leftist groups 
in Turkey, the CPT argued that it was the only true Leninist group in the country and, as such, 
was the only party equipped to cure Turkey’s ills at all levels (Tachau 1994, 556).    
                                                 
62 While the Ataturk regime was influenced by military generals and technocrats, during this period the military 
establishment promoted a decidedly more conservative role than was the case with the younger generals who 
masterminded the 1960 coup. See Pinkney (1990, 96). 
63 Fighting here for the most part did not seem to involve physical attacks.  
 119 
within the party were content to continue along a peaceful path. Within the ranks of the party, 
several younger and radical members eventually created violent wings. In some cases, this was 
done with tacit approval by senior members of the CPT. Two of the outgrowths of this radical 
ideology were the terror groups Partizans and the PKK whose leader Abdullah Öçalan, an ardent 
Marxist-Leninist, who among other reasons wanted the party to take more robust action against 
the ruling regime.   
By 1970, Turkey was mired in civil unrest (Jebb et.al 2006, 37).  As shown in Table 6.2. 
although the JP had won the 1969 elections, the political landscape was as hostile as it had been 
since 1959. While the party policies did help stimulate economic growth by at least 7 percent 
throughout the 1960s, “little had been done to resolve such pressing socioeconomic issues as 
unemployment64
An assessment of the 1971 military intervention shows that second intervention differed greatly 
from the previous one. For many dissident members of the now outlawed political parties, the 
military appeared to be more interested in maintaining the status quo of rightwing government 
supremacy and nothing was done to reorganize the political dynamic in the state.  At best, the 
” (Tachau 1994, 571).  Within weeks of returning to power, the JP party lost 
over forty deputies to a new more right-wing Democratic Party. Weakened by this and serious 
outbreaks of terrorism which they could not control, the military once again stepped to the fore 
and removed the Justice Party from government. However, in doing so the more senior “High 
Command, [to] avert a left-wing junta […] forced Demiral to resign [there were] mass arrests of 
leftist. The Workers Party of Turkey [was] banned, its leaders arrested and put on trial” (Birani 
1987, x).  
                                                 
64 By the late1960s to early 1970s unemployment in Turkey hovered around 12 to 14%.    
 120 
1971 military memorandum “changed nothing in either the political structures or party activity” 
(Birani 1987, xi). 
 
Table 6.2 Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1961-77: Political Parties of Turkey 
 
 
ELECTIONS 
  
NTP 
 
JP 
 
RPP 
 
Inds and Other parties 
1961 % of vote 13.7 34.8 36.7 14.8 
 Seats won 65 158 173 54 
 % of seats 
 
14.4 35.1 38.4 12.0 
1965 % of vote 3.7 52.9 28.7 14.7 
 Seats won 19 240 134 57 
 % of seats 
 
4.2 53.3 29.8 12.6 
1969 % of vote 2.2 46.5 27.4 23.9 
 Seats won 6 256 143 45 
 % of seats 1.3 56.9 31.8 9.9 
 
1973 
 
% of vote 
 
-------- 
 
30.6 
 
33.5 
 
37.0 
 Seats won -------- 149 185 116 
 % of seats 
 
-------- 33.1 41.1 25.5 
1977 % of vote -------- 36.9 41.6 21.7 
 Seats won -------- 189 213 48 
 % of seats 
 
-------- 42.0 47.3 10.4 
 Source: Tachau (1994, 560). 
 
NOTE: There were 450 seats in the National Assembly between 1961 and 1980. The Senate is not considered here.  
 
6.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology, Nationalism, Constitutional Barriers, and 
Radicalization    
 
As pointed out earlier, the 1971 military coup did little to address the grievances of those 
parties forced outside the political process (Ahmad 1977, 293). In fact, while most political 
violence in the 1960s to the early 1970s was restricted to non-political party terror groups such as 
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the “June 16 Organization,” while destructive their grievances and aims were not motivated by 
efforts to create changes to the political process, rather their violence were  anarchist in nature.  
The mid 1970s saw the development of a new and dangerous phenomenon—political parties 
creating or sponsoring militant wings.  From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the ruling 
political establishment in Turkey faced several violent challenges from political parties on all 
sides of the political spectrum. Critically, while rightwing terror groups such as the Gray Wolves 
were reactionary and focused their attacks on rival groups on the other side of the political 
spectrum (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004). Terrorist groups or wings created by religious parties 
and those on the left clearly targeted the ruling right leaning regimes, the public, and their 
supporters.   
Put simply, the actions of the military banning most left leaning parties illustrated to 
many left and religious parties that the political dynamic would only be changed if the regime 
was overthrown through violent revolution. According to Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004, 40), 
developments in the international system in the form of violent revolutions also provided many 
on the left in Turkey clear alternatives to the peaceful approach that many had embraced.   
The first wave of political parties creating terrorist groups saw the creation of the 
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU).  The terror group was founded by 
dissatisfied Turkish students immediately following the 1971 military intervention. The MLAPU 
claimed to be representing the interest of the then banned Turkish People’s Liberation Party 
(THKP).  In fact, many within the hierarchy of the group were members of the banned THKP. 
Like several other leftist parties, the THKP was not allowed to participate in the 1973 and 1975 
general elections because the party had advocated Marxist ideology. While the MLAPU seemed 
initially to have been eliminated by the military, which raided and arrested many of the group’s 
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senior members, the group resumed violent activity just prior to the 1973 elections. Seemingly 
frustrated that political amnesty was not extended to the THKP as it was done for other 
previously banned right leaning political parties following the 1970 disturbances, the group 
kidnapped two British and one Canadian radar technician in an attempt to use  foreign nationals 
as leverage to gain concessions from the government (Mango 2005, 17).  As expected, the 
military responded with force, the group then began engaging in assassinations against 
supporters of the government and members of the military. The group frequently proclaimed 
itself as the “‘Hit Squad’ of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party” (Weinberg and Pedahzur 
2003, 155).       
Among a growing and more demonstrative Islamic political movement in the 1970s was 
the creation of the National Salvation Party (NSP). This group of Muslim politicians had long 
called for a greater role of Islam in society and it collectively voiced its concern in the form of 
the National Order Party (NOP). However, when in 1971 the Turkish Constitutional Court 
banned the party for using religion for political purposes, the more militant members under the 
banner of the NSP began carrying out attacks against the government and its supports (Schmid 
and Jongman1988, 677).  
The third challenge, which occurred after the 1971 decision to ban mostly leftist, 
religious, and separatist groups, came from the vocal Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) (Schmid and 
Jongman1988, 677). The Kurds represent the only large linguistic minority in Turkey.65
                                                 
65 According to (Ozbudun 2000, 143) roughly 10 to 15 percent of the population.   
 The 
majority of the Kurdish population resides mostly in large western cities and is relatively 
integrated into Turkish society, although to do so they have to give up many of their cultural 
identities (Ozbudun 2000).  Many of the members who created the PKK had also been members 
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of the Turkish Marxist-Leninist party (Kocher 2002, 4).  The organization however, differed 
from several of the left leaning organizations that were mostly demanding that the state adopt 
more of a leftist ideology in its economic and social policies. While Abdullah Öçalan’s newly 
formed organization did embrace a decidedly leftist ideology, the group’s major demand was 
along ethnic and separatist orientation (Kocher 2002, 4). In 1971, the Kurdish movement, which 
had for several decades called for greater political involvement, expanded its demands to include 
greater recognition for Kurdish cultural understanding among the predominant anti-Kurdish 
right-leaning governments that had ruled Turkey for the previous 40 years (Ozbudun 2000, 141).   
Many Kurds who were tired of decades of failure by successive Kurdish political 
organizations threw their support behind a more militant organization. Unlike many of the other 
parties that created a front for violence, the PKK members engaged in acts of violence under the 
banner of the party’s official name (Kocher 2002, 4). According to Ozbudun (2000), the PKK 
aimed to “threaten the dominant position and ideology of state elites, Ataturkism” (Ozbudun 
2000, 141).  During its first years of activity, the PKK  engaged in only low scale attacks and 
was mostly directed at “attacking landlords and rightist in the Siverek region in the 1970s” 
(Kocher 2002, 4).        
During the mid to late1970s, the Turkish government responded to the upsurge in 
political violence by using force.  During the four years that followed the military intervention, 
nearly “180,000 persons were detained, some 65,000 were charged, 42, 000 sentenced, and 25 
executed” (Mango 2005, 20). From 1973 to 1977, the Turkish government operated under 
chaotic and volatile political environment. During the 1973 presidential elections, “the president 
of Turkey was elected jointly by the two houses of the Grand National Assembly, [however] the 
en bloc vote of the Democratic Party forced the election of a compromise candidate” (Tachau 
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1994, 562).  However, within months, infighting among members of the fragile coalition resulted 
in the calling of another round of elections. Unable to secure a clear majority or form a working 
coalition the JP, NTP, and RPP went back to the polls in 1977” (Tachau 1994, 562). During this 
period, the country slipped into economic and social turmoil, with parties on the outside of the 
political process occasionally venting their anger in the form of violent attacks. 
Despite forming a coalition government in 1978 with the more left leaning RPP 
comprising the majority of members, the RPP led government failed to incorporate many social 
policies. For example, “party pressure exerted through Sukan,66
                                                 
66  Faruk Sukan was a very conservative member of the Democratic Party. He had been instrumental in nullifying a 
new law aimed at reforming land tenure in 1973. See Tachau (1994, 562).  
 was believed to have prevented 
the government from abolishing articles 141 and 142 of the penal code (which outlawed the 
formation of Marxist political parties)” (Tachau 1994, 563).  Furthermore, the RPP party 
program approved by the Ministry of the Interior in December 1970 had stressed social justice, 
equitable taxation, freedom of thought and religion (Tachau 1994, 563).  An amendment to the 
ideology of the party in 1977 “emphasized right-of-center policies, nationalism and democracy 
[….] free national economy, which, for them meant private enterprise, encouraging savings, and 
progressive technology” (Tachau 1994, 564).  The economic, political, and social policies of the 
RPP government did little to calm the hostility towards the government by rival parties. On New 
Year’s Day 1978, the Prime Minister was forced to introduce Marital Law for twelve months 
following the worst incidence of “sectarian violence in modern Turkish history” (Birand 1987, 
xi). Two years later, the now firmly right leaning government was removed from office by the 
military on September 12th, following months of mass outrage including violence at the 
introduction of harsh “IMF-sanctioned austerity measures” (Birand 1987, xi).   
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The third military intervention in 40 years lasted three years and was aimed at ending the 
prevailing political structure that existed in the Turkish state (Tachau 1994). At best, the military 
hoped to root-out the elements of the political process that created tension and violence Tachau 
1994).   Towards this end, “on October 16, 1981, all political parties were closed down by the 
military, and active politicians were barred from politics for up to ten years” (Tachau 1994, 552).  
When democratic government returned to Turkey in 1983, it did so under severe limitations 
imposed under the new 1982 constitution.  This constitution limited the role of trade unions or 
organizations acting on behalf of workers, which in many ways was the backbone of almost all 
left leaning political parties. Article 33 lists the following restrictions: 
Associations shall not… pursue political aims, conduct political activity, receive support 
from or give support to political parties, or take concerted action with labor unions, with 
professional associations having public functions or with foundations.  Associations 
which depart from their original aims and conditions […] shall be considered disbanded 
(Tachau 1984, 85). 
Stated succinctly, the 1982 Turkish Constitution effectively outlawed the development of 
the “type of social democratic party typical of western Europe, where such parties draw their 
primary base of support and leadership from the trade union movement” (Tachau 1984). The 
constitution, while providing for cases where unions may strike, limited these strikes to issues 
that were not “political” and if found to have some political motivation, unions are held 
responsible for any damages incurred by their members (Tachau 1984, 46). Importantly, political 
parties are also restricted from associations with trade unions. Article 69 suggests, “Political 
parties shall not have relations or have cooperation with associations, unions, foundations, 
cooperatives, and professional organizations in the form of public bodies and their superior 
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organs, in order to promote and further their party policies, nor shall they receive material aid 
from those bodies (Constitution, Article 69 trans Tachau 1984). 
While these rules were created to limit the “excessive politicization” of the Turkish 
society emblematic of the 1960s and 1970s, most religious based political parties, and those on 
the left were mostly affected by these constitutional limits. Workers’ parties were not able to 
represent the rights of workers and/or associations. In such cases, workers’ rights were often 
ignored. When the WP was found to have violated the “spirit” of the law on January 16 1988, the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the WP (Ozbudun 2000, 143).   
The banning of a host of left leaning and religious parties during the 1980s to 2000s 
further intensified violent measures taken by banned political parties such as the PKK. As 
discussed in chapter 3, imposing institutional constraints can create a further radicalization of 
groups towards utilizing terrorist methods. Robbins (1993, 663) suggests that the Turkish right 
leaning government took unusual steps to deny any “special status or provisions for the Kurds in 
Turkey.”  In addition, the Turkish government banned traditional Kurdish costumes and 
restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language.  What is apparent from the literature is that 
politically and socially, the Kurds were denied conventional political access to the decision-
making process. In essence, it is conceivable, and the literature does support the view that, 
government restrictions on the Kurds in democratic Turkey provoked hardliners during the 1980s 
within the Kurdish community to once more abandon mainstream political party formation. 
Indeed, Yavuz and Ozcan (2006) imply that initial attempts at using mainstream political 
agitation were discouraged by the institutional barriers instituted by the Turkish government in 
the forms of bans placed on several political parties.   
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By the late 1990s, there were bans placed on a host of Kurdish political parties for 
breaking laws that protected the solidarity of the state and “alleged” links to the PKK. These 
parties include People’s Labor Party also known as (HADEP) and in 1997 the Democratic 
Peoples Party (DEHAP). Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) points out, if a political party that has 
turn to terror is given an opportunity to express its political goals, it will most often attempt to 
transition to into a peaceful political party. Importantly, while the PKK advocated Marxist ideas, 
many of its members had illustrated a willingness to use the medium of a political party to voice 
their grievances. However, the right leaning policies of the various Turkish governments 
stagnated the possibility of a change in approach by the PKK.   From his prison cell, Ocalan has 
laid the blame on the political system that prevails in Turkey: 
Their failure67
                                                 
67 Turkish governments since 1920s. 
 to analyze from a Kurdish point of view the fact of the Republic being a 
fundamental element and to develop an approach which is not separatist but seeks 
equality and freedom pushes them into the old state of affairs where even the smallest 
criticism is seen as separatism. With the accusations of extreme Turkish nationalism 
added to all this, the Kurdish Question, which is in fact a fundamental democratic 
problem, cannot as a rule even avoid being provoked. The branding of even a minimal 
democratic demand as separatism and treason led to its opposite, i.e. anti-democratic 
attitudes, becoming powerful as a result of the situation. Chauvinism and fascism grew 
strong. […] the failure, despite an oligarchic struggle and a quite serious conflict between 
the right and the left during this period, even to pose the question correctly was to be 
influential in the emergence of the PKK” (Ocalan 2007, 7).  
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Figure 6.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Turkey 
 129 
 
In conclusion, as Figure 6.1 shows, the process whereby various political parties in 
Turkey turned to violence was gradual. Simply stated, the policies of successive rightwing 
elected government as well as those of the military headed governments distorted the political 
process and denied political organizations on the left and those who had ethnic or religious 
platforms. The 1960 junior military coup that many on the left had hoped would deliver the 
change they desired ended up as a huge disappointment for many. Nevertheless, the actions of 
the young military officers had many outcomes, a major one being, it served as a blue print for 
groups that violence could be a viable option to secure their objectives. Critically, the 1971 coup 
and the denial of rights to left leaning political groups that followed, help radicalize already 
discontent sentiments by many including several religious and ethnic-based political parties.  The 
1979 military coup and the subsequent bans placed on political parties as well as constitutional 
amendments that followed separated workers unions and religion from political parties, ensured 
that parties on the left and religious oriented ones would continue to wage violence against the 
state.    
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CHAPTER 7 - Japan  
“Disciples the time to awaken and help me is upon you. Let’s carry out the salvation plan 
and face death without regrets”   
Shoko Ashara— Spiritual leader of the Aum Shinrikyo  
 
The statement above illustrates the extent to which the religious sect or “cult” the Aum 
Shinrikyo became radicalized in the 1990s within a relatively restrictive Japanese political 
system that offered few opportunities for political parties or movements outside the political 
establishment. At best, the activities of the Aum Shinrikyo pre-1995 illustrate many of the 
common features associated with a political party.  The cult/ party had developed a clear 
manifesto, campaign strategy, and presented several candidates for the 1990 Japanese general 
elections. The Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to launch multiple violent attempts on Japanese citizens 
came after what their spiritual leader and some radicalized members of the cult believed was a 
shaming of their movement by the Japanese public and political system. They attributed this fact 
to the Aum’s poor showing in the 1990 Japanese general election (Metraux 1995, 1145). 
Importantly, while the group had a doomsday ideology as part of its beliefs structure, this took 
on increasing momentum following their political defeats. Most notably, outside Japan where the 
group also had several branches, none of these groups believed it was prudent to turn to violence 
as a mechanism to achieve their belief structure.    
        The previous chapters showed how the ruling rightwing governments’ policies 
helped to contribute to the onset of terrorist activities by political parties. This chapter provides 
an example of a political organization operating in an advance majoritarian electoral system 
democracy. In particular, the focus of this section is on the period from 1980 to 1997.  While the 
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Japanese political system, unlike several of the other cases in this dissertation, does not feature 
blatant political repression, successive Japanese rightwing governments created a single-party 
democracy where institutional constraints were rampant and which deterred and even blocked 
political parties outside of the political establishment political opportunity (Hrebenar 2000, 37-
41).  
The rest if this chapter is structured as follows. First, a historical background detailing the 
sociopolitical development of Japan is presented.  Second, critical antecedents in the form of 
varying political and structural factors that resulted from the policies of successive rightwing 
regimes are discussed. Third, the point at which political parties created terrorist organizations or 
the critical juncture is examined. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.   
7.1 Background 
In contrast to the previous cases of Turkey and Colombia, Japan provides multiple 
internal differences that set it apart from those states. Among these differences is the lack of any 
significant ethnic, religious, or economic cleavages that in ranging degrees are features of the 
previous cases (Ward 1967; Hrebenar 2000; Dover 1999). On the surface, Japan appears as a 
model developed state with a mature democracy where there are consistent democratic elections 
and a well-educated, supportive, but largely uninvolved, electorate (Hrebenar 2000; Tetsuya 
1992).        
The modern political system that exists in Japan evolved out of a political system 
transplanted by the United States government following Japan’s defeat at the hands of the allied 
forces in WWII.  The political system was unlike the U.S. presidential system but rather featured 
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multi-member, medium size election districts in a parliamentary system (Tetsuya 1992, 14).68 At 
worst, the political system immediately following the United States occupation of Japan was 
chaotic (Hrebenar 2000, 5).  The post-war politics in Japan was a three-way division created by 
Douglas MacArthur’s purge program. The outcome of the purge of the old order created 
diverging groups representing complex views on opposing sides of the political system. The 
postwar political parties that comprised the Diet69
Marxism was popular in the post-1956 Japan for several reasons.  Unlike many political 
organizations in post-World War II Japan, the Communist Party bore a clear conscience after the 
defeat of Japan. They were unlike the majority of those who had supported the ruling regime pre-
1945. Hence, they were not complicit in war crimes, guilt, and the disgrace of defeat. In 
particular, “they had endured incarceration to prove their fidelity to the idea of overthrowing the 
emperor system” (Tetsuya 1992, 16).   
 had been purged from the political process.  In 
essence, “the purge, by labeling the Japanese government ‘ultranationalist,’ decimated the 
political and military part of it, and those who were purged in the military never returned to 
public life. The ensuing political vacuum in the government was filled by two major groups, one 
of which was the Socialist” (Tetsuya 1992, 3). By 1948, the United States who had advocated a 
purge of the Japanese political system enabled a “three-way of war between the bureaucrats, the 
Socialist, and the professional politicians” (Tetsuya 1992, 4). By the conclusion of the U.S. 
occupation, the three groups had come to represent radically differing policies (Tetsuya 1992, 4). 
                                                 
68 It should be noted that parliamentary system are considered to be more representative systems and create less 
cleavages in polities.  The systematic variance in the size of electoral constituencies—is a feature of the Japanese 
political system.  Through the system of malapportionment   rural voters get greater representation than those of 
urban voters. See Kabashima and Steel (2010, 34) for a detail discussion. 
69 Diet is the name given to the Japanese bicameral legislature. As is the case with most parliamentary systems, the 
Diet is comprised of a lower house called the House of Representatives and an upper house called the House of 
Councilors.  
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Second, the Japanese left was initially supported by the United States whose 
policymakers saw the left as a useful mechanism to balance the hard right groups in the post-
1945 Japan (Tetsuya 1992, 17).  Third, most United States policymakers saw Japan surrender as 
“unconditional” and as such, an opportunity to remove what many U.S. policymakers considered 
to be feudal social structures in Japan. As Tetsuya (1992, 17) points out, “the struggle against 
feudalism brought together Marxism and the messianic doctrine of unconditional surrender.”  
The 1955 system70 was a pivotal point in Japan’s political evolution. The year witnessed 
a standoff between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority and the Japan Socialist Party 
(JSP) minority. Both parties had garnered a significant number of the electorate and approached 
rule from opposing ideological standpoints (Tetsuya 1992, 3).  At most, the JSP was “radical, 
orthodox Marxist, anti-American, neutralist, and adamantly opposed to the U.S. military bases in 
Japan and the U.S.-Japan security treaty” (Tetsuya 1992, 3). In contrast, and based on the system 
of Zaikai71
                                                 
70 With MacArthur removed from his role in shepherding Japan political system and  the partial peace coming out of 
the Korean war the political atmosphere in Japan in 1955 was chaotic. See Kataoka (1992, 5-7) 
 the LDP had the support of the business community and clung to the American 
connection as the best mechanism for Japan’s future (Tetsuya 1992, 3). The conservative and 
right leaning LDP attracted other members of Minseito, the third party and conservative in 
policies. In 1955, there was increasing fractionalization among the weaker parties with members 
joining either the LDP or the JSP (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 11).  Indeed, by the 1960s there 
was a solid turn towards a rightist form of government in Japan, which was supported since 1952 
by John Foster Dulles who had replaced the policy of MacArthur (Dower 1999, 250-69).   As 
Tetsuya (1992) points out “in 1952, then Dulles enlisted the State Department to set in motion a 
71 Zaikai in formal feature of the Japanese political system where the corporate business pressure or influence 
political decisions. From the point of view of the business sector, continual turn over in the political situation was 
detrimental to the achievement of economic goals. Hence such uncertainty had to be rectified by any means .See 
(Hrebenar 2000, 96-99).      
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‘psychological program’ to combat Marxism” (Tetsuya 1992, 23).  With the aid of the United 
States influence on the local political process, the LDP was able to create iron triangles, which 
all but ensured their victory for all of the 1960s to 1990s. 
 
Table 7.1 The Liberal Democratic Party: Japanese Prime Ministers in the First and Second Party 
Systems  
 
Prime Minister 
 
Party 
 
Period 
 
First Party System 
  
 
Hatoyama 
 
LPD 
 
12/10/54~ 
Ishibashi LPD 12/23/56~ 
Kishi LPD 2/5/57~ 
Ikeda LPD 7/19/60~ 
Sato LPD 11/9/64~ 
Tanaka LPD 7/7/72~ 
Miki LPD 12/9/74~ 
Fukuda LPD 12/24/76~ 
Ohira LPD 12/7/78~ 
Suzuki LPD 7/17/80~ 
Nakasone LPD 11/27/82~ 
Takeshita LPD 11/6/87~ 
Uno LPD 6/3/89~ 
Kaifu LPD 8/10/89~ 
Miyazawa LPD 11/5/91~ 
   
Second Party System 
 
  
Hosokawa NJP 8/9/93~ 
Hata Shinseito 4/28/94~ 
Murayama JSP 6/30/94~ 
Hashimoto LDP 1/5/96~ 
Obuchi LDP 8/30/98~ 
 Source: Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanac, 1996, p. 58 
 
 
Even during the early 1960s, Japan had already began to spurn opposition to the policies 
of the right leaning governments by groups allied to political organizations on the left. The 
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Senki-ha (Battle Flag Mainstream Faction), for example, was a radical communist faction that 
first represented radical elements in the JSP but ultimately split from the party. For most of its 
early existence (1958-1980), it concentrated on increasing its membership and opposed the 
United States and Japan alliances. However, as would be shown later in this chapter, the group 
gradually became further radicalized, and engaged in attacks on the government and against the 
United States interest. Most of these attack being directed at supporters of the Narita airport 
project undertaken by the United States and Japan (Schmid and Jongman et. al 1988, 595).      
7.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Malapportionment the creation of a single-party democracy 
Immediately following the creation of the 1955 system, almost all meaningful third 
parties disappeared from the Japanese political process. Illustrative of this phenomenon was the 
elections of 1958. The election results showed that the LDP and the JSP won 453 of the 455 of 
the seats in the lower house.  The other two seats were shared between the Japan Communist 
Party (JCP) and a minority party. The two party systems lasted another two years until 1960 
when there was another fragmentation of the JSP, which split into the Democratic Socialist Party 
(DSP) and another significant number of members joining the JCP (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Along 
with these parties was the Clean Government Party (CGP), a party created by the Buddhist sect.  
During the 1960s, the Japanese political system was emblematic of a multiparty system.  
Despite the  appearance of multiple political parties by 1972, the LDP, the ruling 
government since 1958, and the opposition JSP controlled over 87.5 of the seats in the lower 
house of the Diet (Hrebenar 2000, 6).  The similar success of both large parties resulted from 
their similar origin and platform. Because conservatives had separated into the two largest 
political parties, the LDP and JSP policies were similar even up to the 1970s. Invariably, the two 
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parties were also equally influenced by the Zakai system and were closer to the center than many 
of the political parties that were created in the 1960s and the 1970s.    
 Continuing from the 1950s until the early 1990s, the LDP dominated the political 
process.  In part, this dominance was due to several constitutional amendments that almost 
guaranteed LDP victories at successive elections. As the mid-1970s approached, many citizens 
within the LDP began to view Japan’s political system with some concern. While the LDP and 
their main rival had controlled 81.5 percent of the seats in the lower house of the Diet, this figure 
was well below the 99.5 percent of the seats the two main parties had controlled after the 1958 
elections (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Part of the LDP reducing majority was credited to the party 
consistently denying broad scale welfare or environmental changes, which many of the 
electorate, especially in the urban areas, had demanded (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 31).   
However, most responsible for this degrading of the LDP percentage of the seats in the Diet was 
the issue of fragmentation of political parties. Fragmentation largely occurred when dissatisfied 
remembers of larger parties left and created powerful third parties (Hrebenar 2000, 6; Kabashima 
and Steel 2010, 38). In addition, there was a decline in the rural population which was the LDP‘s 
“natural” constituency as many farmers migrated to urban centers in the mid 1970s (Kabashima 
and Steel 2010, 31). To address this growing concern, influential figures that made up the Zakai 
system helped to push along several constitutional changes that helped change the political 
dynamics in Japan. 
Despite the marginal reduction in the LDP seats in the Diet, opposition far left parties 
such as the JCP did not capitalize much on LDP ‘s relative loss in popularity. While they went 
from 1 seat to 14 in 1969, this was much below the number of seats captured by other new 
parties appearing on the right and slightly left of center (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Many of the more 
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radical members of the JCP saw this less than stellar performance as a clear indication that robust 
measures needed to be taken. To this end, in early September 1969, several of the JCP radical 
members revived an earlier approach that the communist party had used following the creation of 
the 1955 system. The creation of the  Association of Revolutionary Workers Council 
(Kakurokyo-Ha) was seen by its members as a direct challenge to the government and a rejection 
of many of the LDP economic, foreign, and social policies such as the LDP frequent indifference 
to criticize the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Schmid et.al 2010).  While the group only made 
violent threats in the 1970s, it was only later in the 1980s and 1990s did the group carry out 
attacks.  The increasing belligerent rhetoric by the group was symptomatic of the level of 
frustration from the left direct at the LDP government.   
Two important innovations were advanced in late 1975, which created enormous changes 
in the political system of Japan and at the time strengthened the political opportunity of the LDP 
to maintain its grip on power.  The first of these laws passed was the Public Offices Election 
Law.  In advancing the law, the stated purpose was given as:  
To establish an electoral system […] based on the spirit of the Japanese constitution, to 
ensure that these elections are conducted fairly and properly according to the freely 
expressed will of the electors, and thus aim at the healthy growth of democratic politics” 
(Tokyo Ministry of  Home Affairs).  In practice, what the law did was to establish a 
complex and advantageous system for the LDP by creating “multimember/single-vote 
election districts and the national PR district for the House of Councilors (HC)” 
(Kabashima and Steel 2010, 38). As Kabashima and Steel (2010) point out, the law had 
two major features that benefitted the LDP. First was an “unworkable reapportionment 
provision” and second was a series of a comprehensive and stringent set of campaign 
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restrictions “both of which operated to preserve LDP majorities in the Diet” Kabashima 
and Steel 2010, 38).  In general, the usual political outcome of single-member, single-
ballot system has been a tendency to reward dominant political parties with many seats 
“in excess of their vote percentages (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 39).   
 
In general, these modifications of the election system created massive 
disenfranchisement. This was especially true after 1986 when a very high threshold was placed 
on votes as part of the requirement under the PR system for parties to gain seats in the Diet 
(Kabashima and Steel 2010, 46).   
Following the 1976 law, the LDP succeeded in passing another major electoral bill 
through the Diet (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 48). The law stipulated that beginning with the 
1983 elections “100 constituency seats of the HC were—and continue to be—elected under the 
PR system” (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 48).  Under the new PR system the electorate was 
required to cast its votes for the parties, hence, candidates running as independents were forced 
to join party slate to have a place on the ballot (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 49).  These measures 
served once more to reduce the ability of nonaligned or independent candidates from entering the 
political fore.  
 Interestingly, following the passing of the 1976 act, a leftist communist group calling 
itself Commune Minkamo72
                                                 
72 The Commune Mikoamo has never been  conclusively tied to the Communist Party.  
 carried out a bomb attack in March of that year killing two people 
and injuring 95 others. As part of its reason for the explosions was what it called the 
“discrimination and the oppression of political groups;” the group also expressed its desire to 
replace the entire ruling political order (Schmid and Jongman et. al 1988, 595). In general, there 
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was a belief by some radical leftist organizations that the establishment in Japan as it was in the 
other cases could not be removed without violent uprising.        
Despite growing resentment by parties on the left, the ruling LDP continued to benefit 
from enormous monetary aid from the corporate sector. As Blechinger (2000) points out, the 
LDP had been able to benefit from massive inputs from the corporate sector since 1958. He 
suggests that:  
LDP Diet members founded their own private fundraising organizations in which 
companies that decided to "sponsor" a particular politician could become members. 
Monthly 
membership fees ranged between 5,000 and 20,000 yen on average, but could rise as 
high as 50,000 yen (Hirose 1993, 66). Since the Political Funds Control Law (Seiji 
Shikin Kiseihô) obliged Diet members to make public all donations over 1 million 
yen, but did not limit the number of fundraising organizations that one politician could 
found, companies often resolved to split their contributions into several smaller 
amounts that were paid to different fundraising organizations. Thus, neither the 
amounts received by a certain politician nor the names of the donors had to be made 
public […] The Far Eastern Economic Review (9 March 1989, 19), for example, quotes a 
young Diet member who was supported by about 300 companies that paid him 32 million 
yen per year. Former Prime Minister Takeshita, in contrast, could rely on a support 
network that included about 4,000 firms (Iwai 1992, 82). Problems arose from the 
combination of severe competition with other politicians from the same party within 
electoral districts on the one hand, and the high expectations for costly constituency 
among voters on the other hand (Blechinger 2000, 2). 
 140 
 
 In general, while other parties did receive some assistance from outside their party 
organization, the LDP remained one of the biggest recipients of corporate sponsorship. It was not 
until the mounting cost of campaigning that the LDP agreed to a PR system. The LDP efforts to 
reduce overall campaign spending brought some immediate successes for parties on the left. In 
particular, there was greater distribution of votes in the 1983 elections, an election which the 
LDP lost support and following which it sought to change the system in its favor again in 1993 
and rid the political process of controls on campaign spending (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 49).  
In addition to using fiscal and constitutional barriers to reduce opposition on the left, the 
LDP government also engaged in labor union smashing as a way of destroying political parties 
on the left. In 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro took steps towards the deregulating 
several government agencies, “cutting up, abolishing, and privatizing a host of government 
bureaucracies. The demolition of the Japan National Railway decimated the railway workers’ 
union, which had been the backbone of Sohyo, a labor federation that had in turn propped up the 
JSP” (Katakoa 1992, 15).   
7.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology Constitutional Barriers and Radicalization    
The political and economic policies coming out of decades of rule under successive LDP 
governments created more than resentment towards the LDP by many political parties and 
dissatisfied members of the electorate. It eventually contributed to an environment where some 
political organizations believed it was impossible to gain political power by the ballot once the 
LDP was in office. 
  As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, a major feature of rightwing governments is 
their support for capitalism, discouragement of popular participation in politics, support for 
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elites, the exclusion of the working class groups or groups favoring greater equality (Pinkney 
1990, 14).  In the case of the Aum Shinrikyo and their more radical followers, the Japanese 
government and by extension its various bureaucratic arms and supporters were culpable in 
denying their political organization political opportunity.  Unlike most political organization 
covered in this dissertation, the Aum is unique for merging militant religion with political 
advocacy. The group after failing at elections used its religious mysticism or Cult following as 
part of the process to organized political motivated violence. 
For the most part, Japanese religious attitudes and persuasions have not historically had 
an appreciable influence on domestic politics in the state (Ward 1967, 39; Hrebenar 2000, 17).  
Historically, the Komieto Party had been one of the few relatively successful political left 
leaning but also religiously73
As a rule, the party fashioned itself as a “watchdog” of government that focuses on 
excesses committed by Japanese politicians, especially corruption by leaders in the LDP and JCP 
(Hrebenar 2000, 201). Inevitably, because of its stance towards the LDP in the 1990s, the party 
came under pressure to reduce it criticism of the LDP. Powerful members of the LDP had hinted 
their desire to kill the 1951 Religious Corporations Law, which was essential for the legal status 
of raising funds for the party. This law granted very broad freedoms from official regulations for 
the 183/970 registered religious organizations in Japan (Hrebenar 2000, 199).  In October of 
 inspired parties to consistently seat its candidates in the Japanese 
Diet. The Koneito Party occupies a sensitive role because it takes a centrist position on a range of 
social and political issues (Hrebenar 2000, 201). Importantly, the party functions as a “bridge” 
between the two socialist parties, the JSP and the DSP, as well on various occasions working 
along with the LDP on a range of policies (Hrebenar 2000, 201).   
                                                 
73 Komeito has a heavy Buddhist influence. See Kabashima and Steel (2010, 50) 
 142 
1999, the Komeito Party, under some pressure from LDP members, joined their old opponents to 
form a three party government headed by the LDP. Despite earlier pledges to “never to support 
the LDP,” the significant power wielded by the LDP at all levels of the political process proved 
to be too much for many members of the once rival Komeito Party.   
 However, not all religious or leftist leaning groups were eager to join or work with the 
LDP.  From the mid-1980s to the early1990s, several groups with religious and ethnic 
motivations began to agitate their demands in political forums. Among the most vociferous of 
these groups was the Aum Shinrikyo.  The Aum was created in 1987 by Shoko Ashara, a 
mystical figure, who as a youth boasted that he would one day became prime minster of Japan 
(Poolos 2003, 11-15).  Throughout the late 1980s, the Aum operated as a religious organizations 
or as some observers have characterized the organization—a cult. At the core of the groups’ 
beliefs were ideas of Buddhism and Hinduism (Metraux 1995, 1140).  The group’s leader and 
founder—Shoko Ashara: 
“Developed a spiritual message based on attainment of total consciousness […] this total 
enlightenment [is alleged to have] enabled him to have a series of visions. Most of these 
revelations were benign and involved ways that he could help others attain total enlightenment. 
However, some of the visions [especially after 1990] had other meanings. Ashara’s other visions 
were a series of apocalyptic revelations that convinced him he would lead God’s arm to victory” 
(Clinehens 2000, 4).  
In recruiting new members to the movement, the Aum targeted mostly well-educated and 
high skilled but disenchanted individuals to the organization. The recruits were drawn from 
many top universities from areas such as medicine, biology, chemistry, physics, electronic 
engineering, and law (Poolos 2003 14; Kang 1995, 222). In most respects, the group, apart from 
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conducting public meditation practices and sometimes off remarks by the leader, the 
organization went largely unnoticed. As Metraux (1995, 1142) notes, “Initially, its refusal to 
compromise with mainstream societal values was passive but after 1990 it became an active 
oppositionist sect.”  In most respects, the radicalization of the Aum coincided with the group’s 
failure at electing any of its members to the Diet in 1990.  Importantly, unlike the complete 
religious movement that is often portrayed by some scholars when discussion Aum, the Aum 
brain trusts considered themselves as:  
Elite intellectuals, revolutionaries dissatisfied with the stiffly stable world they saw 
around them. They were political technocrats, tired of a fat, lukewarm society. Possessed of 
hypertrophied imaginations, they were convinced they could change people and build a perfect 
state (Tetsuya 1995, 11). 
 
 The Aum leaders in some respects illustrated many of the familiar traits of the leftist 
groups discussed in the previous case studies. From their perspectives, the prevailing political 
system appeared to be at the source of many of the problems they saw in Japan in the late 1980s 
to early 1990s. Hence, they believed only a different ideology and approach could fix all that 
ailed society. 
For members to the Diet in the 1990 elections the Aum ran for 25 seats. Ashara 
envisioned the election as an opportunity to change society as well as offering his organization 
an opportunity for legitimacy and to gain in foothold in a critical arm of the country’s highest 
decision-making body (Cameron 1999, 279).   
Heavily funded by corporate interest, the 1990 elections was one where the LDP 
candidates spent exorbitant amount on their campaigns. Indeed, despite earlier legislation to 
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curtail out of control campaign spending, the LDP and a few other mainstream political parties 
found ways to circumvent such rules.  As Blechinger (2000), report points out about the trend in 
Japanese elections: 
 During the legally prescribed campaign period of about two weeks, candidates could 
legally only spend a limited amount of money, depending on the number of registered 
votes per seat and the total voter population of the electoral district. In the 1990 Lower 
House elections, for example, the maximum legal spending was set at about 16 million 
yen on average.1 In reality, however, LDP candidates in national elections in the 1980s 
and early 1990s exceeded the legal limit by at least six times and as much as by thirteen 
times (Report on Recent Bribery Scandals, 1996-2000). 
 
In comparison to the LDP, the Aum was poorly funded and the districts in which its 
members campaigned were largely contested by well-funded LDP candidates. While the 
organization did have significant access to funds mostly contributed by its members, as a 
political organization this was minuscule compared to the LDP.   
Almost immediately after the public humiliation of losing the 1990 elections, the Aum 
began planning to utilize violence as its newest means of getting their political and religious 
message heard.  Metraux (1995, 1152) suggests that after the 1990 elections, Asahara began 
declaring the arrival of a “massive war between the West, led by the United States, and the 
‘Buddhist world’ led by Asia. The combatants would use nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological 
weapons […] Aum developed these predictions only after 1990 […] after the 1990 national 
parliamentary elections.” The decision to turn to violence was aimed towards ridding system of 
the corruption and evil that the group saw had crept into Japanese political system. As Kang 
 145 
(2009, 221) points out ultimately “the 1995 attack was the solution against inner and outer 
opposition. After the failure in the election, the cult was exposed to society, and the majority of 
the public saw the cult as strange form of a religious belief.”  Simply stated, it was Asahara’s 
party failure to win an election that catalyzed the violence of the Aum Shinrikyo (Kang 2009; 
Cameron 2002; Olson 1999).  
In years preceding the 1990 elections, the Aum gradually escalated its level of violence. 
The Aum’s defeat at the hands of the government illustrated to its leaders that power could not 
be gained by the ballot but only “through a violent confrontation with the government” (Metraux 
1995, 1153). The radical leaders of the Aum not only blamed the prevailing system but the 
Japanese people for following the policies of the government (Metraux 1995, 1153).  Indeed, the 
internal dynamic of the Aum also changed. The Aum Shinrikyo organized itself “like a para-state 
with a whole complement of ministers. Its leaders had official-sounding titles such as the 
Minister of Education, Minister of Health and Human services, and so on” (Metraux 1995, 
1153).  The group also maintained internal discipline by killing members or former members 
who criticized the groups such was the fate that befell Kiyoshi Kariya (Poolos 2003, 30). The 
Aum’s first attack was geared towards killing of the members of the Diet. The plan was to use 
boutlinus toxin and for members to “drive in circles around the Diet building in a modified truck 
and spray the toxin in the air” (Clinehens 2000, 11). Unfortunately, for the group, the delivery 
system failed and the biotoxin was rendered ineffective (Clinehens 2000, 11). A second attempt 
to use biological agents to kill guests at the royal wedding of Prince Naruhito also failed. Several 
other attempts failed before the group’s use of Sarin to kill three judges in late 1994 instead resulted 
in the deaths of seven persons and over two hundred injured (Poolos 2003, 30). Months later on 
March the 20th 1995, the Aum attacked a busy Tokyo subway hoping to kill thousands and bring 
on Armageddon that would lead a removal of the political order. Despite 12 patches of Sarin 
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pouches being released during rush hour on the crowded subway, the death toll was 12 and 5,000 
treated for injuries. Owing to the crude delivery mechanism of punching bags carrying the 
substance, more people were able to survive, as the Sarin did not fill the subway cars (Poolos 
2003, 37-39).    
While the leader of the Aum, Asahara, was not found complicit in the attacks, as other 
members claim responsibility, the Aum’s attacks illustrates another clear incident of a political 
organization attacking the government out of what it believes is a denial of access to the political 
process. While the Aum had varied causes for the attack on the government, what is evident is 
that they had a clear ideological opposing view to those of the Japanese government, a 
government that was run under the LDP and one that was clearly rightist in its policies. From 
1955 to the mid-1990s and without much interruption, the LDP, in concert with corporations and 
its other benefactors was able to ensure that left leaning and other rival ideological parties did not 
gain a majority of seats in the Diet. In reality, such one party rightwing rule created deep 
resentment by leftist and some groups that were decidedly religious in their political motivation.  
For there to have been a more cordial relationship between political groups, the system had to 
change. As Katakoa (1992) points out: 
The principle Diet supremacy will remain shackled until political parties begin to 
alternate in power. As long as the LDP, still made up of a substantial number of 
bureaucratic politicians, retains power, the bureaucracies will be kept on a long leash. If 
however, their political masters were to change periodically, the bureaucracies would be 
forced to retreat to strict neutrality. That last mile towards Diet supremacy has yet to be 
traveled (Katakoa 1992, 15).      
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Figure 7.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Japan 
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In sum, unlike the other positive cases in this dissertation, Japan does not exhibit any of 
the usual types of military or governmental physical repression associated with the other cases. 
Indeed, according to Amnesty International and the United States Department of State Japan 
exhibits positive traits in regards to civil liberties. However, as is evident in Figure 7.1, the 
LDOP right leaning government’s policies were directed in unfair and in some cases illegal 
ways74
 
 to significantly block parties on the left from access to the political process. Over the 
course of its 40 year rule, the LDP continually passed legislation to break-up leftist supported 
workers unions, reintroduce legislations to eliminate spending on elections, and pressured 
smaller political parties to join their party under threats of removing legislation aimed to protect 
such parties.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 As the Blechinger 2000 report shows significant members of the LDP were found guilty of engaging in bribery 
and other illegal acts aimed at maintaining their position in office. See Blechinger 2000   
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CHAPTER 8 - Costa Rica 
A search of all terrorism databases illustrates that there has been no recent acts of 
terrorism in Costa Rica. This country is in contrast to the other cases presented in this 
dissertation. Unlike many of its neighbors in Latin America, Costa Rica has not experienced 
almost constant and bloody civil strife75
While in regards to acts of terror Costa Rica provides a clear contrast, the state in many 
other ways does not differ greatly from its neighbors in terms of its colonial past, religion, 
language, electoral system, wealth distribution, and ethnic demographics.
 as is the case with Nicaragua and `Guatemala (Carey 
1997; Palmer and Molina 2004; Kelly 1998; Wilson 1998).  As a credit to its leader’s foresight, 
the ruling elite especially after 1948 took steps to reduce growing internal divisions that may 
have resulted in the type of political party sponsored terrorism present in many of Costa Rica’s 
neighbors. Importantly, the state  adopted an economic model that balanced socialist policies 
with Western capitalism. In doing so, the citizens of Costa Rica have not experienced the 
extremes of wealth and poverty akin to the country’s neighboring states (National Democratic 
Institute For International Affairs 1990). More importantly, while the state like so many in the 
Latin American region did experience a few incidents of terrorism, none of these acts of terror 
has been tied to political parties. Moreover, a thorough examination of the Costa Rican case 
shows that there have been no instances where political parties have created violent wings or a 
group representing political parties to challenge the ruling regime. 
76
                                                 
75 While Costa Rica did have brief civil war over the contentious 1948 elections, such an occurrence is rare in the 
history of the country.   
  Indeed, what is most 
76 While the country has a relative diverse population, ethnic diversity is less than in countries such as Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala.  
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cogent in regards to Costa Rica is the country’s long history of exceptional support for left 
leaning and centrist governments. 
8.1 Background  
The history of Costa Rica like so many other Latin American states evolved out of a 
break with its colonial master, Spain. Founded as one of the four provinces of the Captaincy 
General of Guatemala (along with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras)77
The immediate post-independence years in Costa Rica saw an evolving political system 
with irregular political elections and unstable governments (Stansifer 1998). However, unlike 
many of its neighbors, the first few illiberal ruling regimes did not hold office for a long period. 
The result was an institutionalization of corruption (Wilson 1998; Stansifer 1998). In addition, 
the post 19th century Costa Rica possessed varied potential for volatile social and economic class 
 the  region that 
became Costa Rica did not possess a strategic geographic advantage nor did the country have the 
natural resources such as silver or gold that other countries in the regions such as Mexico 
possessed (Kelly 1998). By the time Costa Rica gained independence in 1821, the state only had 
a total population of 60,000 (Stansifer 1998, 120). Despite much of its early history being in 
relative terms an “economically disadvantaged” country, the leaders of the state exhibited on 
various occasions extraordinary foresight in securing what was in the best interest for all the 
citizens of the state. Hence, when in 1834 the country’s leaders felt uneasy with the direction of 
the Central American Confederation, it was one of the first two members to withdraw from the 
organization (Stansifer 1998).    
                                                 
77 One representative from Spain governed the aforementioned regions that became independent countries. See 
Kelly (1998, 119) for and in-depth discussion.  
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arrangements that could easily have resulted in the kind of civil conflict that plagued Latin 
America during this period. As Bell (1971, 9) suggests: 
In most of her sister states, the middle class of the cities were a mere extension of the 
landowning oligarchy, sharing its values and aspirations and almost invariably allying 
with it against the ‘pretensions’ and aspirations of the lower classes. The Costa Rican 
middle class traditionally has been strong and numerous, and it has possessed a sense of 
identity distinct from the oligarchy toward which it has been antagonistic. 
 
  However, by 1889, Costa Rican democracy made positive strides and during that year 
the country conducted “the first genuinely free elections in Central American history” (Stansifer 
1998, 125). It was not until 1917 that Costa Rica experienced a reversal in its march towards 
becoming a mature democracy. Unlike the other cases in this study, almost immediately the 
ruling regimes following the 1889 elections instituted a range of social programs aimed to 
develop all social classes and facets of society (Bell 1971). Under the Liberal Party President 
José Joaquín Rodríguez Zeledón, the Costa Rican state benefitted from a range of social and 
economic policies aimed at creating some equality among the classes (Wilson 1998). However, 
from 1910 to 1917 and under the rule of consecutive leftist leaning National Republican Party 
(PLN), governments introduced various social programs aimed at helping the lower classes. 
While the middle and lower classes embraced these programs, the elites did not favor them as 
they included raising salaries and improving benefits for  plantation workers. In response, elites 
helped engineer the 1917 coup that ended Gonzales Flores administration (Wilson 1998, 23).  
Similarly, when elites supported candidates, such as Presidents Rafael Calderon and Teodoro 
Picado of the PLN, turned their backs on the elites in support of the lower classes, elite outrage 
resulted in the 1948 civil war (Wilson1998).   
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Despite a growing contempt for left leaning political parties by many among the élites in 
the pre-1948 era, no far left political party was officially denied access to the political process. 
As Table 8.1 shows, there was an enduring legacy of Costa Rica as being a “Liberal Republic” as 
the country elected several left of center and centrist governments. Under centrist and left 
leaning governments, especially after 1948, there was a continual legacy of allowing all ranges 
of political voices to be part of the political process. This reduced the viability of using terrorism 
among members of political parties. Indeed, as would be shown in the following section, leftist 
leaning parties, including communist political parties prospered in the Costa Rican political 
landscape. 
8.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Constitutional Changes and Centrist Governments 
Diverging Responses to Dissent.  
A major impetus to the creation of terrorist groups by political parties is the denial of 
access to other political parties in a polity, in particular, parties operating from left of the 
political spectrum. As was shown with several rightwing governments in the previous chapters, 
because of the ideological position of most solidly rightwing governments, they often seek by 
various means to ban or curtail the political access of political parties on the left and in some 
cases, the center and those at the religious spectrum. In contrast to these approaches, and as was 
shown in the quantitative section, ruling regimes of the center and left leaning such as Costa Rica  
generally maintain a policy of openness towards a range of political parties.  
In general, while there are several prevailing theories, which attempt to explain Costa 
Rica’s relative peace, no study thus far, provides an ample explanation for why that state has not 
experienced terrorism from political parties. Among the theories used to explain Costa Rica 
relative absence of civil strive vis-à-vis its neighbors, is the more frequently presented “rural 
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democracy” thesis. The rural democracy thesis contends that the peaceful nature of Costa Rica’s 
contemporary democracy is a direct result of the colonial experience, which forms the social and 
political foundations that aided the stability of later democracy (Wilson 1998, 11).  According 
Wilson (1998, 11), a major assertion of the rural democracy thesis is  that  due to the failure to 
find significant precious metals and an absence of a significant indigenous population, Spanish 
conquistador elites in Costa Rica were prevented from replicating the social and economic 
cleavages prevalent elsewhere in Latin America. While the above argument seems plausible, as 
number of scholars correctly and convincingly found in their various works, the thesis has many 
incongruent arguments (Fonseca 1984; Gudmundson 1986; Wilson 1998; Seligson 1980). In 
particular, even though the country was colonized relatively late, it was also relatively isolated, 
and had low numbers of native Indians. Thus, the social and political structure of Costa Rica was 
never “egalitarian but complex and highly structured” (Wilson 1998, 12).  
Although the rural democracy theory may offer some keys towards a better understanding 
of some types of civil strife, it does not explain the absence of terrorism by political parties. As 
this dissertation has shown in the previous country cases and quantitative section, the political 
ideology of the ruling regime does provide answers to why some polities seem to witness higher 
incidences of political parties using terrorism.  
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Table 8.1 Election Results, 1948-1998 Costa Rica 
Year  Candidates  Party  Vote 
(thousand)  
Percentage  
Of Vote 
Turnout 
as % of 
Populace 
1948 Otilio Ulate B. 
R.A Calderon G. 
Other  
Union Nacional 
Republican Nacional  
55 
45 
3 
54 
44 
2 
12.4 
1953 Jose Figueres F. 
Fernado Castro C.  
Liberacion Nacional 
Democratico  
123 
67 
65 
35 
21.0 
 
1958 Mario Echandi J. 
Francisco Orlich 
B. Jorge Rossi Ch.  
Union Nacional 
Liberacion Nacional 
Independiente  
103 
95 
24 
46 
43 
11 
19.8 
1962 Francisco Orlich 
B. R.A. Calderon 
G. Otilio Ulate B. 
Other 
Liberacion Nacional 
Republicano  
Union Nacional  
193 
136 
52 
3 
50 
35 
14 
1 
29.7 
1966 Jose J. Trejos F. 
Daniel Oduber Q.  
Unificacion Nacional 
Liberacion Nacional  
223 
219 
51 
49 
29.4 
1970 Jose Figueres F. 
Mario Echandi J. 
Others  
Liberacion Nacional 
Unificacion Nacional 
296 
222 
17 
55 
41 
4 
31.6 
1974 Daniel Oduber Q. 
Fernando Trejos E. 
Jorge Gonzalez 
Rodrigo Carazo O. 
Others  
Liberacion Nacional 
Unificacion Nacional 
Nacional Independiente 
Renovacion 
Democratica  
295 
206 
74 
62 
41 
43 
30 
11 
9 
7 
34.0 
1978 Rodrigo Carazo O.  
Luis A. Monge A. 
Others 
Unidad 
Liberacion Nacional 
419 
363 
49 
50 
44 
6 
39.5 
1982 Luis A. Monge A. 
R.A Calderon F. 
Others 
Liberacion Nacional 
Unidad 
 
568 
325 
72 
59 
34 
7 
42.5 
1986 Oscar Arias S. 
R.A. Calderon F.  
Others 
Liberacion Nacional 
Unidad Social Cristiana 
 
620 
542 
22 
52 
46 
2 
46.8 
1990 R.A. Calderon F.  
C.M. Castillo 
Others 
Unidad Social Cristiana 
Liberacion Nacional  
 
695 
637 
17 
51 
47 
2 
46.2 
1994 J.M. Figueres O. 
M.A. Rodriguez E. 
M. Salguero 
Others 
Liberacion Nacional 
Unidad Social Cristiana 
Fuerza Democratica  
739 
711 
28 
14 
50 
48 
2 
1 
45.9 
1998 J.M.Corrales B. 
M.A. Rodriguez E. 
Others 
Liberacion Nacional 
Unidad Social Cristiana 
 
655 
685 
116 
45 
47 
 
39.7 
 SOURCE: Booth (1999) “Representative Constitutional Democracy.” 
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As shown in Figure 8.1 the ruling regimes in Costa Rica since 1948 have been 
predominately centrist or left leaning therefore this case does not provide any instance of terror 
groups being formed by political parties. In many ways, the post-1948 decisions by elites in 
Costa Rica staved off what might have ultimately been a critical juncture marked by terrorism by 
political parties.  Instead, as this section shows, because of the left of center and more 
importantly centrist ideology promoted by ruling elites,  political parties across the political 
spectrum found few reasons post-1948 to create terrorist organizations.   
Simply stated, left leaning and centrist governments in Costa Rica have promoted 
conciliation and cooperation (Wilson 1998; Bell 1991; Diamond et.al 1999). As was detailed in 
the previous sections, the pre-1948 period in Costa Rica while relatively stable when compared 
to other regional states’ domestic political climate, was still not a shining example of liberal 
democracy. In at least two junctures since the pivotal 1889 elections (1917 and 1948), 
democracy and peace was interrupted with support from the wealthy coffee  aristocrats, the 
traditional enemy of redistributive reforms (Booth 1999).  Hence, in an effort to forestall future 
breakdowns of the political order following the 1948 civil war, policymakers and politicians took 
two important steps that were critical to understanding the peaceful nature of Costa Rican 
politics.  First, the decision was made to amend the constitution and second, political parties 
moved closer to the center.78
The 1948 civil war led to a range of changes to the Costa Rican constitution that ensured 
it was the most liberal democracy in Latin America (Booth 1999). Despite efforts by coffee 
aristocracy and other conservative elements to block changes by the social democrats and thus 
preserve the 1871 constitution, the pro-liberal legislators through the 1949 constitution 
   
                                                 
78 As Bell (1971, 12-17) notes, immediately before the 1948 civil war there was pressure from the elites to move 
several traditionally left leaning political parties towards the rightist ideology that favored the wealthy landowners.    
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implemented several important changes.  Among these were to strengthen “the independent 
judiciary, fortify the electoral branch of government (the National Electoral Tribunal became the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunnal), weaken the executive, provide for proportional representation, 
and limited the terms of both presidents and legislators” (Stanifer 1998, 127). Other changes 
included the decentralization of political power and increasing participation of regional 
administrators. Such steps were a major accomplishment in a region where centralization has 
such deep roots.  By granting greater power to municipal government and by encouraging the 
establishment of autonomous agencies, regional parties believed that they could actively 
participate in the political process (Stanifer 1998, 127).  
The Costa Rican 1949 constitution differed in many respects to those enacted by 
rightwing governments in the other cases. For example, the Conservative and Liberal party in the 
Colombian case cooperated in creating legislation aimed at increasing their control of the 
political system. In contrast to Costa Rica, the ruling parties in Colombia had enacted laws aimed 
at complete centralization of the state and reduction of political participation by other political 
parties. Such measures ensured that Colombia had a monopoly on access to higher office. In 
general such features were absent from the Costa Rican political system post-1948.   
The second important change that occurred in Costa Rica and one that is cogent to the 
central argument of this dissertation was the conscious effort made by various political parties to 
move towards the center. As Stanifer (1998, 127) points out, “shocked by the temporary 
breakdown of order Costa Rican leaders gravitated to the political center and worked together to 
produce a document that they hoped would prevent future breakdown.”  Thus, consecutive Costa 
Rican governments made efforts to distance themselves from conventional right leaning 
programs and policies. In practice, as seen in Table 8.1, the electorate most often elected centrist 
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and liberal minded governments. Unlike many of its neighbors, conservative institutions such as 
Catholic Church in Costa Rica were forced to reform and accept the supremacy of the state. Even 
before the 1949 constitution, liberal governments pressured the church to reform many of its 
more conservative policies, such as historical demands by the church to have a powerful 
influential role in the state. As Williams (1989, 3) points out “the move towards a reformist 
model occurred much earlier and paralleled the Church’s collaboration with the Calderon 
Guardia government in the implementation of a series of reform.”  In general, there was 
relatively minimal friction between the Church and the state owing to the politically moderate 
governments generally allowed the Church some level of passive “collaboration vis-à-vis the 
regime” (Williams 1989, 4).   
The Costa Rican government granted significant liberty to the Costa Rican Communist 
Party (Bell 1971, 9-11). This is further evidence of the difference in left and centrist political 
policies from those of the right in creating harmonious political dialogue. Despite significant 
pressure from the United States government for limits to be placed on the Costa Rican 
Communist Party, the Costa Rican government granted unprecedented access to the communists 
to participate in politics (Palmer and Molina 2004).  In the mid to late 1940s, the communist 
movement, as it was in many areas of the international system, began to be presented to many 
poor and lower economic classes as an alternative to western style capitalism. In Costa Rica, 
especially in the rural districts where foreign American companies such as the United Fruit 
Company operated large banana farms, there was massive exploitation of the poor and 
uneducated class (Bell 1971, 24-27). Communist movements, similar to those in nearby 
Nicaragua, encouraged the lower and even some lower middle class citizens to challenge the 
government to create social programs (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs 
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1990, 27).  As illustrative of the attitude of accommodation by regimes in Costa Rica towards 
communist movements, a frustrated and angry representative of the United Fruit Company 
approached agents from the United States Secretary of State about the issue of communist 
inspired strikes. As the memo to the Secretary of State showed, the United Fruit Company tried 
to get the United States intervene in Costa Rica by raising claims of communist diffusion:  
Don’t you think that if a Communist Government would be established in Costa Rica 
that it would be very dangerous for President Ubico in Guatemala, who has succeeded 
heretofore in stamping out Communism in that country before it could get a start; for 
President Martinez in El Salvador who stopped Communism at a loss of three thousand 
lives; for President Carias in Honduras and for old man Sacasa in Nicaragua? Do you 
think it is possible to get word to them through your American Ministers in those 
countries and from you to their representatives (of other Central American countries) in 
San Jose to point out to them the grave danger which exists here and which would affect 
them if carried to its present conclusion in order that they might bring pressure upon 
President Jimenez to let him know that the Governments in these countries are watching 
the situation in Costa Rica with much concern  (U.S. Department of State, 1944).  
 
  Unlike in Colombia, the Calderon Guardia government, as did many of its successors, 
responded to demands by the Communist Party and its supporters not by banning the Communist 
Party but instead sponsoring:  
Comprehensive programs that included, among others, the Law for New Industries to 
encourage diversification of the economy; the creation of the Social Security System and 
the enactment of the Labor Code; the pragmatic Land Law, the so called Law of 
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Parasites, which allowed the landless to acquire title to land on the promise of cultivating 
it; and the simple but effective program of distributing free shoes to needy children in the 
first grade to protect their feet against parasites and to help abate the feelings of 
inferiority produced by the lack of such a basic item  (National Democratic Institute For 
International Affairs. 1990, 29).   
 
Under the leadership of Manuel Mora, the Communist Party candidates were frequently 
elected to the country’s parliament. For many communists, despite preferring a different 
economic model there was no need to challenge violently the state through arm conflict.79
As Figure 8.1 shows, the access granted to opposing political organization in Costa Rica 
enabled almost all political organizations in the state to believe that they had a legitimate 
opportunity to vie for higher office.  Hence, the chances of political parties turning to terror was 
significantly reduced in that polity. 
 
Mora’s position was simple “violent revolution was not necessary or called for in Costa Rica, 
because the Communists participated in the democratic institutions of the nation and thus impel a 
peaceful transformation of systems and institutions” (Bell 1971, 24-27).  For the ruling regimes, 
especially post-1949, liberal policies of dialogue over authoritarian policies helped ensure that 
the political atmosphere in Costa Rica did not become closed so as to precipitate violence as it 
had occurred in many of Costa Rica’s neighbors.  Palmer and Molina (2004, 5) point out that one 
of the important liberal traits of consecutive Costa Rican governments has been to “resolve 
conflict by channeling it in a legal and institutionalized fashion.”  
                                                 
79 The only exception here was the 1949 civil war when leaders of the coup who had taken control of government 
sought to rid the state of the communist, which was met with resistance from the party. See Bell (1971, 50-53). the 
state under the direction 
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Figure 8.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Costa Rica 
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Table 8.2 Structured Focused Comparison of Cases Between 1960-2006 
Variable  Colombia Turkey Japan Costa Rica 
Majdemoc No No Yes No 
Proportional rep Yes Yes No Yes 
Left wing gov’t No Yes No Yes 
Centrist gov’t Yes No No Yes 
Right wing gov’t Yes Yes Yes No 
Religious gov’t No No No No 
External conflict Yes Yes No No 
Political repression  Yes Yes No No 
Political party/terror groups Yes Yes Yes No 
 Three party coalition gov’t No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Thus, the absence of terrorism in the state along the lines of political party provides a clear 
indication of the role centrist and left of center ideology play in reducing terrorism by political 
organizations.  It seem, Costa Rica represents one of many cases where countries that have 
adopted leftist or more often centrist ideology as a medium of rule.  
As the structured focused comparison presented in Table 8.2 shows a centrist ideology more 
often than rightist ideology create harmonious environment where opposition political parties on 
the far left, religious and even right, are less motivated to use violence as a means to achieve 
their political aims.  In fact, as shown in Table 8.2, the only consistent variable which explains 
political parties turn to terror is the existence of rightwing governments. While as a point of 
criticism, it can be argued that Costa Rica possesses various other factors that allow for peaceful 
cohabitation of political interest such as a proportional electoral system, a relative peaceful past 
and a thriving economy.  It can also be shown that many of the other cases in this study also on 
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various occasion also possessed one or all of the mediating factors previously mentioned.  
Importantly, what this negative case shows is that an equitable centrist ruling ideology appears to 
be a key factor in polities that do not possesses incidents of political parties creating terrorist 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER 9 - Conclusion 
 
This dissertation was framed around an important yet unanswered question—why do 
political parties turn to terrorism? More importantly, the dissertation sought to ascertain whether 
some types of political ideology by incumbent government creates an environment where 
opposition political parties are more willing to turn to terror. In answering the above question, 
this dissertation contributes to the extant literature in two important ways.  First, this study 
investigated and examined key variables responsible for the process whereby political parties 
form alliances with or create terrorist organizations. Using both quantitative and qualitative 
research deign, this dissertation shows that rightwing governments increase the numbers of 
terrorist organizations created by political parties in a given polity. Second, this dissertation also 
fills an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issues 
and a different theoretical view that was only implied in the conflict literature. In fact, while the 
extant literature argues that institutional constraints, such as electoral systems, are more likely to 
lead political parties to create terrorist organizations, this research provides another explanation 
of the issue. This dissertation shows that regime ideology is also an important factor explaining 
the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties.   
This chapter reflects on the findings of my dissertation, a few methodological problems, 
and examines some areas of promise that it has uncovered. The next section presents the 
theoretical discussion and empirical findings from the quantitative section as well as conclusions 
drawn from the case comparison.  The section that follows focuses on a few weaknesses with the 
research design and provides some suggestions for future refinement. The final section provides 
several applicable policy prescriptions that may emerge from this dissertation.   
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9.1 Findings 
 This dissertation investigated two important theories that could be used to explain why 
political parties turn to terrorism. It does not distinguish between the two, but rather it 
illuminates the importance of an underexplored variable that rests at the intersection between 
structural and rational approaches. As extant literature has shown, the type of electoral political 
system is critical in determining the level of stability in a given polity. Importantly, majoritarian 
systems are more likely to encourage political parties to turn to terrorism than proportional 
representation systems. As this dissertation shows, governing party ideology should be included 
in strategic perspectives as well since it is a crucial component of the structural framework. It is 
within this context that political parties make strategic choices to either stick with traditional 
political practices or turn to violence. Thus, as shown in the quantitative and qualitative sections, 
governing party ideology is another important structural factor because it conditions the type of 
policies the party will implement once in power. In order words, party ideology must be 
considered as an important explanatory variable that helps connect the structural and strategic 
perspectives while simultaneously adding to our understanding of political parties that use 
terrorist tactics.   
  Unlike extant literature that focuses on predominately structural and strategic 
perspectives to explain why political parties turn to terror, this dissertation used a mix 
methodology to provide another unidentified variable that explains why political parties turn to 
terror. In the quantitative chapter, the central hypothesis of this dissertation—regimes  whose 
leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have 
greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes—was 
empirically tested.  Employing several random effect possion models that included samples from 
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31 countries covering 1960 to 2006, the statistical models supported the central hypothesis of the 
study.   The findings showed that even after controlling for the effects of institutional factors, 
regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet govern from a classical ideological right position should 
expect to experience greater numbers of political parties turning to terror than other types of 
regimes.     
    Although the, statistical analysis is excellent in providing macro analysis of conflict 
processes, it does not tell us the causal processes that lead to the development of terrorist 
organization by political parties under rightwing governments. To address this perceived 
shortcoming, this dissertation employed a most different case comparison using three positive 
cases—Colombia, Turkey, and Japan—and one negative case, Costa Rica.  Process tracing 
approach outlined by Slater and Simmons (2010) was used to establish and trace the causal path 
connection from the independent variable to the dependent variable. As was the case with the 
statistical chapter, the qualitative analysis also supports the main hypothesis. In fact, the 
examination of the three positive cases also supports shows a clear causal path linking the 
independent variable to the dependent variable.  Importantly, the negative case Costa Rica which 
can be considered to lie at the fault line of a region with significant terrorist activity by political 
party, provide no evidence of terrorism by any of its domestic political parties. Noteworthy in the 
Costa Rica case, is the consistent rule of centrist and left leaning government, which provides 
open access to all political party in the polity.         
9.1.1 A Few Theoretical and Methodological Weaknesses  
The argument presented in this dissertation provides an additional explanation to when 
political parties turn to terrorism.  In fact, it presents a significant improvement over those of 
Weinberg (1991), and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003), which do not empirically examine any of 
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the theories they advanced about political parties and terrorism. Nevertheless, this dissertation 
has two weaknesses that need to be addressed in future research. The first relates to data 
collection.  A common complaint about terrorism research is that the data are often noisy, which 
invariably raises questions about reliability of findings. Since there was no readily available 
dataset to model the phenomena under investigation, a complete dataset had to be constructed in 
this study.  For much of the aggregate data, multiple existing databases on terrorism were tapped. 
However, in doing so, there were at times problems associated with differentiating groups that 
were named and coded differently across different sources. In addition, in some cases terrorist 
groups date of formation ranged widely across existing sources.  Despite tedious attention to 
reduce coding errors in the dataset80
The second, issue of importance relates to the role of repression. In Danzell (2011), 
repression was found to be not statistically consistent with political parties creating terrorist 
groups. However, in this dissertation, which employed a significantly longer period of study, 
repression was found to be statistically significant. The inconsistency of repression as a predictor 
of terrorism has previously been identified in extant literature (Testas 2004; Bloomberg 2002 and 
Piazza 2006). In this dissertation, repression’s role was found to be significant only when 
additional data from the early 1960s was included.   
, it is possible that in a few cases –mostly in the case of 
Lebanon—the year of terrorist group creation by political parties in this dataset may differ from 
some sources.  
                                                 
80 Process tracing was used to track the formation of groups where there were doubts as it relates to the groups 
formation. 
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9.1.2 Policy Implications  
A solution to the issue of terrorist groups and the direction they move may depend 
heavily on the type of regime they function within. Hence, as Li (2005) suggests, “improving 
citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and political participation […] democratic 
governments can reduce the number of terrorist incidents within its borders.”   Furthermore, the 
more terrorist groups adopt mainstream non-violent methods of agitating their political views, 
the more peaceful would be the international system. It is the contention of this dissertation that 
an adjustment of institutional barriers and the approach of governments towards terrorist 
organizations that show a willingness to be part of the political process could significantly reduce 
the number of terrorist groups. As the case of Costa Rica shows, polities that follow a more 
centrist political ideology are less likely to witness transition of political parties towards violent 
terrorist organization.  
9.1.3 Avenues for Future Research  
Several avenues of research are evident from this dissertation. In particular, rightwing 
ideology variable can be used in other conflict studies that attempt to model the behavior of 
ruling regimes. First, the ideology of a ruling political party that takes office is important in 
understanding why some governments are beholden to certain ethnic and socioeconomic groups 
in a given polity.   
Second, this dissertation provides the only extensive dataset on political parties, which 
create terrorist organization.  Therefore, beyond the main variable—rightwing ideology—the 
dataset can provide researchers with data on the typology of parties that create terror groups, 
regions where political parties create terror groups, as well as how competing political parties 
create terror groups when they function in the same polity.   
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Finally, as the field advances, improved data collection and available databases that 
include more cases may provide alternative answers to the issue examined in this dissertation. To 
date, the dataset used in this research only covers 31 countries over 46 years and does not include 
recent data from the last five years, during which time various analysts have pointed to a 
noticeable increase in parties on the right creating terrorist organizations. 
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